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Abstract 
The model of the citizens' jury is used here to examine whether the promise 
that deliberative democracy can enable transformations of preference among 
citizens is valid. Supporters of the citizens' jury go so far as to claim that it 
can encourage the habit of active citizenship. Deliberation has become 
central to academic work on the future of democracy and much of this work 
alludes to a relationship between deliberation and learning. So far however, 
the learning processes that are seen as central to it have not been fully 
investigated. This thesis explores the impact of participation in a deliberative 
process by presenting a predominantly qualitative analysis ofthe way the 
citizens' jury experience changes participants' preferences. The changes 
experienced by the jurors are presented as a juror journey but not all jurors 
embark on this journey in the same way, nor do they all travel at the same 
pace. Some of those interviewed for this study claim that their journey only 
ended some time after the jury itself came to an end and for some it is clearly 
ongoing. Addressing the juror journey as a learning process highlights the 
changes in the discursive strategies employed by the jurors as they come to 
understand the ethical components of discourse. By dividing the process into 
its constituent parts of thinking, willing and judging the procedural 
requirements of deliberation are highlighted. The results of the fieldwork 
show that the majority of respondents in this study of former citizens' jurors 
develop a heightened sense of efficacy that enables them to assert a sense 
of themselves as citizens. Most describe a new awareness that their actions 
affect others on whose behalf they are deliberating. This now occurs for 
many of them alongside a new sense of trust in others to make decisions on 
their behalf. The research concludes that if practitioners of deliberation want 
to continue to make claims about transformation of preference they need to 
use the principles of discourse ethics to examine the legitimacy of 
deliberative forums that are in use and to make recommendations about how 
to improve their validity in the eyes of the public. 
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1: Introduction 
Introduction 
The problem of political participation is central to contemporary debates 
about the nature of democracy in advanced Western European liberal 
democracies. As a result, the existing democratic process in Great Britain in 
particular has been subject to growing scrutiny and criticism. This scrutiny 
has led to concern that a large portion of the population feel "estranged" 
(Weeks, 2000: 360) from the political system, and this concern underpins 
much of the theoretical work being carried out in political theory in recent 
years. One conclusion that is regularly reached in work of this nature is that 
democracy as it is practised in Great Britain is limited in its ability to inCUlcate 
a sense of civic involvement (Gastil, Oeess and Weiser, 2002: 584). 
10 
This chapter considers the current interest among social and political 
theorists in the problems of voter apathy and disillusion currently facing 
liberal democracy and examines one attempt to tackle these problems. 
Deliberative democrats are making this attempt but, until recently, 
deliberative democracy was seen as a predominantly theoretical exercise. In 
recent years, faced with growth in the popularity of theories like Putnam's 
(1993) social capital, deliberative democrats have been engaged in a search 
for a forum that could represent an application of the principles of deliberative 
democracy. The social capital approach claims that citizens exhibit a 
"pervasive disbelief in the possibility of good in dealing with others" (Berman, 
1997: 105), and as a result the number of trusting relationships that an 
individual forms in a society is in decline (Putnam, 1993). These theories 
reduce citizen estrangement to cynicism and lack of trust and this leads to 
blame being placed on citizens rather than on any structural problems of 
government-citizen relations facing modern representative democracies 
(Berman, 1997: 110). Deliberative democrats take a more positive approach 
to the ability of citizens to act together to make legitimate decisions that all 
affected parties can accept. They understand the phenomenon of civic 
estrangement more in terms of the shift in societal discourses and thus tackle 
it through a theory of social transformation (Strydom, 2002: 3-4). 
I make use of the promise of deliberative democracy as a theory of social 
transformation to understand the potential to uncover a viable alternative to 
liberal democracy. By this I do not mean that the state institutions that 
11 
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manage public services and administer benefits will become defunct, but 
instead I refer to occasions on which a decision about how to proceed must 
be made and there is disagreement about what to do (Warren, 2002: 687). 
According to Goodin (2003: 1), democracy is "a matter of making social 
outcomes systematically responsive to the settled preferences of all affected 
parties". The problem with the current system according to deliberative 
democracy is that the liberal system based on externalised processes of 
voting cannot capture the need for responsiveness and are often seen by the 
public as "sparse" (Warren, 2002: 678). Deliberative democrats attempt to 
replace this version of democracy with one that concentrates on the 
communications occurring between citizens as they argue about the best 
course of action to take on a contested issue. Better communication is seen 
as the key to better decision making and deliberative democrats place their 
faith in deliberation in the belief that "participation in public deliberation 
enhances the autonomy of citizens, promotes open mindedness, and fosters 
democratic values whilst also stabilising the political system and releasing 
tension among dissatisfied segments of society" (Sulkin and Simon, 2001: 
810). 
Lately, the study of deliberative democracy has begun to divide into the ideal 
theoretical approach of Habermas (1996), and the work of Bohman (1996), 
which tries to marry the theory of Habermas with the more pragmatic 
approach of Forester (1996). The pragmatic account of these writers offers a 
theory of deliberation that combines the ideal of Habermas's (1996) all 
12 
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affected parties without appearing to ignore the complexity of modern 
societies. In effect, both Bohman and Forester are seeking to establish a 
form of deliberative democracy that will proceed with a compromise that 
relies on Habermasian (Habermas, 1984) procedures that enhance the 
possibility of "free and open exchange of information and reasons" (Bohman, 
1996b: 16), leading to a situation where the better argument prevails. 
I greet this pragmatism with caution because I agree with Goodin (2003) that 
while it may be attractive to deliberative democrats to compromise on certain 
ideals in order to find a workable model, deliberative democracy is "not really 
being true to its own primary concerns when it is sucked into an exclusive 
focus on the 'politics of the bottom line'" (Goodin, 2003: 11). But in order to 
understand the ideal version of deliberation I make use of the pragmatic 
position on deliberation in this study. I do this by examining the popular 
phenomenon of the citizens' jury. For the most part however the emphasis 
will be on the more theoretical account of deliberation since the object of this 
study is to understand how transformation of preference occurs, if at all. 
Therefore, when I refer throughout this thesis to deliberative democracy I am 
working with Habermas's (1996) ideal type. However, in order to understand 
the ideal I use the microcosm of the citizens' juries to simUlate the ideal. 
Citizens' juries like legal juries are made up of a small sample of the general 
population who, it is hoped, can come to a decision similar to that which 
would have been reached if the whole population were given the opportunity 
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to decide. Citizens' juries bring together a group of more or less self-selecting 
ordinary citizens to listen to submissions, question witnesses and deliberate 
about social problems that are believed to have a variety of solutions. For 
example, a citizens' jury run by the women's unit of the Cabinet Office in 
1998 (White, Lewis and Elam, 1998), on the issue of childcare in families of 
working mothers, called a wide variety of different witnesses. These included: 
a specialist from the family policy studies centre, a panel of mothers, a child 
development expert from the Thomas Coram research unit, a panel of 
children, a spokesperson from the Department of Education and Employment 
(now known as the Department for Education and Skills, DFES), a panel of 
childcare providers and their regulators, a panel of large and small employers 
and finally a panel of financial experts to discuss the Government's funding of 
childcare. By making these different experts available, the citizens' jury 
organisers are attempting to provide citizens with enough information about a 
variety of approaches to the same problem in order that they can make an 
informed choice about which course of action to recommend (White, Lewis 
and Elam, 1998: 1, and see Appendix II). Besides time however, they must 
also be provided with the opportunity to talk about this information. In this 
extract Weeks (2000: 361) captures what is central to the practice of 
deliberation, "information is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for public 
judgement. Judgement requires deliberation. To deliberate is to act on 
information - it is an application of creative intelligence and normative 
evaluation that leads ultimately to the formation of personal judgement." 
14 
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Citizens' juries are now used in a number of countries including Spain, 
Japan, Germany, and Great Britain (Blakeley, 2001; Wakeford, 2002) but I 
concentrate here on juries run in England. Since citizens' juries were first 
used in Great Britain in 1994 they have been seen as having two main 
benefits: firstly as a tool of public policy-making that can lend legitimacy to an 
otherwise hidden process and secondly as a step forward for qualitative 
methodology since they have been used as a form of action research by 
organisations like the think-tank IPPR. The use of citizens' juries in England 
at the moment offers the best available option to operationalise these ideas 
because the main commitment is to making better decisions but their 
underlying aim is to improve the public use of reason (Coote and Lenaghan, 
1997; Delap, 1998). The use of citizens' juries has been promoted by IPPR 
as offering the citizen who takes part "a unique combination of information, 
time, scrutiny, deliberation, and independence" (Coote and Lenaghan, 1997: 
ii). This enthusiasm was also reflected at government level in the UK with 
Professor John Stewart being called before the House of Commons select 
committee on Public Administration in November 1999 to give evidence 
about the benefits of this form of conSUltation (Public Administration 
Committee, 1999). 
But the window of opportunity that was open when I began this study may not 
arise again as the costs involved in running juries are very high and "having 
seen that jury's conclusions often contain criticisms of Government, and are 
often announced very publicly, Whitehall's funding for such experiments has 
15 
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now largely been transferred back to safer, more controllable methods such 
as focus groups" (Wakeford, 2002: 3). But this retreat from the use of the 
citizens' jury does not seem to have been motivated by the usual concerns 
about the validity of the citizens' jury model the design of which is often 
criticised. Critics have pointed to an important flaw in the design of citizens' 
juries that, unlike a legal jury, there is no leave to appeal a seemingly unfair 
outcome, and therefore to offer the opportunity for an ongoing discourse 
(Sanders, 1998; Wakeford, 2002: 3). This design is seen as contradicting the 
very idea of discourse as an ongoing process (Habermas, 1990). 
Organisers of citizens' juries have responded to criticisms about the design of 
juries and the selection processes used to recruit jurors and have formulated 
clear guidelines for best practice that are intended to minimise unfair 
practices. These include the use of steering groups (Coote and Lenaghan, 
1997: 9), the decision to video and transcribe the proceedings and some of 
the juries (lTC, 1998), and the use of stratified sampling (ESB&H, 1997). 
While these interventions do much to create necessary transparency, the 
model itself seems to have been a victim of its own early success in eliciting 
from so-called ordinary people well reasoned arguments. Coote and 
Lenaghan (1997: 3) point out it was assumed that the jurors would inevitably 
agree with the organisers: 
there is a widely held view among decision-makers (italics in original) 
that ordinary members of the public lack the capacity to grasp complex 
issues or to form views of any relevance, that they are too gullible and 
will believe anything they read in the popular press, that their views are 
inevitably shaped by narrow and selfish concerns, and that they are 
generally apathetic and will not take time to consider anything which 
16 
does not affect them directly or personally. 
But when the results of the juries were not in line with what was expected 
their use declined. This suggestion of the cynical use of public deliberation is 
not shared by ordinary people who are less suspicious and are willing to 
accept that "if the jurors have enough information about the matter in hand, 
and if they have the opportunity to discuss the matter amongst themselves, 
they can be trusted to take decisions on behalf of the community, that others 
can safely regard as legitimate and fair" (Coote and Mattinson, 1997: 4). In 
this conclusion, Coote and Mattinson (1997) are supported by the literature 
on legal juries that shows that even where it is claimed that trial by jury is 
inappropriate because of the scientific or technical nature of the evidence, 
problems of understanding (Pennington and Hastie, 1986) have been 
overcome where the manner of presenting the evidence is given careful 
consideration (Edmond and Mercer, 1997). Again, in the case of legal juries 
time would appear to be running out on the opportunity to show whether or 
not this critique of the aptitudes of the public is compatible with the Justice for 
All White Paper (CJS, 2002). This paper advocates the removal of the right to 
trial by jury in cases of complex fraud trials and some other complex and 
lengthy trials on the assumption that the difficulties of comprehension will 
damage the ability to reach a sound decision. 
Citizens' juries obviously represent the implementation of a more pragmatic 
approach to deliberative democracy and Goodin's cautionary note in relation 
to pragmatic deliberative democracy should also be sounded in relation to 
17 
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this model (Goodin, 2003: 5). While I have noted and agree with his caution, I 
still use the work of the pragmatists like Forester (1999) here to examine how 
the expectations placed on deliberation as a decision-making principle are 
upheld in a real situation. Bohman (1996), who attempts to marry the 
theoretical ideal of deliberation with some concessions to the questions 
raised by the pragmatists, proves helpful in this regard. However, I remain 
convinced that trying to accommodate the call for deliberation whilst also 
fulfilling the idea's of representation through the selection of members by 
randomised stratified sampling and so on is a problematic and unnecessary 
concession. Like Goodin I see this as an "unpalatable choice" (2002: 6), but I 
accept the need to apply a representative principle to the juries themselves in 
order to achieve a sense of legitimacy until we can show whether or not 
deliberation can deliver on its promise of preference transformation. This is 
what I am seeking to do in this study. 
The above discussion makes much of highlighting the distinctions between 
deliberative democrats but this is mostly for the purposes of illustration and 
as my reliance on literature from both sides of the divide will show it is not a 
distinction that I adhere to. For the most part, however, when I refer to 
deliberative democrats, my use of the term is theoretical with the more 
pragmatic use of the ideal type being used as a supporting argument. The 
time has come for deliberative democrats to show what difference, if any, 
deliberation could make to the quality of decision making and thus to suggest 
that any progress can be made without new theory building as a result of the 
18 
findings of practical experience would be foolish. In fact, this is what I am 
doing here when I look for evidence of what I call the transformative potential 
of participation in a deliberative process. This means looking for evidence 
that the participants are developing a more discursive approach to problem 
solving as the jury progresses. In effect, what I am looking for is evidence of 
change being created in the talking and discussions of the citizen' jury and I 
use the terms 'change' and 'transformation' to capture the idea of 
empowerment arising out of a dialogical process that can lead to social 
learning. 
Coote and Lenaghan (1997), like many writers on citizens' juries, clearly 
support the idea that citizens' juries offer us an opportunity to learn. They 
support the search to create a trustworthy participatory decision making 
apparatus that can address the problem of a growing "cleavage between two 
social classes: the privileged 'decision makers' and the 'administn§es'" 
(Dienel, 1989). This is the prevailing problem of the role of elites in discourse 
(Zaller, 1992), and while the search for a solution that incorporates an idea of 
social learning is underway it is flawed because of the dependence on elites 
that it creates and sustains. The current British Government promotes a 
project of lifelong learning as the solution to a perceived crisis of citizenship 
(Commission on Citizenship, 1990). This learning is more akin to education 
and while it can be useful in creating social and personal change for the 
participants it cannot outstrip the ability of social learning to "foster[ing] a 
political culture in which citizens actively participate in public debate and 
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consciously adopt the discursive attitudes of responsibility, self-discipline, 
respect, cooperation, and productive struggle necessary to produce 
consensual agreements" (Chambers, 1995: 177). Social learning is therefore 
a better solution to the combined problems of Dienel's (1989) cleavage, 
citizens increasingly rely on knowledge as they are faced with an ever-larger 
number of decisions (Albrecht, 1985) as a result of growth in technology 
(Dienel, 1989; Renn et aI., 1993), and the development of expert systems 
(Knorr-Cetina, 1999). I continue this discussion in the chapters on social 
learning and method. 
What is deliberation? 
The first use of the term deliberative democracy is traced back to 1980 and is 
attributed by Elstund to Joseph Bessette (1993: 1478). In the same year, the 
first empirical study of deliberation, Mansbridge's Beyond Adversary 
Democracy, was published. Although more recent studies of deliberation are 
more in-depth, the basic ideas are still usually formulated in terms of the 
belief that "legitimate lawmaking issues from the public deliberation of 
citizens" (Bohman and Rehg, 1997: ix), and "a law is legitimate only if it is 
based on the public reasons resulting from an inclusive and fair process in 
which all citizens may participate and in which they may continue to 
cooperate freely" (Bohman, 1996b: 184). These writers stress the importance 
of avoiding the reduction of democracy to the mere formation of collectively 
binding decisions. Instead, they call for a society in which the notion of 
democracy implies the adoption of a culture in which problems are addressed 
20 
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discursively and rationally. These discussions should be organised according 
to procedures devised by the polity (Honneth, 1998), and which therefore 
have a claim to legitimacy. Smith and Wales (2000: 53) understand 
deliberative democracy as a form of democracy that "promises more 
trustworthy and legitimate forms of political authority, more informed 
decisions and a more active account of citizenship". All of the above are 
largely inspired by the work of Habermas (1984, 1987b) and stress, as he 
does, that communicative rationality is as important, if not more, as economic 
and political power. These scholars, amongst others, understand deliberation 
as the activity that occurs in the event of a dispute over the best course of 
action. Participants in a deliberation proceed by responding to options and 
presenting reasoned claims and counter claims and justifying them by 
appealing to accepted principles until a resolution is reached. This resolution 
does not have to be unanimously accepted nor does it have to be final but it 
must be one that all affected parties can agree to live with (Bohman, 1996b). 
In short, deliberation requires that decisions be made according to the 
principles of discourse ethics, the most important principle being that in 
discourse the unforced force of the better argument prevails (Habermas, 
1990). 
Deliberative democracy is therefore to be seen as "a dialogical process of 
exchanging reasons for the purpose of resolving problematic situations that 
cannot be settled without interpersonal coordination and cooperation" 
(Bohman, 1996b: 27). This formulation clearly shows how at its inception the 
21 
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idea of a deliberative politics set itself up against "the earlier economic and 
pluralist models: that politics should be understood mainly in terms of a 
conflict of competing interests - and thus in terms more of bargaining than of 
public reason" (Bohman and Rehg, 1997: xii-xiii). The ideas of competition 
and bargaining have no place in a deliberative democracy which, if it is to act 
as an alternative to a model based on bargaining, must "put bargaining in its 
place" (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996: 43). 
However, a significant proportion of deliberative democrats (Mansbridge, 
1999a) trace the roots of their theory to Tocqueville's (1960, 1966) studies of 
America's town hall meetings of the nineteenth century. In these studies of 
Democracy in America Tocqueville points to the central argument of this 
thesis that citizens "converse, they listen to one another and they are 
mutually stimulated to all sorts of understandings" (1966: 124) and, as a 
result, they may even "learn to surrender their own will to that of all the rest 
and to make their exertions subordinate to the common impulse" (1966: 127). 
But can the complex nature of modern living and work arrangements ever 
allow this to be more than an ideal? After all, the necessary conditions are 
"harder than ever to sustain given the constraints imposed by today's large­
scale, complex, and pluralistic societies" (Warren, 2002: 678). Do we have to 
accept that it will be impossible for a relatively informal forum, like a meeting, 
to enable ordinary citizens to test the knowledge employed by experts? By 
examining the citizens' jury for evidence of transformations of preference I 
will discover whether or not this is the case. Modern theories of deliberation 
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have helped the inventors of the citizens' jury to develop the citizens' jury as 
a forum that can cope with the scale of modern communities and the 
complexity of modern life (Crosby, 1986; Coote and Lenaghan, 1997; Dienel, 
1999). 
The deliberative turn 
The turn to a deliberative form of democracy described above represents a 
relatively new approach to solving problems with a large amount of effort 
being spent by theorists in "seeking to articulate forms of democracy in which 
the moment of collective action is highlighted as the very source of political 
legitimacy" (Blaug, 1996: 72). The problems this form of decision-making is 
being used to address are, however, not new even though they are 
sometimes treated as such. Fischer (1993: 172) describes how "the more 
malleable problems, the ones that could be attacked with common sense and 
ingenuity, have in recent decades given way to a different class of problems 
- 'wicked problems' - with no solutions, only temporary and imperfect 
solutions", thus requiring new methods of dealing with them like citizens' 
juries. 
Evidence of transformation, if it has occurred, might be found in evidence that 
the participants developed a discursive approach to problem-solving in their 
dealings with the jury, and perhaps in their lives after the jury. This approach 
to deliberation means that I align this work with that of the discourse theorists 
(Rasmussen, 1990; Habermas, 1995c, 1996; Chowcat, 2000). This implies 
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an acceptance that no problem is ever fully laid to rest and is also open to 
reconsideration as circumstances and society itself changes. The ideal of 
discourse ethics is that coliective decisions based on deliberation are 
inherently better than ones made by individuals alone regardless of how 
educated they might be (Allan, 1963), and this concept is even supported by 
Aristotle (1946) despite any misgivings we may have about his other 
exclusions. This idealisation of deliberation appears again in the work of 
Tocqueville (1960), Mill (1958), and is given serious consideration in the work 
of Pateman (1970), Fishkin (1991) and Habermas (originally 1979, translated 
1 995a), who each show that the idea that politicisation is nurtured and can be 
learned through deliberation is part of every account of democracy. But all of 
them accept that deliberation that conforms to the ideals of discourse is not 
easy to achieve. In fact, the opportunity to practise public deliberation is 
relatively rare and "only under the most extraordinary historical 
circumstances, when the near total collapse of existing structures of 
domination open unprecedented new vistas of now realistic possibilities, can 
we expect to witness anything like an unguarded discourse" (Scott, 1990: 
102). 
A problem of culture 
Deliberative democrats have always had to face the twin problems of scale 
and the pervading political culture. Criticism of deliberation is based on the 
idea that deliberation is too time consuming and expensive to be a viable 
alternative to representation (Dale et aI., 1998). Deliberative theorists now 
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recognise that what is needed is a "theorization of social change around what 
might be called a cultural politics of citizenship bringing together discourses 
of creativity, reflexivity and discursivity" (Delanty, 1999: 123). The theorists 
most closely associated with this new wave are James Bohman (1994, 1996, 
1998, 1999a, 1999b), and John Forester (1985,1994,1999), who has 
already been shown to adopt a more pragmatic approach to deliberation 
rather than stressing the need for ideal conditions as set out in the work of 
Jurgen Habermas (1996). Throughout this study both approaches to 
deliberation will be examined, culminating in a discussion about how 
deliberative democracy can best make a contribution to the current problems 
of voter apathy and disillusion with political life. In spite of any misgivings 
about pragmatic deliberation I continue to use the work of Forester and 
Bohman as a way to understand an attempt to simulate deliberation: the 
citizens' jury. The analysis of this model, however, will not concede to realist 
politics and what Goodin (2002) describes as Realpolitik. According to 
Johnson (2001: 225), Habermas "refuses to break faith with the ideal of 
communicative rationality. He will not concede that liberal pluralism can only 
accommodate a degraded idea of modern democracy guided by the 
pragmatic preoccupations with a market society concerned with driving 
bargains, negotiating settlements and 'doing deals"'. 
These deliberative democrats have made progress as the call for a more 
participatory politics grew in strength in the wake of damaging criticisms 
about the more direct approach of the referendum. In a referendum it is 
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reported that "voters lack relevant information, there is no requirement for 
reflective and rational consideration, powerful and financial interests may 
dominate campaigns, minority rights may be compromised" (New, 1998: 9). 
Therefore the call for a participatory politics which characterised the new 
social movements of the 1970s, which sought to encourage "the entry of the 
greatest number of social actors, both individual and collective, into decision 
making" (Touraine, 1997: 25), gave way in the 1980s to a call for a 
deliberative politics (Bessette, 1980) that has grown in strength ever since. 
Strydom (2002: 11-34), in his discussion of the risk debate, describes how 
the political culture is changed through similar methods and has led to a full­
scale public debate. In this study, I aim to show whether the citizens' jury can 
bring about a similar cultural change. The changes Strydom (2002: 12) notes 
show a gradual broadening of the scope of the debate combined with the 
greater inclusion of all affected parties. 
In a similar way, increasing calls made on governments and service 
providers for change has resulted in the use of public consultation measures. 
The work of these initiatives can be seen in almost every public body in 
Britain: local authorities are now obliged to consult the public about spending 
plans and hospitals and health authorities undertake initiatives such as 
shared governance and clinical governance (New, 1998; Pickard, 1998). It is 
as a direct result of this "cultural turn" that initiatives such as the citizens' jury 
have become increasingly popular (Nash, 2001: 77). Political theorists and 
observers who highlighted the democratic deficit (Cooper et aI., 1995) have 
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been working on designs that it is hoped can help to reinvigorate democracy. 
They undertake this work on the assumption that by being exposed to 
deliberation, in arenas like the citizens' jury, citizens get "the habit of active 
citizenship" (Hall and Stewart, 1996: 1), and can become more than just 
"surrogate citizens" (Sperlin, 2001: 15). 
But while "it is agreed that citizens should share in decision making, there is 
no feeling that they should be involved in the process of governing more 
directly" (Pickard, 1998: 227). This is where the critics' problems with the 
citizens' jury lie. As Cohen (1991: 21) describes it, the very idea of citizen 
deliberation is that "citizens in such an order share a commitment to the 
resolution of problems of collective choice through public reasoning, and 
regard their basic institutions as legitimate in so far as they establish the 
framework for free public deliberation". Experiments in decision making that 
work with a Habermasian definition of discourse and citizenship are still 
relatively new. Citizenship in a deliberative democracy must involve the 
public articulation of values (Bohman, 1996b), and even if the process 
produces conclusions and recommendations in the form of the juror report 
this cannot provide answers to the questions surrounding the legitimacy of 
the process itself. 
Deliberative democracy is not about reaching unanimous decisions in which 
everyone affected agrees that this course of action is the correct one but 
instead it is founded on the principle that citizens in a deliberative forum must 
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give reasons for their preferences, "deliberation under conditions of pluralism 
requires that I find reasons that make the proposal acceptable to others who 
cannot be expected to regard my preferences as sufficient reasons for 
agreeing" (Cohen, 1991: 24). While Cohen holds on to the idea of consensus 
rather than compromise, his summation of the principle of deliberation as the 
belief that if a given preference or belief is one's own it will not, by itself, sway 
others to one's opinion is useful to this study (1991: 23). To show how 
compromise is central to the usefulness or otherwise of deliberative 
democracy requires an understanding of the transformation created through 
deliberation as well as the cultural and normative tools that Cohen (1991) 
does not accept. 
However, the motivation to use the citizens' jury in decision making often has 
instrumental roots associated with the obligation to consult the public and the 
need to assert the democratic principles underpinning the management of 
the NHS in Great Britain and similar public organisations in other countries. 
But while this obligation is premised on the belief that "all persons should 
have the right and opportunity to participate in the deliberation and decision 
making of the institutions to which their actions contribute or which directly 
affect their actions" (Young, 1990: 91), there is no requirement that all must, 
in fact, participate. Therefore, what deliberative democrats seek is to change 
the values by which deliberation is judged so that emphasis is on the 
presence of ideas not of bodies in the deliberative structures. 
2b 
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Studying transformation ofpreference 
Understanding whether or not participants in citizens' juries learn how to 
realign the frames they use through discourse requires developing a model of 
deliberation that can expand practical opportunities for democratic 
deliberation. This means focusing on best practice from the experience of 
citizens' juries in order to understand what happens when opinions are 
voiced rather than stifled, but this does not mean that evidence of 
manipulation, if found, will not be highlighted (Arnstein, 1969). But the main 
objective is to build up a theory of how public learning about the value of 
deliberation can be harnessed. Therefore I begin, according to Forester 
(1999), where other theories stop. Forester (1999: 247) believes that theories 
of deliberation usually falter when the problems that hamper deliberation 
such as inequality of education and wealth, become obvious to the 
participants but he encourages us to "stop rediscovering that power corrupts" 
and this is what is attempted in this thesis (Forester, 1999: 9). Seeking to 
understand the potential of the citizens' jury model involves looking for 
possibilities to develop this form of democracy and this means concentrating 
on the positive elements of the experience. The idea is to understand what 
we can learn from the citizens' jury that can improve the experience of 
deliberation. 
This study builds upon existing accounts of practical experiments in 
deliberative democracy by investigating the "real world" of deliberative 
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political activity and subsequently profiling what actually happens to citizens 
who engage in discourse oriented to uncovering a deliberative democratic 
solution to a social problem. In so doing, a number of fundamental concerns 
about the current state of liberal democracy, with an emphasis on the British 
experience, are addressed. The main aim of the thesis is to examine from a 
critical perspective the process of taking part in a deliberative process and to 
establish whether the process itself constitutes a learning experience. In 
short, the object is to address the question of how people experience political 
participation and its effect upon them. 
To this end, a Habermasian definition of democracy is used throughout this study 
where democracy is understood not as the formation of collectively binding 
decisions by the people (Beetham, 1994; Held, 1996), but as the institutionalisation 
of the public use of reason jointly exercised by autonomous citizens. But the 
principle of political equality remains central to Habermas's definition of democracy, 
as it does in the work of Beetham (1994) and Warren (2002). Democracy for 
deliberative democrats is about more than decision-making. It uses the process of 
decision making to understand how "deliberative action [that] shapes others' 
understanding of their cities, their selves, and crucially, their possibilities of action" 
(Forester, 1999: 6). This is why I chose a qualitative approach, which asked the 
jurors to rationally reconstruct not the day-to-day events of the juries (which had 
been so carefully collected by the facilitators) but what their motives were when 
they said something and how they reached the decisions they reached. 
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By adopting this definition I can introduce a second aspect to this research, 
the understanding of participation in the more inclusive sense of discursive 
will-formation instead of merely as political participation. Habermas sets out 
this task in Between Facts and Norms (1996), where he calls his theory of 
democracy a theory of deliberative politics and, instead of defending 
participatory democracy directly, he concentrates on describing how these 
ideals might be accommodated with the institutional arrangements of the 
modern legal system. Concentrating his work in this way prevents him from 
becoming entangled in the pathologies of modernity and what Bohman 
(1994: 898) refers to as the "persistent tensions of democratic theory" that 
can hinder communicative rationality and enables him instead to concentrate 
on "the real possibilities for democracy in current constitutional states". 
This approach shifts the prevailing focus of discussions about deliberation 
from issues about composition and levels of political participation to the 
question of how citizens participate in political life. This involves setting out 
the journey that citizens' jurors undertake to reflect upon the types of 
knowledge needed to fully participate in public (Davies, 1998: 65-71). I also 
examine how ordinary citizens come to terms with the complexities of 
participation in public discourse, how they negotiate the importance attached 
to expert testimony, personal anecdotal evidence, and experience. The 
respondents to whom I have spoken throw light on a number of key issues 
surrounding the nature and role of contemporary forms of political 
participation within advanced liberal democracies. 
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In many respects, the notion of a discursively mediated political sphere 
remains a highly utopian concept, and Habermas (1996) is undoubtedly 
accurate when he argues that discourse cannot organise society as a whole. 
Yet if it were understood as cultural, and therefore as a learned capacity, it 
could become easier to use. However, the question of discourse ethics is 
especially relevant to 'the political', particularly in complex 'post-traditional' 
societies where more and more public decisions face us every day (Albrecht, 
1985). Political participation would thus represent the channel through which 
citizens are able to deliberate and come to some form of agreement over 
issues of common concern. This is why discourse is central to democratic 
politics. Political relationships, like discourse, are founded on the idea of 
conflict and, like discourse, "political issues emerge when existing ways of 
doing things are no longer taken for granted" (Warren, 1999a: 17). Both 
begin where normal communication breaks down and are invoked to find a 
negotiated solution to a seemingly irrevocable problem. 
The solution lies in finding a new way to make more effectively the required 
decisions and to delegate some decision making to the public in a way that 
can not only achieve the aim of increased efficiency but also create a sense 
of civic involvement and increased levels of social trust (Lash, 1994; Warren, 
1999a, 1999b). Habermas (1996: 108) makes his position on this quite clear 
when he states that 
norms [that] can be justified if and only if equal consideration can be 
given to the interests of all those who are possibly involved ... with 
ethical-political questions, the form of life of the political community that 
is 'in each case our own' constitutes the reference system for justifying 
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decisions that are supposed to express an authentic, collective self­
understanding. In principle, the decisive reasons must be acceptable to 
all members sharing 'our' traditions and strong evaluations. Opposition 
between interests require a rational balancing of competing value 
orientations and interest positions. 
Here Habermas effectively responds to his critics who claim that Habermas 
demands consensus, this is clearly not the case which his use of the term 
"balancing" as a synonym for compromise will attest to. He is heavily 
criticised for his expectation that all of those who are possibly involved can 
be included in consultations and decision making, whereas the above 
quotation makes clear that this inclusion can be symbolic. Symbolic in the 
sense that their opinion is given consideration implying that they can be 
included by proxy by other members of the community who act as advocates. 
Even though Habermas has made his position so clear since the publication 
of Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law 
and Democracy in 1992 (translation into English in 1996), he and his fellow 
deliberative democrats continue to be criticised on exactly these points. 
Therefore, the rehabilitation process referred to above is crucial if inserting a 
culture of deliberation into modern political systems is to remain viable. 
This definition of deliberation is therefore more fluid and more sensitive to the 
culture of the society in which it is being played out than Habermas is usually 
given credit for. His only measure of success is to demand that where real 
deliberation occurs an individual who is better able to "distinguish between 
his [sic] own impulses and desires, he learns to be a public as well as a 
private citizen" (Pateman, 1970: 25), will emerge. This transformation if 
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found, will fulfil Barber's (1984: 232) belief that what is necessary to 
strengthen democracy is a "remarkable change in man" and would mark the 
full emergence of a fully reflexive modernity (Beck, 1994). For Barber (1984), 
this reflexivity is gained through the medium of "democratic talk" which 
serves nine main functions, these are: the articulation of interests, 
persuasion, agenda-setting, exploring mutuality, affiliation and affection, 
maintaining autonomy, witness and self-expression, reformulation and 
reconceptualisation and community building as the creation of public 
interests, common goods and active citizens. Each of these functions must 
be fulfilled if deliberation is to be effectively instigated. For Asen (1999: 117), 
deliberation above all entails a "meta-level of critical reflection that promotes 
perspective taking". The reflexivity that is gained enables participants in my 
study to learn to apply their own pre-existing knowledge and their new expert 
knowledge gleaned in the jury sessions to solving the problem. 
Participants in a deliberative process learn to do this because the experience 
of perspective taking is essentially unsettling and raises questions for the 
individual. These questions cause them to re-examine their priorities and 
desires and lead them to listen critically to suggestions from the other 
participants in a discourse about how to transform them. These functions are 
similar to the criteria that a truly deliberative process should, according to 
Benhabib (1992), fulfil. For Benhabib, a deliberative process imparts 
information that can enable us to perceive a problem differently and to 
construct our preferences. 
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Now that deliberative democracy is believed to have "come of age" (Bohman, 
1998: 401), we are seeing a large amount of public money invested in public 
consultation exercises such as citizens' juries, citizens' panels, urban 
community councils, and user panels. Bohman (1998) and Goodin (2003) 
both question the extent to which these suggestions are merely attempts to 
shore up the existing structures of representative democracy against a tide of 
disenchantment. But even if the reasons behind their use might be suspect, 
can we learn anything from them about what it would mean to implement 
deliberative democracy, and what successful deliberation would look like? 
This study attempts to clarify the tension faced by deliberative democrats in 
their search for a deliberative forum that can satisfy modern standards of 
legitimacy. To this end I rely on three key concepts in social theory and two 
theoretical frameworks that have been compiled by JOrgen Habermas. The 
concepts are discourse, reflexivity and public sphere and the theories are 
social learning and discourse ethics. The model of the citizens' jury is used to 
demonstrate how these concepts and theories can be used to understand the 
potential, if any, of deliberative democracy to produce more legitimate 
decisions that the public can accept. Two of these, discourse ethics and the 
public sphere are described below in greater detail. 
Values and deliberation 
The above discussion suggests that deliberation is based on values. By this I 
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mean the values espoused by discourse ethics where the aim is to 
understand how citizens rewire their identities and therefore their approach to 
solving social problems so that they come to be seen as moral problems. The 
idea that individuals, when faced with moral dilemmas, undergo such a 
process is not new. Taylor (1989) and Gamson and Modigliani (1987,1989), 
understand this process as "framing" whereby the identity we use to frame 
ourselves provides the horizon from which we can identify the moral 
dimension of problems we face in the life-world. Gamson and Modigliani use 
frames to refer to the "central organising idea for making sense of relevant 
events and suggesting what is at issue" (Gamson and Modigliani, 1989: 57). 
In effect, people use frames to link self-identity with moral orientation and 
when existing frames are challenged by a new frame created out of new 
experiences or new understandings of the world, they have to be brought 
back into alignment. The individual achieves this realignment by resorting to 
discourse that enables her/him to learn processes that can realign these 
frames. This process of frame competition is discussed at length in the 
literature of Goffman (1974), Snow et al. (1986) and Gamson (1992), and will 
not be gone into here but this approach to identity argues that identity is 
created where meanings and values are shared between individuals. I bring it 
into the discussion here to show that in order to understand the citizens 
involved in citizens' juries we must adopt a reflexive approach to 
understanding the issues being discussed by them on the juries. 
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Discourse ethics 
The idea of discourse ethics forms the core of Habermas's theory of 
communication. The use of the term discourse rests on the assumption that 
participants come to such an understanding so that they may successfully 
co-operate and co-ordinate their action. But it also has one other use that is 
crucial to this study: discourse ethics is based on the assumption that validity 
is determined communally and how this occurs can be shown by engaging in 
reconstructive science (Rasmussen, 1990: 64). This means that by applying 
the principles of discourse ethics we can examine the means by which 
people can come together in public to collectively discuss their problems, and 
come to resolutions and show how cognitive validation is achieved through a 
set of procedures that can create and justify norms. For Habermas, discourse 
ethics is a theoretical framework, which describes how personal issues can 
be reworked as public issues. That is, how the substantive problems of 
everyday life are transformed so that the issues can gain a saliency and 
power in public discourses. 
Deliberative approaches to democratic decision making, such as the use of 
the citizens' jury model, might afford political commentators the opportunity to 
observe this process in action. I show how this is achieved where personal 
problems are reframed using a mix of reasons related to the substantive 
issue, and more formal moral or universal arguments. Where this does not 
happen the process under observation cannot be described as deliberative 
since deliberation implies the adoption of the principles of discourse ethics as 
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the means by which we can see how discursively-created solutions to 
contested issues come to be accepted by the public. This principle is known 
as the universalisation principle and is used by Habermas (1990: 57-68) to 
show how participants in a discourse determine the validity of ideas and 
suggestions that are being introduced to the discourse. This means that in 
language-based interactions like those of the citizens' jury "the fundamental 
assumption is that that the author of a statement should be able to motivate it 
and fulfil the validity claims inherent in it, or alternatively be able to modify the 
viewpoint expressed" (Alvesson and Sk6ldberg, 2000: 119). 
Habermas uses a principle of discourse ethics that is supposed to express 
the cultural meaning of discourse, or the procedures used in coming to a just 
decision in discourse. For Habermas, these symbols are produced in coming 
to a decision itself, the core of which is the universalisation test. The cultural 
meaning of discourse is not something that all members of society may 
adopt, rather, it is through participation in discourse that people are 
socialised into being able to think about problems by using and applying the 
universalisation test. In short, when we look for evidence of the use of 
discourse ethics we are looking for examples of role taking. This means that 
for Habermas (1995c: 117), discourse ethics rests on the intuition that the 
application of the principle of 
universalisation, properly understood, calls for a joint process of "ideal 
role taking." .... Under the pragmatic presupposition of an inclusive and 
non-coercive rational discourse among free and equal participants, 
everyone is required to take the perspective of everyone else, and thus 
project herself into the understandings of self and world of all others; 
from this interlocking of perspectives there emerges an ideally extended 
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we-perspective from which all can test in common whether they wish to 
make a controversial norm the basis of their shared practice. 
In summary, participants in a discourse develop a post conventional morality 
(Habermas, 1995a). Whether or not what happens on a citizens' jury is akin 
to discourse is established by applying the principles of discourse ethics 
which, according to Rasmussen (1990: 64), give "privileged access" to the 
post-conventional morality of the participants. While participants in discourse 
will develop these abilities at different rates and in different ways depending 
on level of education, the experience of the principle remains the same. It is 
the basis of the validity claim on which utterances in a discourse will be 
made. Validity claims will themselves "always be open to question" (Alvesson 
and Sk6ldberg, 2000: 119). 
The public sphere 
The public sphere is a more familiar term than discourse ethics and it forms a 
crucial building block in Habermas's (1996) discussion of deliberative 
democracy. While a theory of the formation of the public sphere remains 
crucial to deliberative democrats, the public sphere as Habermas (1989) 
described it in 1962 with the publication in German of The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Sphere has been the subject of a variety of 
criticisms and reinterpretations (Benhabib, 1992; Fraser, 1992; Mansbridge, 
1996). These criticisms have almost always been accepted by Habermas, as 
his acceptance in Calhoun (1992) have shown, and is also seen in his work 
with the theorists of the "politics of recognition" (Taylor, 1989, 1994; 
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Habermas, 1994; Honneth, 1995). Yet the public sphere as it changes and 
responds to challenges still forms the cornerstone of theories of deliberation 
(Asen, 1999). 
The term public sphere was used by Habermas (1989) to describe the 
emergence of a rational debating public. For Habermas, social changes like 
the development of the postal service and the greater availability of printed 
books and pamphlets enabled a more reflective communication between 
individuals and most importantly the discovery of the self (Habermas, 1989) 
in abstract public spheres (Habermas, 1996: 374). These changes occurring 
in the seventeenth and eighteen centuries led to new opportunities for the 
public to come together to discuss matters of public concern and to generate 
what he calls public opinion. The increased autonomy that this created for the 
average citizen meant that the power relationships in society were 
fundamentally transformed with feudal lords who held power over people 
being replaced by a system of power of the people. But as Habermas (1989: 
179) shows, the integrity of the public sphere has suffered from the 
increasing intrusion of the state into public will formation and a sort of 
refeudalisation which has meant that "rational critical debate has yielded to 
compromise fought out or simply imposed nonpublicly". Habermas has, as a 
result of identifying this pathology (Holub, 1991: 8) of the public sphere, 
become preoccupied with "the way in which enlightenment ...... turns from a 
means of liberation into a new source of enslavement" (Outhwaite, 1994: 2). 
Because of this concern about the decline in meaningful public discourse he 
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yields to his critics who suggest some very fundamental changes to his 
theory that can enable us to identify and deal with the obstacles to 
communication that are undermining discourse. 
Fraser (1992) unpicks these pathologies by addressing the public sphere at a 
more fundamental level and she shows how Habermas has failed to accou nt 
for a variety of publics other than that of the bourgeois public sphere. 
Although Fraser's (1992) work on the multiplicity of publics is more useful 
than Habermas's historical exploration of one manifestation of it, especially in 
terms of the work being undertaken here, we must be aware that Habermas 
(1996: 374) has accepted the idea of partial publics that can communicate 
with one another resulting in a universal public sphere made up of 
segmented publics which "remain permeable in principle". The term public 
sphere has thus been redefined by writers like Fraser and Ben habib to 
incorporate, among others, feminist and ethnic minority concerns that the 
idea of a single public sphere limits access to this space to those who 
operate within normal communication paradigms (by which they mean male 
and western) instead of fulfilling its potential as a space for discursive 
interaction to enable participants to discuss and inform the shaping of public 
policies. The public sphere then becomes what Habermas might have 
originally intended in his overly historical account, the forum for political 
participation (Habermas, 1996: 329-374). But Habermas's primary interest is 
to understand political participation in order to shed light on processes of 
rationalisation occurring at the same time and he believes (as I do) that 
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participation "should not be considered as a value in itself but related to the 
conditions in which it occurs" (Outhwaite, 1994: 3). 
The idea of multiple publics, or partial publics (Habermas, 1996), allows us to 
see how the discursive space necessary for effective deliberation to occur 
can be created. This is described below as the space for "perspective taking" 
(Rasmussen, 1990) or as Habermas's ideal role-taking already referred to. 
Prior to the period in which we now live where the opinions of subordinated 
groups are routinely collected, these groups had to rely on "parallel 
discursive arenas where [they could] invent and circulate counter discourses 
to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and 
needs" (Fraser, 1992: 123). These publics can, according to Fraser, act as 
training grounds for future full participation in the wider public sphere while at 
the same time offering a safe environment in which to practise and try out 
public involvement. 
The above discussion has been undertaken to describe the theoretical 
approach that will be developed in the remainder of this study. Any 
examination of the development of a system like that of the citizens' jury 
requires an acceptance of Fraser's (1992) ideas about the existence of 
counter-publics and an acceptance that what is being sought by organisers of 
citizens' juries is an opportunity to create something akin to these counter­
publics. If we are to conclude that the citizens' jury is effective in creating 
transformations of preference then it will be because it provides both a 
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training ground and a regrouping area for novice political actors or 
disillusioned citizens to engage in public debate and discourse. As Asen 
shows, it is the "publicity of deliberation [that] prompts participants to support 
their positions with reasons or risk the dismissal of their views as 
unsupported assertions" (1999: 124). This study proceeds by using the term 
public sphere to describe the space in which deliberation can effectively 
begin. 
Overview of the fieldwork 
In this thesis, I set out the findings that have emerged from interviews carried 
out with former citizens' jurors between 2000 and 2001. The fieldwork utilises 
qualitative methods and relies on the semi-structured interview supplemented 
by documentary analysis. Using the data I have collected from 35 interviews 
with jurors who served on ten different juries run by a variety of different 
organisations, ! illustrate a range of experiences of the process of political 
participation. Where necessary, I also undertook analysis of relevant 
documents such as jury agendas, juror handouts, video recordings and 
transcripts of jury sessions. 
By drawing upon the interviews with former jurors I contribute to a growing 
interest in analysing the process of taking part in political participation. 
Recent debates have raised the importance of exploring the effects of 
existing forms of participation upon those who take part, but there has been 
little attempt to explore this area. Concern over measurable policy outcomes 
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of participation has been complemented by analytical interest in the 
experience of political participation itself. As Parry, Moser and Day (1992: 29) 
note, the "experience of participation, not only the results but of the process 
itself, is crucial to the vitality of democracy itself'. This is a central problem, 
and can only be solved by shifting the focus of research from a quantitative 
towards more qualitative methods of data collection and analysis. The 
framework within which we interpret the nature of political participation 
therefore undergoes significant change. The quality of the process of taking 
part in political life comes to the fore, and the traditional focus on the levels of 
political activity becomes less significant. 
The thesis explores the process or conditions of participation rather than any 
detectable impact on policy content. I have deliberately made only passing 
comment on the ideological and policy agendas of the sponsors of the 
citizens' juries included in this study. This is not to deny the importance of the 
issues to which the citizens' juries address themselves; rather, I have 
specifically attempted to focus on the internal workings of the juries 
themselves. The findings of this thesis suggest that the experiences of 
participants are crucial in understanding broader patterns of participation. In 
particular, I demonstrate that it is important to recognise the dialectical 
relationship that exists between participants and the participatory 
environment in which they find themselves. 
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Plan of the thesis 
Following this introductory chapter I include two related chapters. These 
chapters outline in more detail the theory of deliberative democracy, 
specifically relating it to the current interest in deliberative politics. In Chapter 
2, I provide an outline of the citizens' jury, a model of deliberative 
participation that I have adopted to provide the SUbstantive element to the 
analysis. Chapter 3 examines theoretical work on deliberation and 
supplements it with a discussion of some earlier experiments in deliberative 
democracy. The emphasis however, is on the theory of deliberation as set 
out by amongst others: Habermas (1996) and Bohman (1996). I provide in 
Chapter 4 a detailed account of the theory of social learning, concentrating in 
particular on the work of Habermas. Chapter 5 contains a detailed description 
of the research design and methodology of the project. This chapter also 
includes a section outlining in detail the philosophical approach to social 
investigation that underpins this study. The first half of the thesis therefore 
provides a rationale for the overall research programme. 
The second half of the thesis presents an analysis of the findings generated 
in the fieldwork. The data is organised and presented as part of a model of 
deliberative learning and does not follow a case study format. This has been 
done in order to draw out clearly the main themes that have emerged from 
the primary data, and to enable comparisons to be made between the 
participation that takes place within each organisation. In Chapter 6 I analyse 
what I have labelled the juror journey, by using semi-structured interviews I 
45 
have been able to develop a model of the jury itself that highlights the jurors' 
own perspective and relies on them to highlight their move to a deliberative 
rationale. In Chapter 7, I present a discussion of the early activities of the 
citizens' jurors that the participants describe as a personal learning 
experience. In Chapter 8, I examine the second phase of being a citizens' 
juror where I examine these stories as a cultural journey. Chapter 9 covers 
the final part of the jury journey as the jurors emerge out of the jury itself and 
back into their ordinary lives. Finally the concluding chapter attempts to 
synthesise the jurors' understanding of their experiences and to explore the 
potential of deliberation as a response to the problems of modern liberal 
democracy. In this chapter I draw conclusions from the research material, 
and reflect upon some of the major issues arising out of the analysis of 
political participation provided by this thesis. 
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2: Citizens' juries 
Introduction 
In this chapter I describe in detail the model of the citizens' jury. As an 
innovation in participant research the citizens' jury is seen as "potentially 
challenging this separation between analyst and subject. Having the potential 
to be a tool of social justice and the legitimisation of non-specialist 
knowledge .... Citizen's juries are a radical alternative that could contribute to 
the reining-in of the unaccountable exercise of power" (Wakeford, 2002: 1). 
The first thing I want to do here is to provide a brief response to the most 
frequent argument against the use of the citizens' jury model, the issue of 
representativeness. The citizens' jury is promoted as a political space in 
which ordinary people who are more or less disinterested and do not display 
a fierce commitment to the issue to be discussed are brought together to 
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deliberate. The idea is to give ordinary people time to reach decisions about 
everyday issues that affect their lives in the hope that "the jury situation" 
(Kuper, 1997: 143), will encourage them to think of the public interest. 
Selection processes used to recruit jury members have purposefully 
excluded known activists, party members, current and former members of 
local authorities as well as MPs and councillors (Coote and Lenaghan, 1997; 
White, Lewis and Elam, 1998). 
One method used by the citizens' jury in an attempt to pre-empt the problems 
of under-representation among key groups like ethnic minorities and women 
has been to pay participants for their time and to convene juries that 
concentrate on real issues that will affect them; this usually means a local 
issue (Coote and Mattinson, 1996). According to existing evaluations the 
payment system seems to work well (White, Lewis and Elam, 1998). But 
Dunkerley and Glasner (1998) complain that a citizens' jury held in Wales 
had "too many" non-white, lower educated and unemployed members. As 
would be expected, this is not a common complaint and recruiters do report 
finding it difficult to access a pool of potential jurors. However, these 
problems do not seem to arise as often as might be expected in the 
traditionally problematic categories: women with childcare responsibilities, 
the young, the unemployed, the disabled and members of ethnic minorities 
(Pickard, 1998). Coote and Lenaghan (1997) refer to the problem of fair 
recruitment as a major issue for them but claim to have resolved it by vetting 
potential jurors. 
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The ten juries included in this study are shown in table 1 below. This table 
also includes information about when the jury was held, who funded the jury, 
how many jurors took part and the question they were asked to discuss. 
Location Source of Funding and Topic No. of 
and Date Jurors 
East Sussex King's Fund - Where should women with 15 
Brighton and gynaecological cancer who live in East Sussex 
Hove Brighton and Hove be offered treatment? 
(ESB&H) ­
February 
1997 
Luton - IPPR - How should citizens pay for health 16 
November services in the future? 
1997 
Camden - LGMB - How could the Swiss Cottage be 14 
March 1996 improved? How can these ambitions be 
achieved? 
Association ABI - Should insurance companies continue to 14 
of British have access to the results of genetic tests? What 
Insurers responsibilities do the industry and government 
(ABI) - have for meeting the insurance needs of citizens? 
November 
1997 
Independent ITC - What principles should regulators use to 17 
Television judge what is and what is not acceptable on 
Commission television? How should these principles be 
(ITC) - applied? 
October 
1997 
Norwich A- LGMB - "Norwich in the computer age" 12 
March 1996 
Norwich B- Norwich City Council - War Pensions, Housing 12 
April 1998 Benefit and the case for disallowing? 
Hertfordshire LGMB - How and to what extent can the county 16 
September achieve its aim of becoming self-sufficient in the 
1996 provision of waste management facilities? 
Women's Cabinet Office - Should women with children be 15 
Unit A- able to work; and what is the ideal balance 
March 1998 between work and parenting? 
What forms of childcare are needed: who should 
provide them and who should pay for them? 
Women's Cabinet Office - Should parents with children be 
Unit B- April able to work; and what is the ideal balance 
1998 between work and parenting? 
Table 1: Juries included in this study 
16 
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Why citizens' juries? 
The two people credited with the invention of the citizens' jury model are Mr 
Ned Crosby in the United States and Professor Peter Dienel in Germany 
(Coote and Lenaghan, 1997). They call their models respectively the citizens' 
jury and the planning cell and both base their models on the claim that their 
model "strengthen[s] the democratic process by generating thoughtful citizen 
input on matters of public importance" (Jefferson Center, 2000). As in the 
case of representativeness, these claims have been the subject of a variety 
of criticisms. On the one hand, citizens' juries are seen as going "beyond the 
more limited processes of consultation with the public on political 
questions ... In a citizens' jury, members of the public are given both the time 
and the information to deliberate fully on the issues in question," (Aldred and 
Jacobs, 2000: 218). On the other hand, they are reported as helping to 
breach the closed circle of policy makers and creating "new deliberative 
spaces in which experts, policy makers, stakeholders and citizens work 
constructively on a common subject. Decision makers and citizens learn 
about each other and operate on a higher level of trust" (Delap, 1998: 19). 
Either way the main point of contention is the stage-managed nature of the 
process, which is often regarded as unhelpful in attempts to encourage the 
public to get involved in decision making. Petts believes the model "provides 
no opportunity for juror's input to the agenda" (2001: 215), and are in danger 
of being reduced to "a process of experts educating the ignorant" (2001: 
217). My interviews described further show that this is plainly not the case. 
so 

.P--------------------------------__________________=-___~---~-.--------
Another important question that occupies commentators is the question of 
how to measure the cost-effectiveness of the citizens' jury model and cost is 
a key factor in deciding whether or not to make use of the citizens' jury for 
future consultations (Pickard, 1998). The King's Fund report on their 
experiences of using citizens' juries to deliberate on health issues describes 
this tension between costs and outcomes (Dale et aI., 1998). Whilst the 
organisers saw the juries as an "all singing, all-dancing piece of work to really 
involve local people" (Dale et aI., 1998: 30, italics in the original), the 
evaluators were disturbed by the financial implications of the process. They 
felt they could "consider using one again only (my emphasis) if the issue 
were significant enough to warrant spending a sizeable amount of public 
money" (Dale et aI., 1998: 32). 
Admittedly citizens' juries are expensive to run, requiring a great deal of 
commitment from the organisers in terms of financial and personnel 
resources. It has been calculated that one series of pilot citizens' juries run 
by the Local Government Management Board had an average cost of 
£12,300 per jury (Hall and Stewart, 1996). While this amount compares 
favourably with the costs of other more traditional consultation exercises, the 
problem with this figure is that it is not a true representation of the exact costs 
involved. The real cost is not easily quantifiable because only above the line 
costs can be included in this figure. For example, when organisers use their 
own premises or decide not to pay the jury members for their participation as 
in the North Kesteven jury costs can be greatly reduced. But the decision to 
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keep costs to a minimum by these means is deemed by some evaluations to 
have reduced the overall effectiveness of the process (Hall and Stewart, 
1996: 20). In contrast, the King's Fund set aside £240,000 for a series of 
three juries and made use of professional jury recruiters to select each jury. 
Conference and hotel facilities were used and payments to jurors were 
higher. Altogether given that we know from both organisations that the 
organisers made use of existing personnel as well as infrastructure to 
support the arrangements it will be a difficult, to attempt to calculate the true 
cost of running a single jury. These concerns about cost are regularly 
highlighted in the literature on the topic of citizen participation. This is 
possibly due to the fact that whilst those running the juries are interested in 
the implications the model might have as an alternative to liberal 
representative approaches to decision making, those funding the juries have 
mostly been concerned about more instrumental outcomes like deciding how 
to act on a specific topic. The jurors themselves are also expected to invest a 
significant amount of their time to make the process work (White, Lewis and 
Elam, 1998: 20-21). 
In spite of these discussions, citizens' juries are seen as a short sharp 
introduction to the world of the political (Hall and Stewart, 1996). The 
intention of the citizens' jury is to jumpstart jurors' interest in politics and 
return them to the ordinary world where they will seek fulfilment in being 
involved. 
A conclusion that has enjoyed general consensus is that the jurors 
themselves found the experience to be immensely rewarding. Although 
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nervous and occasionally apprehensive at the outset of the process, 
and often not sure why this apparently weighty responsibility was being 
thrust upon them, the jurors almost unanimously agreed that they had 
personally benefited and often claimed to have a renewed interest in 
public affairs (New, 1998: 14). 
Words like "trust", "renewal" and "responsibility" appear throughout much of 
the literature on citizens' juries and organisers regularly conclude that having 
seen the beneficial effects of taking responsibility for others and having a 
stake in society, the jurors' confidence in democracy will be restored. In time 
it is suggested, their involvement and its beneficial effects will boost general 
levels of confidence in the democratic process (Coote and Mattinson, 1997). 
Coote and Matlinson (1997: 3) conclude that "jurors are not merely a 
resource to be mined by researchers, nor actors in a public relations 
exercise. They are citizens engaged in a serious task who become lay 
experts as well as confident and competent decision-makers". 
Choosing a citizens' jury 
As mentioned earlier, the citizens' jury makes use of a model developed 
almost simultaneously in Germany and the United States. Stewart, Kendall 
and Coote (1994: 1), claim the German equivalent of the citizens' jury, "the 
planning cell", came into existence in 1969 and the American model known 
as a citizens' jury arrived two years later in 1971. Other research claims the 
American version came first (Wakeford, 2002: 3). Either way, both models 
make use of the basic principles of a criminal jury to enable ordinary citizens 
to listen to evidence about a local/public problem, to deliberate together, and 
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after a few days deliberations make judgements about which course of action 
will best serve the needs of the community. These judgements are collated in 
the form of a jury report and this is presented to the funding body. 
Organisations that have run juries thus far in Great Britain have been under 
no obligation to act upon the recommendations. 
Much of the literature on the citizens' jury claims that the American and 
German versions are almost identical, but this is not the case. The German 
version of the citizens' jury, unlike its American counterpart, does not use 
stratified sampling to select participants. In Germany, large numbers of 
speculative letters are sent out in the search for participants and once 
enough responses have been received to fulfil the numerical quota the 
volunteers are divided into groups of about 25 per jury (Dienel, 1989: 137­
138). Only at this stage is some attempt made to sort jurors into 
representative groups according to age and gender. This arrangement would 
actually appear to satisfy the stipulation made in Chapter 1 that deliberation 
should be solely about transformation of preferences and, in principle, any 
group of people who get together to discuss a social problem should be 
acceptable. This position relies on the belief that evidence of the public use 
of reason and not statistical representativeness is what validates deliberative 
forums. The argument against sampling is made here as a theoretical point 
but we are beginning to see this argument take root in legal theory where the 
idea of some essential nature that only women or ethnic minorities can bring 
to a process is being undermined (Spelman, 1988). Abramson (1994: 10) 
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makes this point succinctly in a discussion of the dangers of essential ising 
legal jury members in the American context where jury selection is carried 
out prior to trials and allows for the legal representation of both sides. 
We do not want to encourage jurors to see themselves as irreconcilably 
divided by race, selected only to fill a particular racial or gender slot on 
the jury. Yet we do want to encourage jurors to draw upon and combine 
their individual experiences and group backgrounds in the joint search 
for the most reliable and accurate verdict...Teaching jurors to think of 
themselves primarily as representatives is to give up on the ideal of 
impartial justice, to see the jury system as nothing better than a way for 
different groups to register their views on justice in a particular case ... 
Deliberating jurors are human beings who start from different places. 
But, so long as juries are selected without discrimination from a cross 
section of the community, their different views can enrich and round out 
the conversation. 
However, German jury organisers in order to satisfy calls for 
representativeness (Dienel, 2002), make a concession to those who seek 
statistical representativeness. In this case, multiple planning cells are often 
used simultaneously to consider the same problem in the hope that larger 
numbers of jurors will lead to more reliable and externally valid conclusions 
(Dienel, 1999). A series of juries held in the German province of Bavaria in 
2002 consisted of 450 participants working on 18 juries to examine the same 
issues (Dienel, 2002). In Britain, while it is still unusual for multiple juries to 
be used, both the ITC and the Women's Unit ran two juries to discuss their 
chosen topic. Multiple juries were used to enhance the perception of validity 
and to ensure that a variety of opinions were collected. However, the juries 
were not run simultaneously (lTC, 1998). One possible advantage of multiple 
juries that has not been explicitly raised by these authors is the opportunity 
for multiple juries to serve as an adjudicating process in the absence of the 
formal appeal process that exists where legal juries are used. 
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The use of random selection is favoured by Jacobs (1997: 223), and 
Lowndes, Pratchett and Stoker (2001: 448) have shown that 
the people who had themselves participated in local authority initiatives 
did tend to be 'natural joiners' ... the exception to this was the case of 
citizens who had been personally invited by the council to participate in 
a particular initiative. The reaction of citizens who had been telephoned 
as part of a random selection for a citizens' jury indicated the potential 
value of direct invitation. They variously felt that: "It sounded 
interesting"', "It was worth a try". "Better than watching telly", ... [and] not 
only are people prepared to join 'juries', but the public at large is willing 
to trust their decision making - even over that of elected 
representatives. Given the example of building development people 
were asked: "Who would come to the best decision always or most of 
the time?" In response 54 per cent chose a citizens' jury, and 33 per 
cent elected councillors. 
These responses provide sufficient support for the position that random 
selection is favourable to stratified sampling. They also go some way to 
disputing the rationale of simply replicating a relatively expensive process in 
order to achieve statistical representativeness. Daniels (1991) has shown 
that while the Oregon health decision making forums engaged between 1000 
and 10000 participants at a time, they could not claim to have engaged a 
group that was representative. Similarly Weeks (2000: 364-365) has shown 
that people from social groups who would normally be unlikely to respond to 
postal questionnaires respond overwhelmingly better to the call to talk to their 
fellow citizens in workshop-type forums. This realisation echoes that of 
Arendt who convincingly argues "that to turn a subject into an object violates 
the freedom that only makes sense for subjects - for people, not things ­
and, at the same time falsifies reality ... human beings are subjects always" 
(Minnich, 1989: 135). For Weeks (2000), the use of stratified sampling also 
risks turning people into objects. 
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Guidance on citizens' juries 
The set of guidelines used in England for the running of a citizens' jury were 
developed by researchers at the IPPR (Coote and Mattinson, 1996). Juries 
that have been run in Britain meet most of these on the assumption that "a 
citizens' jury is only as useful as its reputation" (Coote and Mattinson, 1997: 
15), and because most have tended to involve facilitators or advisors from 
the IPPR. 
The first point made by the IPPR is that juries should be used for simple 
questions with clear options and that it should be made clear to everyone 
what the authority (or the commissioning body) wants out of the jury process. 
This does not preclude, however, accommodating the more theoretical and 
methodological issues discussed in Chapter 1. Secondly, the issue should be 
"live" and one the commissioning body is willing and able to act upon. 
Participants should not feel that they are being used in an experiment or that 
their time is being wasted. Choosing a live issue, it is believed, helps to 
create a sense of purpose since when an issue is not real to the participants 
it will take longer to get to grips with the real task of deliberation while the 
participants grapple with new words, new ideas, and alien concepts. Thirdly, 
prior to the jury start date the organisers should hold a practice run not only 
to rehearse the ideas and formats but also to ensure the testimonies are not 
too technical or too vague. This usually occurs after a steering group has 
spent time refining the question and developing the agenda. Fourthly, once 
issues like topic and format have been settled the question itself should be 
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broken down into options or perspectives, according to the feedback of the 
trial-run jurors and spread out over the four days. Wakeford calculates this 
means between 30 to 50 hours of juror involvement (2002: 1). Time should 
also be set aside at the end of each day to allow the jury to deliberate. 
Finally, the morning of the final day should be left clear for moderators to 
draw together the recommendations of the jurors. For Coote and Mattinson 
(1996), four days seems to be the accepted ideal for jury duration. 
These expectations mean that the citizens' jury experience is intended to be 
highly structured (Thompson and Hoggett, 2001: 352). Even still, in almost all 
cases, the jurors report feeling rushed (Petts, 2001). While those people who 
have been on juries express an enthusiasm and willingness to stick with the 
jury once it has started, the experiences of juror recruiters has been that prior 
to taking part most people do not feel they can afford to spend more than 4 
days on such an activity (White, Lewis and Elam, 1998: 17). This issue of 
time is discussed by Petts (2001: 218) as a shortcoming of the citizens' jury 
design. Petts (2001: 218) acknowledges, however, that in spite of time 
constraints "the jurors could easily raise some of the key complex issues". 
While timing and other practicalities will playa part in the quality of the 
deliberation the jurors interviewed here they describe a variety of ways in 
which they avoided these pitfalls. They frequently travelled to sessions 
together discussing the day's sessions en route, they took home large 
amounts of reading to prepare for the next day's sessions, they talked to 
each other over lunch and in coffee breaks. The only division in the group 
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during these times seems to have been between smokers and non-smokers. 
Running a citizens' jury 
A citizens' jury in Britain typically includes 12 to 16 so-called ordinary citizens 
(Davies et aI., 1998). Participants are chosen using a stratified sampling 
technique leading based on a list of characteristics which should be 
represented on the jury. Usual characteristics identified as important are age, 
gender, housing tenure, education, ethnicity and so on. It is also normal for 
persons under the age of 18 to be excluded from the jury (White, Lewis and 
Elam, 1998). 
Having developed a profile of the community in which the jury is planned 
interviewers set out to discover their targets. The earliest juries run in Great 
Britain began their juror recruitment by sending out letters to people listed in 
the local electoral register but this was usually ineffective. Intermarket, the 
company hired to recruit jurors for the King's Fund juries, report that it took 
"approximately fifty approaches to recruit a juror and thirty to recruit a focus 
group member" (ESB&H, 1997), and perhaps more tellingly they report that 
one field worker spent five days in one town and still met with negative 
responses. Echoing the experience of Weeks (2000) and Lowndes, Pratchett 
and Stoker (2002) letters have, in fact, been found to be the least effective 
way to identify candidates since people are more likely to respond to 
personal contact whilst relying solely on the electoral register can mean 
missing out on new inhabitants of an area as well as those who chose not to 
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register (White, Lewis and Elam, 1998). For example, a sample batch of 150 
letters sent out by Intermarket in the early stages of the ESB&H jury resulted 
in only three responses, all of which were later deemed unsuitable. 
Telephone recruitment strategies have similar drawbacks and it was the face­
to face interviews where people are approached at random in the street that 
seem to have been most effective (ESB&H, 1997). The Women's Unit report 
highlights a similar situation about difficulties with recruitment (White, Lewis 
and Elam, 1998: 19-20). 
Once a potential juror has been identified, s/he is asked to fill out a brief 
questionnaire (although the Women's Unit did use some face-to-face 
interviews). Jurors have described this form as similar to a job application or 
curriculum vitae. Details of education and interests are requested and based 
upon this unsuitable individuals are excluded. The definition of unsuitable 
types is usually discussed only in rather oblique terms and is usually 
interpreted to mean the "politically active" (White, Lewis and Elam, 1998). 
In some cases, exclusions of a specific nature have also been applied 
because different convening bodies have asked specifically for different 
"types" of people to be included (lTC, 1998). The ITC stipulated that jurors 
must have a television set (preferably with some of those chosen having 
either cable or satellite television, although the ITC has no authority over the 
content of satellite channels). For these juries there was also the added 
stipulation that the recruiters should divide the cohort into people who have 
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children under 16, older children and no children (lTC, 1998: 6). The 
women's unit juries were women-only juries because it was felt that the 
Women's Unit as the funding body should be prioritising women's input into 
public debates and identifying "areas where action should be taken to 
improve the lives of women, and to co-ordinate and drive forward policy 
development and strategies for implementation across government" (White, 
Lewis and Elam, 1998: 1). 
In cases like the women's-only jury (where men were not included as jurors) 
the juries themselves sought to rectify this perceived oversight by calling for 
men as witnesses (White, Lewis and Elam, 1998: 57). On the whole, the 
amount of time spent ensuring a broad mix of people was seen as worthwhile 
in encouraging these sorts of discussions. More importantly, in the ESB&H 
jury, because of the diversity of the group, the jurors were able to highlight 
one other important deliberative principle: while the issue was specifically 
women's cancer treatment in their local area, the real underlying issues were 
health in general, attitudes to illness, NHS funding and care. 
The next stage is to randomly select the requisite number of jurors from the 
permissible candidates, a few stand-by jurors are usually selected to be 
available in cases of illness and other unforeseen problems. In fact, in 
addition to the problems associated with finding potential jurors, a great deal 
of work goes into keeping them on board, regular telephone calls to jurors 
are made in the days leading up to the jury and the recruiters themselves if 
61 
@Fi@ 
-

they are not officially part of the jury, are usually present at the initial session 
so that jurors can be met by someone they had already had some contact 
with (White, Lewis and Elam, 1998). 
Having chosen the jury members, the organisers then ensure that the 
question they are set is suitable, accessible and interesting. A great deal of 
time is spent choosing appropriate witnesses and this is usually done in 
consultation with the pilot group or with focus groups (lTC, 1998: 9; White, 
Lewis and Elam, 1998: 2). For example, in the case of the ITC jury, 
witnesses included television producers, an advertising executive, college 
lecturers, children who watch television, as well as television viewers who 
have previously contacted the ITC to make a complaint about taste and 
decency as well as politicians and civil servants (lTC, 1998). An analysis of 
the witness lists for other juries show a similar mix of lay and expert 
witnesses. Once these details have been settled the moderators are chosen 
and the location details are finalised. 
Juries are typically held in hotel convention centres, university campuses or 
in public buildings, such as libraries. The participants are expected to give up 
one evening prior to the start of the jury for a social "get to know you" session 
and then between four to five days of their time for actual jury sessions 
(White, Lewis and Elam, 1998; Coote and Lenaghan, 1997; Hall and Stewart, 
1996; Delap, 1998). Some of the juries take place on a continuous basis 
working one day after another, without a rest day in between. Other juries 
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have been known to take a rest day or even a break over a weekend (Hall 
and Stewart, 1996). Some juries have been run over consecutive weekends 
to facilitate those who would not be willing or able to take leave from work 
(White, Lewis and Elam, 1998: 17). The arrangements made by convening 
bodies while different, display no obvious pattern. 
Incentive payments 
Payments made to jurors vary; the average payment made to jurors included 
in this study was £50 per day plus expenses. This is usually paid as a gift to 
avoid income tax difficulties as well as complications for those who receive 
benefits payments (White, Lewis and Elam, 1998: 20-21). However, recent 
changes in the taxation system have made this more difficult. Paying jurors is 
seen as a positive aspect of the citizens' jury model and evidence shows that 
more participants from usually marginalized groups do come forward to 
participate (Dienel, 1989; Hall and Stewart, 1996). However, according to 
McLeod et al. (1999), they may have come forward anyway as marginalized 
groups tend to be more interested in these types of activities than might be 
expected. This finding corroborates the reports of recruiters who say that the 
payment was usually only mentioned to a potential juror when they had 
agreed in principle to take part. White, Lewis and Elam (1998: 20) remind us 
that interviewers were asked "not to use it [the payment] to encourage 
participation where there seemed little interest in, or enthusiasm for, the idea 
of juries". They also note that the degree to which the payment was influential 
was varied and in some cases was seen as irrelevant. 
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What the payments are really intended to do is to create the sense that 
participants are actually working as "public consultants" (Dienel, 1989: 136). 
This perception is credited with encouraging a serious approach to the tasks 
being carried out and getting the group of jurors to work together from the 
start. It is believed that the feeling of being taken seriously is substantiated 
when an individual is paid for their opinions; this is the key to the success of 
the juries (Dienel, 2002). Jurors are also reimbursed for their travel expenses 
and are provided if necessary, with childcare in the form of a creche. In cases 
where only a few jurors would avail of this opportunity, a payment to cover 
the cost of childcare during the jury is made instead (Wakeford, 2002). 
The jury report 
Another issue, which separates the juries, is that of report writing. In some 
juries the moderators wrote the report based on notes taken during the 
discussions. Once the report is written, it is sent to each of the participants 
for their comments. They have the opportunity to request changes. In other 
cases, most notably the Norwich juries, the jurors write the report. In these 
cases, the jurors planned the report together and worked using an overhead 
projector with one person acting as a scribe to gather together ideas. Two 
members of the jury who had been elected by the others typed the report. 
This system of elections within the jury is also used to select a spokesperson 
for the jury should the media take up the invitation to attend either the jury 
sessions themselves or come along to the meeting at which the report is 
handed over (Sang and Davies, 1998: 46). Some of the juries included in this 
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study received a great deal of media interest: the ITC jury was filmed in its 
entirety and a 30-minute documentary about the jury was broadcast on 
lTV/Carlton regional television; the Luton jury was covered for a national 
news programme in England; the second Norwich jury was reported at length 
in the local news, and the first Women's Unit jury was covered by a national 
radio programme in England. Others were also covered in the local and 
national press. 
The role of moderation 
The issue of moderation is not discussed in the above description because it 
varies between juries. The moderator is usually an academic from a local 
university, although she or he will not necessarily be working in the field in 
which the jury will deliberate. The moderator works alongside a professional 
facilitator to chair the sessions of the jury. The facilitator devises the time­
plan, the use of group work, pair work and the general arrangements about 
refreshment breaks. The moderator and the group themselves usually start 
off by agreeing a general set of ground rules about fairness and jury 
etiquette. However, the facilitator also negotiates with the jurors themselves 
on the more procedural issues about when to allow observers into sessions 
or when sessions should be held "in camera" (New, 1998: 14-15). 
Throughout the process these "rules" are usually negotiable and the 
participants can introduce their own rules or challenge existing ones (Kuper, 
1996, 1997). 
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The King's Fund describes how the moderators were keen to ensure that the 
juries did not include too many closed sessions. It was felt that a closed jury 
might raise questions about coercion of the jurors by the organisers but also 
"if jurors are made to feel too comfortable with one another, and therefore 
unwilling to challenge the opinions of their colleagues, productive and critical 
debate within the group might be inhibited" (New, 1998: 14). These are 
complex issues, which cannot ever be fully resolved. If people are too 
comfortable with each other they might not want to be seen as being hostile 
to new friends (Price, 2000: 272-273). But it is up to the organisers of the 
citizens' jury to arrange the process so that as Bohman (1999a: 594) 
suggests, 
everyone is dependent on everyone else both for their cooperation and 
for their contribution to the collective organisation of knowledge. Such 
dependence is a consequence of seeing intelligence as a genuine 
social property, not merely as an extension of individual capacities and 
powers. If inquiry is democratically organised, then socially distributed 
knowledge is not represented anywhere but in the group as a whole. 
This mutual dependence makes it impossible for any subgroup or 
individual to possess knowledge sufficient to gain control over the social 
processes since only the full collective knowledge of the group can 
achieve social control. 
While the moderators are crucial to the effectiveness of the process, their 
involvement is not always seen as benign. Moderators themselves have 
responded to the criticism that the opinions expressed by the jurors are 
invalid because they have been taught that admitting "facilitation - like 
teaching - is inherently dysfunctional if it encourages participants' 
dependence on the facilitators .... The challenge for us was to become 
increasingly redundant," (Sang and Davies, 1998: 36-37) echoing Gaventa's 
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(1999: 56) stipulation that the role of a good facilitator is to "work yourself out 
of a job". 
The most important thing for the moderators to remember is that they must 
enable the group to develop the confidence to move from a discussion of the 
technical issue at hand to a dialectical exchange because only then can 
citizens "engage in discourse rather than simply have an input" (Simreli King, 
Feltey and O'Neil Susel, 1998: 320). 
Understanding the citizens' jury 
The above discussion highlights the points made in the preceding chapter 
about the importance of examining the inner dynamics of political 
participation in terms of the discourse entered into and the discourse ethics 
applied to the discussions rather than the actual events themselves. The 
overriding aim of this type of analysis is to uncover the way that opportunities 
for discursive participation are created below the surface, not always in 
words but through gestures, nods of encouragement and open body 
language (Forester 1985a). As Oryzek (1995: 108) notes, the purpose of this 
type of research is "not simply to offer arguments to support positions within 
policy debates, but, more importantly, to scrutinize the conditions under 
which debate proceeds." 
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The next chapter included in this study attempts to incorporate the model of 
the citizens' jury outlined here into a more theoretical discussion of 
deliberation. As we have seen from the above, and according to Stewart 
(1997: 10), the intention of the citizens' jury is that "over the three to four day 
period jurors develop[ed] considerable understanding of the issue, were 
ready to modify their views and come up with recommendations". In some 
cases, this has been achieved as the reports by Hall and Stewart (1996) 
have shown, but more important to this study is the way that the jurors 
change their communication strategies. Some of the ways this is facilitated 
by the citizens' jury is through the opportunity they are given to open up the 
discussion to include new areas. In this way, it is expected that the jurors will 
be able to widen the scope of the discussion by calling witnesses from other 
sectors, and that they might even challenge the procedures for carrying out 
their deliberations. In short, the citizens' jury is used to gather reflective 
opinions that are based on reasoned arguments not on opinion. 
Citizens' jury organisers have normally justified their work by drawing on the 
idea of deliberation presented by Habermas (1972: 37-40) without directly 
referring to his work. In this vein, the goal of public deliberation is assumed to 
be "to initiate public processes of self-refiection"(Bohman, 1996: 200), and 
this is the process that will be described under the heading of deliberative 
democracy. For Bohman (1996: 200), deliberative forums that operate at a 
public level achieve this because "the self-critical and self-reflexive character 
of public reasoning can be a source of innovation and change in 
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democracies". The emphasis throughout Chapters 3 and 4 then is on what 
Arendt (1965), Eder (1993,1996,1999) and Habermas (1995a) recognise as 
the capacity of learning that is created in reflection. The first step then is to 
set out what is meant when political theorists refer to deliberation as having a 
transformative potentia\. 
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3: Deliberation and the citizens' jury 
Introduction 
The last two chapters identified the theoretical and substantive points of 
reference for this study, the most important being the potential to observe 
how learning occurs in deliberative processes. This chapter on deliberation 
looks specifically at the usefulness of the citizens' jury in clarifying a number 
of aspects of deliberative democracy. As already stated, the primary object of 
my research is to examine the micro-processes at work when citizens learn 
together through exposure to deliberation. In order to show this I start with 
Habermas's work on social learning. Citizens' juries are used here because 
they might be able to show us how co-operation can "emerge and develop as 
a consequence of exchange between semi-autonomous, interdependent 
actors ... inventing new organisational forms shaped by participants' needs, 
intentions, and decisions and for making adjustments in these forms over 
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time based on learning" (Levin, 1993: 196). 
But first I deal with the notion of deliberative democracy as an alternative to 
liberal democracy. As described in the previous chapter, the strengthening of 
democracies is the ultimate goal of deliberative democrats who are faced 
with the reality of the "thinness of civic affiliation" (Seiner, 1992: 101). This is 
easy to see in Great Britain where progressively fewer adults exercise their 
vote in national elections, political parties are losing members and polls 
regularly show that the average citizen feels disconnected from politics (BBe, 
2002: 5). This decline has been discussed in the literature as the outcome of 
twin processes that have reduced the choice available to voters, with on the 
one hand, the major parties perceptibly moving to the centre to take up the 
middle ground and on the other, the concomitant move towards an emphasis 
placed on lifestyle as the modern badge of citizenship (Beck-Gernsheim, 
1996). These changes in the political culture of Britain, combined with other 
changes in modern political life, have led to a situation where many 
commentators now believe that representative democracy is facing a crisis of 
legitimacy. Deliberative democracy represents a first step in resolving these 
issues with problems of legitimacy no longer being seen as the preserve of 
experts and instead being handed over to ordinary citizens. 
Deliberative democracy is envisaged by Habermas and others as a form of 
decision making, which takes its justification and legitimacy from the fact that 
decisions made are the outcome of public arguments between citizens. The 
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theoretical arguments about the advantages of a deliberative form of 
democracy presented here, lead inevitably to arguments about how to put it 
into practice and this has led in the last decade to an admission among 
deliberative democrats of the need for an investigation of the empirical 
dimension (Schauer, 1997: 1329; How, 2001). The time has come to explore 
the effectiveness of strategies designed to engage with the public since the 
volume of participation by the public "has become a touchstone for [the] 
general effectiveness" of government (OETR, 1998). These discussions have 
led to the development of a variety of models that, it is hoped, can 
reinvigorate the public's interest in public decision making and, in turn, create 
a more vigorous democracy. 
During 1997,47% of local authorities in England and Wales were using focus 
groups, 26% used visioning exercises, 23% involved users in some form of 
service management, 18% had citizens' panels and 5% were using citizens' 
juries (OETR, 1998). The popularity of the citizens' jury as an "innovative 
method of involving "lay people" in often complex and challenging decisions" 
grew, and "since 1996 there have been over two hundred citizens' juries held 
in this country" (IPPR, 2002). The use of such initiatives is a key part of the 
New Labour government's programme of "democratic renewal" (Lowndes, et 
aI., 2001: 445). Lowndes et a1. (2001) carried out work to establish which 
types of participation were most popular and they identified five different 
methods: consumerist methods, traditional methods, forums, consultative 
innovations and deliberative innovation. The figures they present closely 
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match those released by the OETR in 1998 with only 5% using citizens' juries 
(Lowndes et aI., 2001). Despite the publicity attached to citizens' juries they 
conclude that local authorities still tend to favour consumerist methods such 
as opinion polls and satisfaction surveys with 92% using them (Lowndes, 
Pratchett and Stoker, 2001). Similarly forums, like neighbourhood forums or 
service user forums, were used by 87% of local authorities (Lowndes, 
Pratchett and Stoker, 2001). Seargeant and Steele (1999) found that most 
local authorities use a number of different techniques with the average local 
authority using 9 different methods. 
In the 1998 White Paper Modern Local Government: In Touch with the 
People (OOPM, 1998), the British Government clearly set out its aims "to see 
consultation and participation embedded into the culture of all councils ... and 
undertaken across a wide range of each council's responsibilities". Lowndes, 
Pratchett and Stoker (2001), have reviewed the policy literature on attempts 
to encourage citizen participation in decision-making and uncovered a long 
list of initiatives that are being used to establish this new culture. Some of 
these initiatives are listed above, and their use highlights the interest of the 
British Government in engaging the public in the hope of securing public 
support for policies that might otherwise lead local authorities into 
controversy or, worse still, expensive and painful planning appeals. 
So far, most of these initiatives have involved asking the public to make a 
straightforward choice between a limited number of options. Famous 
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examples include the Croydon and Bristol referendums on council tax 
increases held in 2001 (Croydon Council, 2001; LRGRU, 2002). in addition to 
referendums, citizens' panels (Luton Borough Council, 2000), user forums, 
area forums (Norwich City Council, 2002) and power groups (Norwich City 
Council, 2002) are used by local authorities to gauge public opinion by 
discussing a variety of public service plans with a "sounding board" of about 
one thousand inhabitants who are selected to be statistically representative 
of the area and who meet several times a year. Panels like these are used by 
Luton Borough Council (2000) and Norwich City Council (2002). 
Area/neighbourhood forums are also used and meet regularly to discuss the 
service needs and provision for a particular geographical area. Perhaps the 
most popular method is the focus group. These are made up of small groups 
of the general population who are chosen to represent a particular group or 
groups of citizens. They are asked to meet for about one to two hours to 
discuss a specific issue and are usually one-off exercises. The members of a 
focus group are asked to describe their attitude to certain plans or strategies 
and although they do have some opportunity to engage with other members 
of the group, by their relatively short-lived nature they are opinion gathering 
rather than opinion forming. Focus groups are u'sed by large numbers of 
companies, health authorities, local councils and even television 
programmes. These forums can be divided into what are referred to below as 
conventional and deliberative forms of participation. This distinction is 
important to show what the deliberative form of participation can truly mean 
in practice. 
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Conventional participation 
The conventional approach to participation is based on the assumption that 
citizens can be written into the existing structure of decision making. In this 
case, the problem is first identified by the administrators (operating in their 
capacity as experts) who set out to uncover the possible solutions within the 
existing structures of the system. The input of the citizen is sought once the 
issue has been framed and possible solutions have been formulated. This 
approach puts the issue at the centre of the process with the existing 
structures of the system protecting it and preventing both the administrators 
and the citizens in particular from transforming either the construction of the 
problem or the system which gave rise to it. The role of the administrator in 
this system is essentially to insulate the system from the citizen who is 
"reactive and judgemental often sabotaging the administrators' best efforts" 
(Simrell King, Feltey and O'Neil Susel, 1998: 320). In the conventional 
approach, the citizen is placed at the greatest possible distance from the 
problem and must rely on the administrator to make changes. This type of 
participation gave rise to instruments such as the suggestion box, the 
interactive website and even the focus group and is regarded by citizens as 
symbolic rather than real (Simrell King, Feltey and O'Neil Susel, 1998; 
Crosby, Kelly and Schaefer, 1986). 
This view is verified by the work of theorists of participation who have also 
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noted a lack of commitment to uncovering real public opinion among 
participation administrators and the public who take part in non-deliberative 
forums because of the lack of emphasis on uncovering reasons for 
preferences. Simrell King, Feltey and O'Neil Susel (1998) quote a number of 
participation administrators who are clear that processes such as focus 
groups, surveys and public meetings are inadequate and would fail to qualify 
as real participation. This debate, as well as discussion about biases in 
composition, and bias in favour of educated communicators, has been well 
rehearsed in the literature on public participation (Verba et aI., 1993). The 
SSC research quoted above, found that while the nation was neither "de­
politicised nor uninterested, it was disillusioned and disconnected" (SSC: 
2002: 1). When asked to finish the statement: "I would get more involved if ... " 
more than a third of respondents ticked either "I thought my contributions 
made a difference" (24%), and "I thought anyone would listen"" (12%). Their 
research findings are supported by other research carried out by the Institute 
for Public Policy Research (lPPR) in England which verifies these positive 
outcomes and they state "citizens' juries demonstrate[d] that ordinary 
members of the public are interested in policy issues and capable of 
understanding and contributing to decision making" (IPPR, 2002). People are 
not organising into angry confrontational groups to loudly protest because 
they feel that talking cannot work but it is more likely because they feel that 
the conventional approach to citizen participation adopted by many 
administrations will always place them on the periphery. This distancing of 
the public is seen as a sign that the administrators are not interested in their 
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input and leads not only to the anger and resentment referred to above, but 
also to what Matthews (1994) calls political impotence which will in turn serve 
to undermine any underlying commitment to discourse that might exist and 
causes interest in participation itself to decline (Berman, 1997). 
Deliberative participation 
Many theorists, however, believe that the way to prevent this impotence 
turning into apathy or anarchy is found in the current trend towards citizen 
participation in the form of deliberation (Habermas, 1996; Mansbridge. 1999). 
But whether or not the citizens' jury can be taken as a deliberative form of 
participation is not an uncontested decision. At the start of this research I was 
unsure that what occurred on a citizens' jury could properly be called 
deliberation. Like Pickard (1998: 242), who notes that citizens' juries "may 
properly be described as consultation rather than participation and is far from 
being shared decision making", I was more inclined to see them as 
participatory but not deliberative. Whether or not identifying the citizens' jury 
with the deliberative approach to politics is correct is something that will need 
to be determined. Determining this will not be easy, and any such 
determination will have to proceed from a procedural point of view to rely not 
on the outcomes of the process but on the actual progress reported by the 
jurors. This will be a relatively new way of looking at the problem of 
deliberation and contradicts the belief that NIMBYism is what motivates 
individuals to get involved in the first place not an abstract notion of 
commitment to the public use of the reason (Lake, 1993). Fear of the NIMBY 
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character of the general public has led critics of deliberation to criticise public 
involvement on the assumption that the inevitable "selfish parochialism" of 
ordinary citizens "generates locational conflict that prevents attainment of 
societal goals" (Lake, 1993: 87) but my research can highlight areas of 
positive change (Forester, 1999). 
As the discussion in the next chapter of this thesis will show, I reject the 
critique of deliberative democracy that assumes the public are on the whole 
incapable of engaging in "conversations that involve more than the evaluation 
of efficiency" (Forester, 1999: 86). This has also been refuted by Forester 
(1999) and Bohman (1996), who both seek to make use of the theory of 
discourse ethics to investigate the foundational tenet of deliberative 
democracy - "political decision making is legitimate insofar as its policies are 
produced in a process of public discussion and debate in which citizens and 
their representatives, going beyond mere self-interest and limited points of 
view, reflect on the general interest or their common good" (Bohman, 1996b: 
4-5). The second half of this thesis is occupied with the need to establish 
whether the conversations that the jurors engage in are more than mere 
conversations or do they represent discourse and therefore a deliberative 
form of participation. 
The turn to deliberation represents is different from the conventional type of 
participation because it involves changing the way the components of the 
discourse - system, citizen and administrator are arranged around the issue. 
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This model is what I call the deliberative construction of citizen participation 
and in this model, the role of the citizen in influencing the outcome of the 
participation process is increased and the role of the administrative system 
and the administrators is lessened. The citizens' influence is increased 
because they have access to the issue itself in the framing and construction 
stages (Simrell King, Feltey and O'Neil Susel, 1998: 321). 
This arrangement is seen by the participating citizens as more transparent 
and trustworthy, not simply a bolt-on to give legitimacy to a decision that has 
already been made 
From the very beginning people need to be involved ... If you go to the 
community with a totally preset agenda that does not work. Bringing 
people into the process too late does not work ... 1 think it is very 
important that individuals be given the opportunity, prior to the decision 
being made to provide input, [Citizens must have] enough time to 
process that information. There is a lot of phony participation going on 
out there (Simrell King, Feltey and O'Neil Susel, 1998: 320). 
This is what they refer to as authentic participation. This means that from the 
very beginning, as with the citizens' jury, the citizen is involved. This is 
deemed necessary not only in order for the participation to be seen by them 
as authentic, but also because the very idea of citizen participation is based 
on the idea of engaging citizens through discourse in a "dialectical exchange" 
(Fischer, 1993: 183). This way the citizen can be involved in not only framing 
the solution but in transforming the system. This happens with the steering 
groups used by citizens' jury organisers to identify and set the questions to 
be discussed by the jury and the inclusion of most jurors in the evaluations 
after the juries (lTC, 1998: 9). The deliberative arrangement of the 
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participants in the decision making process is the prerequisite of an authentic 
participation process. 
According to Habermas (1976: 107-108), a system which does not allow all 
participants in a discourse to have an equal footing is illegitimate. 
Participatory processes such as the public meeting or the focus group fail to 
meet the standards of a deliberative model because of the time constraints 
imposed on the meetings themselves, the expert-amateur dichotomy created 
and sustained by the setting as well as the lack of trust on both sides. The 
expert fears the public is too fearful of change and the "amateur" fears the 
motives for the changes proposed. Lack of trust is also acknowledged to 
have prevented the citizen having an equal footing in the deliberative 
approach and, in an attempt to challenge this inequality, the issue is firmly 
set at the centre of the entire process (Roberts, 1997). Two important signs 
of this arrangement are firstly that the citizens' jurors, unlike lega\ jurors, are 
not required to reach a decision but instead to make recommendations. This 
lack of compulsion to reach a decision is seen as a positive way to prevent 
coercion. The need for unanimity is rejected on the basis of research into 
\egal juries carried out in the United States by Ellsworth (1989), who has 
shown that it can serve to hinder the /egal jury process. This attempt to 
create a more relaxed process is accepted by citizens' jury organisers who 
advise the citizens' jurors not to search for unanimity (Wakeford, 2002: 1). 
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Organisers behind citizens' juries also benefit from its similarities with the 
system of legal juries. This model of citizen participation draws on similarities 
with the system of legal juries to give it the initial air of legitimacy that the 
legal system retains in the eyes of the public. As Stewart, Kendall and Coote, 
(1994: 5) write: 
citizens take part in juries within the judicial system. Although jury 
service is compulsory, what is significant is the seriousness with which 
it is undertaken. Around such commitment participation can develop. 
Juries are robust institutions that have survived for many centuries, 
although they have assumed their present form relatively recently. They 
give expression to citizenship both as a duty and as an activity. They 
rest upon the assumption that citizens can bring their judgement to bear 
upon often complex issues, hearing evidence over prolonged periods of 
time, deliberating and drawing conclusions. Citizens' juries can build on 
that tradition. 
Deliberation and the citizens' jury 
The attempts to find a way to facilitate and promote greater levels of citizen 
activity listed above are currently made in the name of deliberative 
democracy. A call to change the approach to public decision making to one 
that is more deliberative has gained support in recent years. The current 
British Government believes deliberation could make the work of governance 
more legitimate (DETR, 1998), and the British public also express support for 
this approach (BBC, 2002). The promise of deliberative democracy is at a 
minimum "understood to be a device for broadening the social base of policy" 
(Price, 2000: 272). It is assumed that, by actively seeking out and including 
the input of ordinary citizens in policy debates, the quality of policy decisions 
can be improved. The use of the word "ordinary" is contentious but in the 
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case of the literature on deliberation in general and citizens' juries in 
particular it is usually used interchangeably with the term "lay" to describe 
non-professional or non-expert. It is not intended to mean that the people 
chosen to take part, or indeed any person, is entirely passive or objective 
(New, 1998: 7). 
The first thing deliberative democrats need to understand is what it is about 
representative democracy that prevents people taking part or, indeed, being 
included. For Habermas (1996) and Benhabib (1996), this means that 
deliberative democracy needs to take account of the processes at work 
where citizens engage in discourse. Recent research carried out in the USA 
goes some way to address this and examines, as I do, the transformative 
potential of participation in a deliberative process (Gastil, Deess and Weiser, 
2002). The researchers examined whether or not there was a link between 
legal jury participation and electoral participation. They conclude that a 
conclusive deliberative experience leads to an increase in electoral 
participation after the jury has ended. They define as conclusive the 
experience of serving on ajury that reached a verdict. In fact, they conclude 
"participation begets participation ... The jury may serve as an institutionalised 
school for political participation" (Gastil, Deess and Weiser, 2002: 585). They 
also expect that while "the effects observed in this study are modest, over 
time and across a large population they could constitute a tremendous force 
sustaining political participation across generations" (Gastil, Deess and 
Weiser, 2002: 585). 
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When Gastil, Dees and Weiser (2002) emphasise conclusive participation 
they mean participation that results in the jury reaching a verdict but the 
approach taken here is more fluid. The goal here is to highlight the 
communicative validity of the reasoning used by the citizens' jurors to reach a 
verdict. Evidence of changes in the way the jurors solve social and moral 
problems, if any is found, is used instead to examine change as part of a 
process of transformation. As noted in Chapter 1, the search for 
transformation of preference through discourse is what marks deliberative 
democracy as a form of democracy in its own right, it is also what determines 
whether or not learning is occurring. Participants in deliberation are not 
judged in terms of reaching a verdict, or "getting a result" (How, 2001: 184). 
Gastil and Dillard (1999: 3) believe that jurors can learn to act in the 
discursive way necessary to enable these transformations. They refer to this 
ability as the "development of citizens' political sophistication". This rather 
oblique description ties in with Elster's and my contention that we should be 
concentrating on political activity as a form of moral consciousness where 
"the decisive political act is engaging in public debate with a view to the 
emergence of a consensus" (Elster, 1997: 3, my italics). While I agree that 
the ability to reach conclusive verdicts is a clear sign that a more mature level 
of moral consciousness has been achieved, I also persist with this broader 
definition of consensus. 
Therefore, while Habermas is often heavily criticised for seeking consensus, 
what he is doing as a deliberative democrat is looking for consensus more 
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akin to what Taylor (1999) calls "overlapping consensus". Overlapping 
consensus only requires participants to reach an agreement to continue in 
the discursive relationship even if the outcomes and decisions made are not 
to their liking. However, Habermas (1995c: 121-122) did oppose the idea of 
overlapping consensus, stating that it leads to: 
merely an index of utility, and no longer a confirmation of the 
correctness of the theory; it would no longer be of interest from the point 
of view of acceptability, and hence of validity, but only from that of 
acceptance, that is, of securing social stability. 
Habermas's modest acceptance of compromise over outright consensus, 
referred to above, allows deliberative democrats who follow Habermas to see 
deliberation as a cross-cultural dialogue between representatives of different 
traditions who will not always agree on every issue but will agree to pursue 
the give and take that is central to deliberative democracy (Simon and 
Xenos, 2000). This means participants in Habermas's deliberation have even 
greater possibilities for mutual learning from each other's moral universe 
(Taylor, 1999). Participants are then assumed to be able to agree on courses 
of action, not because they have accepted every demand made by opposing 
groups, but because they have agreed on a few fundamental norms though 
they might agree on them for different reasons. 
In terms of concrete outcomes, most citizens' juries run in Great Britain have 
led to only minor policy changes in the practices of local authorities and other 
convening bodies, but this is not the point of the citizens' jury. While concrete 
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changes in policy-making activities are positive developments, I remain 
unconvinced that the absorption of the jurors into the policy process even as 
sources of "pressure" is positive. Elizabeth (1998: 4), reports as a positive 
outcome that "in some cases the jurors themselves have kept up the 
pressure on the health authority" but, like Forester's (1999: 208) study of 
community development workshops, I feel the citizens' juries are interesting 
not because of policy outcomes but in spite of them. What is important is the 
opportunity they offer us to understand how Habermas's (1995a) moral 
development is achieved by means of a culture of participation and 
deliberation. 
In support of this broad definition of what can be defined as political culture, 
Leftwich (1984) has argued that "political" activity occurs throughout society 
and can take place in social encounters of any type. Similarly, Stoker (1995: 
5) believes that politics occurs wherever there is "conflict and co­
operation ... [which]. .. reflects and indeed influences the structure of society". 
The key strength of deliberative democracy then lies in its ability to recognise 
and accommodate difference. Instead of simply relegating issues like gender 
and ethnicity to the private sphere, a deliberative form of democracy 
accommodates these issues via institutional and cultural changes but this 
can only be achieved if they are first recognised as moral issues (Honneth, 
1995). 
:~ 
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In order to capture this culture, citizens' jury participants are selected to 
maximise the opportunity for contested issues to arise, participants are 
chosen to represent different types, and while they are chosen to act as 
"trustworthy surrogates" (Dahl, 1989) who, it is believed, will find the most 
points of disagreement on which to build their discussions, they are also 
understood to serve as a proxy for the public at large (Weeks, 2000: 361). 
These arrangements are made to avoid repeating the mistakes of 
deliberative forums that "are too antiseptic, too free of the historical legacies 
of pain and suffering, racism and displacement that citizens bring to decision 
making arenas" (Forester, 1999: 201). In this way, unlike conventional 
avenues of citizen participation, the organisers take to heart Habermas's 
(1995a: 3-4) stipulation that discourse is what happens after the normal 
avenues of discussion based on shared beliefs break down: 
In everyday life we start from a background consensus pertaining to 
those interpretations taken for granted among participants. As soon as 
this consensus is shaken, and the presuppositions that certain validity 
claims are satisfied (or could be vindicated) is suspended, the task of 
mutual interpretation is to achieve a new definition of the situation which 
all participants can share. If their attempt fails communicative action 
cannot be continued. One is then basically confronted with the 
alternatives of switching to strategic action, breaking off communication 
altogether, or recommencing action oriented to reaching an agreement 
at a different level, the level of argumentative speech (for the purposes 
of discursively examining the problematic validity claims, which are now 
regarded as hypothetical). 
This means that in deliberative democracy, the parties involved in the 
deliberations are challenged to state their implicit understandings of issues 
and problems in order to discover points of contact with other participants 
(Hall and Stewart, 1996; Coote and Lenaghan, 1997). 
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This is where the citizens' jury is unlike other deliberative forums. It operates 
with Schudson's (1997) distinction between "sociable" and "problem-solving" 
conversations and concentrates on the latter. Sociable conversations occur 
between relatively like-minded individuals and are difficult to turn into 
discourses. Instead, for Schudson (1997), problem-solving conversations can 
only operate at a public level because they take place between people with 
different backgrounds and value systems. This is because they must involve 
a level of argumentative speech and therefore must operate in public if they 
are not to be reduced to mere coercion. A citizens' jury can achieve 
discourse, and therefore a valid outcome, even if it only uses a small sample 
of the population since it creates the conditions for argumentative speech 
that will lead to a public discourse in spite of its short duration (Weeks, 2000: 
361). The careful selection of the jurors helps to further short-circuit this 
process and gets discourse happening sooner. By seeking out people who it 
is expected will disagree with one another, the tendency to put on a show of 
consensus for the sake of appearances and good manners should break 
down more quickly (Matthews, 1994). 
This set of arrangements means that participants on a citizens' jury who 
might attempt to practise exclusion through dominance, or even the threat of 
stigma or violence, should not be able to hide behind false claims to 
rationality (Mouffe, 1994). Instead they will need to create structures of 
accommodation and tolerance. By relying on group work, the citizens' jury 
members are artificially primed to see their differences from other members 
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of the group. The most common working method is to divide the groups into 
constantly-changing groups of four or five members to work on different 
topics and, by rotating them constantly, the level of comfort that might 
otherwise be created and might lead to antipathy about causing a 
disagreement is reduced. But this working method, combined with a 
concerted effort to include "oppressed groups" (Scott, 1990: 223), can only 
work if the facilitators remain committed to the recognition and acceptance of 
the "hidden transcripts" that are carried in people's culture. These hidden 
transcripts find expression especially among oppressed groups in "cultural 
forms - stories, theatre, music, humour" (Scott, 1990: 102). To find out if the 
citizens' jury can sufficiently accommodate difference, the first thing I do is 
look into the processes of discursive will formation and the role played in 
discourse by mechanisms of social learning (Gastil, Deess and Weiser; 
2002). The assumption is that by engaging in the practicalities of decision 
making, the dynamics of group work, the process of negotiation and 
collective reasoning, the participants can learn to become, as quoted above 
"subordinate to the common impulse" (Tocqueville, 1966: 127). But 
deliberative democracy as it has been presented above, has not yet been 
unquestioningly accepted into the mainstream of political and social theory. 
We need to understand why this is the case. 
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Deliberative democracy: a cultural turn 
The full acceptance of deliberative democracy as an alternative to liberal 
democracy, or at least as a necessary supplement, has been slow because 
in many of its earliest guises it became conflated with the idea of a localised 
democracy where problems are sorted out face-to face. Much of the early 
work on deliberative democracy was tied up with trying to unravel the 
dilemma that modern societies are complex and, even on a simple logistical 
level, all affected parties cannot be given the opportunity to have their say. 
Dahl (1970: 67-68) illustrates this problem by calculating that, "if an 
association were to make one decision a day, allow ten hours a day for 
discussion, and permit each member just ten minutes - rather extreme 
assumptions ... then the association could not have more than sixty 
members." This kind of reasoning has been used against deliberative 
democrats from the outset but is itself flawed. At the most basic level, Dahl's 
(1970) argument is undermined by the advent of new technologies that have 
meant that large groups of people can meet, for instance in online forums 
thus rendering obsolete the need for physical proximity (Budge, 1996: 1). But, 
as discussed above, the principle that guides this research is a commitment 
to an understanding of deliberation as a cultural and discursive phenomenon 
and e-democracy will not form part of this discussion. 
Chambers (1995: 177), believes that 
the ideal of a consensually steered society is the ideal of a society that 
is committed to a certain type of political culture. Implementing practical 
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discourse, then, is not so much a matter of setting up a constitutionally 
empowered 'body' of some sort as it is of engendering a practice. It 
involves fostering a political culture in which citizens actively participate 
in public debate and consciously adopt the discursive attitudes of 
responsibility, self-discipline, respect, cooperation, and productive 
struggle. 
But this will involve drawing the participants on a citizens' jury into situations 
where their very sense of self is called into question. Pitkin (1981: 347), 
describes the outcomes of that self-questioning in these terms: 
drawn into public life by personal need, fear, ambition or interest, we 
are there forced to acknowledge our power and standards. We are 
forced to find or create a common language of purposes and 
aspirations, not merely to clothe our private outlook in public disguise, 
but to become aware ourselves of its public meaning. We are forced as 
Joseph Tussman has put it, to transform 'I want' into 'I am entitled to', a 
claim that becomes negotiable by public standard. In the process we 
learn to think about the standards themselves, about our stake in the 
existence of standards of justice, of our community, so that we 
ourselves are changed. Economic man becomes a citizen. 
This is what the organisers of deliberative processes are trying to do, to 
create a "we" narrative out of a plurality of individuals. It is only in discursive 
situations that the principles of discourse ethics come into play. Citizens who 
operate according to the principles of discourse ethics experience these 
changes as challenges to the very meaning of their world, necessitating a 
reorganization of their basic assumptions about how to proceed (Habermas, 
1990). 
By engaging in discourse Habermas believes participants in something like a 
citizens' jury might be able to experience reflexivity, which is essentially the 
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capacity to learn about the self as an individual and as a member of a 
collectivity. This learning precipitates a redefining of their life-world and "has 
an emancipatory moment, for it reveals the potentiality of change and 
introduces the creative dimension" (Delanty, 1999: 145). It also precipitates a 
challenge to existing ideas of democracy as primarily about decision making. 
It involves the acceptance of a new culture. This new culture is a culture of 
deliberation. 
As noted earlier, the importance attached to deliberation in political theory is 
a direct result of the urgency seen in recent research, which makes the 
assertion that the problems of cynicism and disengagement among the 
electorate are growing (Weeks, 2000; SSG, 2002). Because I am working 
mostly within an English framework, evidence of this disengagement from 
political life of the country can easily be found in the British Social Attitudes 
Survey. The BBG used this survey to collect evidence which "shows that the 
percentage of people who trust the government to put the needs of the nation 
about the interests of their own political party has dropped to a new low of 16 
per cent in 2000 compared to 39 per cent in 1974" (BSG, 2002: 1). But their 
broad conclusion is that people "are not apathetic - they are a new force, 
'savvy consumers', who want answers and solutions; who feel they have a 
right to have a say and for their voice to be heard" (SSG, 2002: 1). This 
finding points to the main theoretical attempts being made to re-enchant 
democracy: direct democracy and deliberative democracy_ 
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The trend towards deliberation is being replicated all over the western world 
but too often it is reduced to being an adaptive rather than a generative 
process. In Great Britain this has meant that the benefits of deliberation are 
understood in terms of lifelong learning which is clearly seen as an adaptive 
process. According to the then Secretary of State for Education and 
Employment (Edwards, 2000: 1) 
[lifelong learning] helps make ours a civilised society, develops the 
spiritual side of our lives and promotes active citizenship ... Iearning 
contributes to social cohesion and fosters a sense of belonging, 
responsibility and identity ... learning is essential to a strong economy 
and inclusive society. 
Thinking about deliberation as an adaptive process is too limited and 
according to Cohen (1991) and Elster (1983), leads to political resignation 
which makes it an ineffective way to solve longstanding problems. The 
challenge for deliberative democrats is to uncover a set of generative 
processes that can enable decision makers to learn about alternative ways of 
solving problems. Roberts (1997: 125-126) identifies four types of learning: 
directive, reactive, generative and adaptive. 
Adaptive learning involves trying to innovate in response to external factors 
facing the participants and leads to "groping along" and seeking out new 
ideas about how to behave as and when problems arise (Roberts, 1997: 
125). A reliance on generative learning practices, although costly as the 
discussion in Chapter 2 has shown, is more efficient in the long-term and 
involves an ongoing commitment to the process of seeking out new ideas for 
action. Roberts (1997) and Elster (1983) both promote adaptive approaches, 
92 
which have been shown to rely on learning "in action" (Schon, 1983). This 
means testing hypotheses, reflecting on the outcomes of these tests and 
reframing our strategies as a result. 
The generative approach is closer to the Habermasian approach being taken 
here and involves remaining open to the possibility that things could be done 
better and that no problem is ever fully solved. Therefore organisations or 
systems that adopt a generative approach to seek out public input and public 
consideration "about how problems are to be defined and understood, what 
the range of possible solutions might be, and who should have the 
responsibility for solving them" (Reich, 1990: 7) tend to fare better in the 
longer term. The generative approach enables us to achieve the same 
outcome as the adaptive approach but is potentially less time consuming and 
potentially less expensive than a trial and error approach (Forester, 1999: 
130). One of the key critiques of the citizens' jury model has been the cost, 
but the costs incurred are often far higher when planning processes lead to 
changes that the public will not accept and hence to litigation or expensive 
planning appeals. The generative approach can get around this because it 
relies on enabling deliberation since, rather than carrying out a number of 
actual experiments, it relies on working through the possible outcomes of the 
experiments had they been carried out in dialogue (Roberts, 1997, Forester, 
1999). In this way, not only can decisions be made but we also develop 
insight into the relationship between knowledge and power in society. This 
knowledge can then be used to further enhance the process each time it is 
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used, thus reducing the costs of consultation over time as the culture of 
participation that it engenders takes hold and citizens learn to deliberate 
(Doxtader, 1995), and Gastil and Dillard's (1999) "political sophistication" is 
developed. I will return to discussing the process of generative learning in 
Chapter 4 but first how does deliberative democracy (understood as a 
journey to moral maturity) work? 
The relationship between deliberation and learning 
For Edwards (2000: 1), "learning ... stimulates inquiring minds and nourishes 
our souls ... Iearning develops the intellectual capital which is now at the 
centre of the nation's competitive strength". Adopting a discourse approach 
to deliberative democracy goes further than Weeks's (2000) theory allows 
and also highlights the moral aspects of the learning that take place as 
ordinary citizens are transformed into active citizens. By removing the 
individual from the centre of the decision making process and replacing 
her/him with ideas about how to resolve the problem, deliberative democrats 
can ensure that learning is not being reduced to citizens adapting to the 
needs of the society but instead it is society itself that is charged with 
adapting. By highlighting and confronting ambiguities and oppositions, 
citizens are forced to look for solutions that can better represent the needs of 
the whole of society. Dryzek (2000, 154-155) supports this position and he 
reformulates the idea of representativeness to refer to the representativeness 
of the discourses that are used to solve the problem. His position forms the 
key rejoinder to Dahl's (1970) dismissal of deliberation because of what he 
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sees as insurmountable problems of scale. 
Repositioning deliberation to emphasise the moral dimension serves two 
purposes, most importantly it points to the misunderstanding that the core of 
deliberation is not the individual but the reasons offered in support of a 
position. Thus, the usual critiques of deliberative forums that they 
"reinforce[d] rather than generated active citizenship and attracted 
those ... who are already socially active" (Benn, 2000: 241) are rendered less 
valid, since it is not who is present but how they interpret problems that 
matters. Secondly, the emphasis on the moral offers a meaningful challenge 
to the belief that average citizens cannot be trusted to reach sound decisions, 
a belief that has been cited throughout the course of democratic theorising. 
This argument was most famously made by Schumpeter (1943), but 
continues to be seen in more recent work. Pellizoni (1999: 100) also 
reiterates the belief that "average citizens do not have the technical skills 
necessary to make informed choices or define the links within which they can 
delegate decisions to experts". A moral understanding of deliberation takes 
away the burden of knowledge from the process of deliberation and instead 
"focuses on the manner in which a common world is shaped through joint 
interaction ... it takes into account both meanings or textual representations of 
reality and the social actions or relations by which they are generated" 
(Strydom, 2002: 5). In the light of this, a moral understanding of deliberation 
offers the opportunity get beyond what Dahl describes as "the democratic 
gamble" (1989:192). 
If deliberation can be understood not as a goal in itself that can deliver 
decisions that everyone wili agree to abide by, but instead as a process of 
social learning that enables the citizen to develop a set of capacities that can 
be stored as cultural tools to be used when a new problem emerges, then the 
promise of deliberation can be fulfilled. This claim to legitimacy of the 
deliberative programme, the idea that the experience of deliberation can 
change the socialisation of individuals, relies entirely on the idea of social 
learning as transformative and reflexive. 
A commitment to deliberation is a commitment to reflexivity. If we accept this, 
then it is clear that work on deliberation relies heavily on an understanding 
that the participants' experience of deliberation must be a learning 
experience. According to Cohen (1999: 215), a society where deliberative 
capacities are undervalued forfeits the opportunity to "generate politically 
relevant public opinion". The findings of this study suggest that the political 
culture of co-operation based on interpersonal trust identified by Chambers 
(1995) is available in contemporary civic society, but a failure to recognise 
the importance of this resource means that it is rarely drawn upon. When it is 
achieved, however, it leads to the possibility of actors like citizens' jurors 
being able to "make decisions that all citizens would agree to if given time, 
knowledge and a chance to be heard, and a disposition to make their 
reasons answerable to one another" (Bohman, 1996b: 6). 
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The legitimacy of the deliberative approach 
The next task, then, is to understand why deliberation is seen as a legitimate 
approach to problem solving. As the forgoing discussion has shown, I relate 
this to the possibility for social learning that is enabled when groups of 
individuals are given the opportunity to engage in discourse. Learning theory 
lost favour in the 1960s with criticisms of its proximity to evolutionary theories 
of society and continues to suffer from this fallout to this day (Giddens, 1984). 
Eder (1999: 196), although an important advocate of learning theory, accepts 
that existing learning theories are problematic. He points out, however, that 
the problems arise not because of any fundamental flaw with the idea but 
because theories are na'ive, "end[ing] in the notion that learning is a self­
organising process going on in society and moving society through 
progressive stages either towards moral universalism (the ethical tradition) or 
towards technological mastery of nature (the cognitive/scientific tradition)". 
But Eder (1999) does not reject the idea of societal learning, instead he calls 
for a cultural account of learning that can show how reflexive knowledge 
about ourselves and our societies is created and how it is used. How might 
learning create the deliberative potential that many theorists believe bridges 
the gap now commonly known as the democratic deficit or the democratic 
divide (Stewart, 1997: 2)? What is learning and how is it created and 
sustained? These questions are posed in the following chapter. 
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4: Social learning and deliberation 
Introduction 
The first three chapters included here contain a detailed discussion about the 
theory of deliberative democracy as well as shedding light on one of its most 
popular forms: the citizens' jury. Deliberative democracy has been defined as 
an attempt to transform the relationship citizens have not only with other 
citizens, but also with democratic procedures and practices as well as 
democratic institutions. The problem, however, is that while the existing 
literature "offers much insight into the nature of political sophistication ... it 
says relatively little about the development of sophistication" (Gasti! and 
Dillard, 1999: 3). Political sophistication was referred to earlier in the context 
of changes in their problem solving skills and even electoral participation that 
the jurors might experience as a result of the jury and essentially describes 
the behaviours associated with an individual who has experienced political 
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learning. According to Habermas, this can only occur in a social setting like 
the one the citizens' jury organisers attempt to replicate on the jury since the 
experience of learning is itself historically contingent and could only occur 
when the conditions necessary for deliberative democracy to flourish are met 
(How, 2001). In this chapter I trace the journey of participants in deliberation 
as they come to terms with how discourse occurs and is maintained. I begin 
by reiterating my commitment to a generative understanding of learning. I 
then highlight how learning can be viewed as the outcome of participation in 
deliberation and demonstrate that it is what will need to be encouraged if 
deliberative democrats are to respond to criticisms of deliberation. This 
involves undertaking an in-depth account of Habermas's work on social 
learning that will enable me to highlight the features that make it work - these 
are the commitment to reflexivity and rational reconstruction taking place in 
the public sphere. 
In short, theories of deliberation promote the idea that it enables the 
participants to get "beyond self-interest" (Mansbridge, 1990). Benhabib 
(1988) refers to it as developing "political judgement" and Nussbaum (1990) 
has put it down to the development of a "moral imagination". The decision to 
make use of a deliberative process to solve seemingly intractable political 
problems instead of simple deal-making is therefore, in effect, a decision to 
learn about our own and others' priorities and to work with others to uncover 
the best course of action when faced with opposing camps (Coote and 
Lenaghan, 1997). I show how this can be achieved through discourse, which 
I 
is the activity associated with deliberation and as a result of which learning I I 
occurs. 
Under normal circumstances discourse is difficult to set in motion but 
discussions like those that take place between citizens' jurors, which occur 
where the opportunity for disagreement has been maximised, can speed up 
this process. This is achieved because the presence of "conflicting points of 
view, highlights moral and practical trade-offs, and stimulates critical thinking" 
(Gastil and Dillard, 1999: 5). The decision to maximise the potential for 
disagreement represents a commitment to generative learning on the part of 
the organisers of citizens' juries and, in time, from the participants 
themselves. This involves accepting that although people will "bring certain 
ideals and values to the process, even specific ideas about what they think 
should be done, they nevertheless look to the public ... as sources of 
guidance" (Roberts, 1997: 126). The process thus involves more than the 
mere identification of preferences and goals as, for example, in the focus 
group, but instead by increasing the volume of information available to the 
jurors they are provided with "alternative visions of what is desirable and 
possible, to stimulate discussion about them, to provoke a re-examination of 
premises and values, and thus to broaden the range of potential responses 
and deepen society's understanding of itself," (Reich, 1990: 8). This, in turn, 
widens the moral frame of reference, which is the ultimate goal of 
deliberation (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996). 
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A wider moral frame of reference is sought by generative learning and it 
involves the creation of opportunities for individuals to submit their beliefs to 
public scrutiny, but they must also remain open to revising them according to 
new moral criteria that are learned in the process of communication (Roberts, 
1997). Generative learning means learning how to create situations in which 
experience can be stored and passed over to the next generation. In this 
way, what has been learned can be used to create new knowledge that can 
in turn be assimilated into the stock of existing knowledge of the jurors as 
they reconstruct their worldview based on their learning. This is why 
generative learning is being sought here since it provides evidence that the 
next time a citizens' juror is faced with a similar problem, s/he can draw on 
these stored processes to decide how best to act. This is why I, as a 
deliberative democrat, am so keen to promote deliberation as a 
transformative tool that enables the participant to learn how best to act. The 
knowledge that is created this way is, however, not stored in a substantive 
way, as information about a specific subject, but as social rules (Eder, 1999: 
204), thus rendering it more flexible to recurrent use and to reframing. 
Examples of social rule or norm formation will need to be found if my 
research is to support the idea of deliberation as transformative. Gastil, 
Deess and Weiser (2002) have already sought this kind of evidence in 
relation to legal jurors and while they are looking for specific behavioural 
changes, I am looking at the accumulation of social rules for evidence that 
the transformation promised by deliberative democrats is being achieved 
through the processes of deliberation that they sanction. In order to 
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understand why activities such as citizens' juries and deliberative opinion 
polls (Fishkin, 1990), future conferences and visioning exercises might be 
able to re-enchant democracy, I suggest that we need evidence that the 
participants are learning at the same time. Any process that gives people 
time and space to think about their preferences can enable better 
understanding of the issues involved but to qualify as a deliberative 
experience, the learning occurring must lead to some level of resocialisation 
and transformation of preference (Boyte, 1999). Learning as socialisation, an 
essentially reflexive process occurring in public, was most influentially 
described by Habermas (1995a), and this is where this exploration begins. 
What is social learning? 
Understanding that social learning occurs in deliberation allows us to see it 
as a process of non-psychological collective discussion in which the 
adversarial approach to problem solving can be left behind in favour of 
negotiation: 
Negotiation... requires making suggestions that the other may not have 
thought of, and learning from both acceptance and refusal. When 
negotiators engage in this quest for understanding they can use the 
understanding so gained to change the others' preferences. They can 
help others discover what they really want, creating new preferences 
that better reflect the others' needs or values. They can even help 
others develop new values (Mansbridge, 1992: 44). 
Where the participants learn in this way they can overcome what is their 
natural inclination: "to defend their positions, consider them as 
incontrovertible facts, and resist any attempt to treat them as assumptions" 
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(Roberts, 1997: 128). Participants in a deliberative process are enabled to do 
this because the very processes involved in the citizens' jury, including role­
playing, encourage them to move away from a concrete and therefore 
personal assessment of the problem, to a more schematic one. As these 
schemas become more sophisticated, they can organise political ideas and 
issues in terms of abstract or ideological constructs. Once the schemas with 
which the participants normally work at the conventional level are altered, 
they must then address any residual incoherence between these new 
schemas and their existing beliefs. This is why the deliberative process is 
often described as painful and, in fact, according to Forester, all "democracy 
is painful and any theory of political participation that obscures this fact 
should make us suspicious" (Forester, 1999: 201). This is also why it is 
described as transformative. 
Contradictory schema about similar or related issues cannot be sustained 
and instead, existing ideas must be integrated into new schema (Gastil and 
Dillard, 1999: 4). This is how learning, if it occurs on a citizens' jury, will be 
achieved. It will be seen in the greater ability of the individual to engage in 
the twin processes of self-reflection and rational reconstruction. I return to an 
explanation of how these transformations can be observed in the next 
chapter. In the meantime, it will suffice to explain that self-reflection involves 
becoming aware of "the ideological distortions that flow from repressive 
social arrangements, and incorporating it into life practice ... Rational 
reconstruction by contrast, involves theoretical reflection on, and 
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reconstruction of, the very rule systems through which human subjects 
experience the world" (How, 2001: 179). 
I identify learning as the variable that can be used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of participation in a deliberative process and which can, in turn, 
improve democratic institutions in particular and democratic processes in 
general. According to Welton (2001: 20), "a learning society ... encourages 
active citizenship, nurtures people-centred work and fosters governance and 
public spaces that engage a significant minority of citizens in deliberative 
processes committed to the common weal". However, simply discovering that 
people can learn will not solve the problems facing democracy. Instead 
learning, as indicated above, must be seen as the discernible outcome of 
taking part in discourse and engaging in the reconstruction that this entails. 
Learning is a tool that I use to draw attention to the reconstruction that 
discourse entails. This involves a commitment to an understanding of 
democracy which emphasises and "has always placed a premium on speech, 
persuasion and rhetorical skill" (Walzer, 1984: 304). Evidence of this will be 
seen where utterances made by participants in their deliberations are 
expressed more as "normative points of view than from the standpoint of 
particular interests" (Habermas, 1996: 355). 
The idea that societies can learn has existed in social theory since at least 
the beginning of the modern period. The Enlightenment period encouraged 
ordinary individuals to look inside themselves for the answers to questions 
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about how to proceed in a period of indecision or crisis. Prior to this, it had 
been the norm to concentrate on God as the universal advisor from whom all 
knowledge came, but by introducing a socialisation approach to learning we 
see it instead as a process that involves "new and innovative ways of 
conceiving reality ... based on a common morality that affected all" (How, 
2001: 191). This was the Enlightenment contribution that encouraged people 
to rely upon themselves and to believe that they could learn through 
experiment and investigation. Marx (Marx and Engels, 1987), in his studies of 
class and the inevitability of class action, interpreted this learning potential as 
the powerhouse behind the increasing complexity of class relations and 
commerce that would inevitably lead to the downfall of capitalist society and 
the bourgeoisie. Marx's position is that the dynamics of social development 
arise out of conflict between classes and that the development of new 
technologies and changes in the means of production are what creates these 
conflicts. Society, according to Marx, changes when the equilibrium between 
the classes is challenged and will eventually lead to the end of the class 
system. Such an evolutionary understanding of society steaming towards a 
final state of moral universalism was dismissed as na"ive and was all but 
forgotten until organisational psychologists (Haas, 1990; Levitt and March, 
1988), and second generation critical theorists (Eder, 1993; Habermas, 1984, 
1995a), attempted its revival in the latter part of the twentieth century. 
Habermas tried to separate out the capitalist system from the life-world and 
to show the importance of the latter. Instead of accepting the Marxist 
assumption that the rationality of decisions comes from economic relations, 
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he sought to establish how communicative rationality is established and is 
decisive in ensuring the social integration of society (How, 2001). This is why 
a version of learning theory that highlights the learning process in a 
discursive way (known as the "linguistic turn") and is based on 
communication between individuals was instead sought out by Habermas 
and marks a definite shift from his earlier, more Marxist work (Bohman, 
1996a). 
The idea that people learn through their communications with others about 
social problems lies at the centre of much of Habermas's work (1976, 1990, 
1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1996), and this learning through interaction is the 
source of the transformation sought when we deliberate. Habermas (1995b: 
170) is emphatic that "because others attribute accountability to me, I 
gradually make myself into the one who I have become in living together with 
others". This means that we learn through our interactions to take on the 
accountability necessary to deliberate effectively. 
Understanding learning in this way supports the idea that "learning involves a 
cognitive change involving changes in beliefs and perceptions" (McCoy, 
2000: 2). Thus, when we make an assertion about what it is that we want to 
see happen in response to issues raised for instance on a citizens' jury, such 
as health care rationing, we are able to incorporate the needs and 
perspectives of the other because we have developed a "conscious process 
of revaluating causal relationships" (McCoy, 2000: 2). Here McCoy is echoing 
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Matthews (1994: 195) that the individual who can see a problem from a 
social rather than individual perspective can also see how it might be solved. 
As highlighted above, learning is about self-reflection and rational 
reconstruction. This process of self-reflection, when carried out in public 
makes the individual aware of his or her own assumptions (Roberts, 1997). 
This can help the individual to refashion her/himself and her/his life practices 
leading to the adoption of new behaviours. Likewise, rational reconstruction 
involves reflecting on this new self-knowledge at a more abstract theoretical 
level. How (2001: 179) describes these changes as the difference between 
"knowing how" and "knowing that", thus we need to reconstruct the "that" by 
asking questions about the "how." This involves gaining knowledge about the 
pre-jury knowledge of the jurors in order to understand how their approach to 
solving social-moral problems has changed and establishing the 
communicative validity of the reasoning involved. 
Habermas on learning 
Habermas (1984, 1987b, 1995a) became interested in learning when looking 
at evolution as part of his theory of the emergence of bourgeois society 
(Habermas, originally 1962, in English, 1989). This, in turn, led him to 
examine social evolution and its role in the moral development of the self 
through language and communication (Habermas, originally 1979, reprinted 
1995a). The thesis presented in Communication and the Evolution of Society 
(Habermas, 1995a) drew heavily on the work of Piaget and Kohlberg and 
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attempted to understand the role of the development of personal 
communicative structures in the evolution of collective structures. By drawing 
together evolutionary paradigms and historical knowledge, Habermas sought 
to uncover the basis of our ability to order and structure our communication. 
He placed the emphasis on the individual as if to suggest that by 
understanding how the individual learns we can understand how society 
learns. 
Eder (1999: 195) describes how this work was rejected because Habermas 
(1 995a) failed to distinguish adequately between epigenetic learning and 
evolution of the genetic kind. Therefore, it should be made quite clear at this 
stage that what will be meant by learning here is epigenetic learning, that is, 
learning which is secondary to natural evolution and which deals specifically 
with cultural and social evolution. But because of the association with 
evolution, interest in learning itself waned. In an attempt to encourage 
participation and to promote the deliberative model of the public sphere, 
learning in the sense of a learning citizen has crept back onto the agenda. 
Essentially the study of social learning is now recognised as the study of 
social change. 
Habermas's (1995a) approach to understanding change in society meant 
setting out to draw a parallel with the increasing awareness of a child. How a 
child gains awareness of their position in the world is discussed at length by 
Kohlberg (in Habermas, 1995a: 69-94), and Habermas draws upon his stage 
108 
jiP 
theory to describe the moral maturation and integration processes that Occur 
when a citizen learns (How, 2001: 184). These processes can be seen not 
only in children but also in any individual who is faced with having to state 
their assumptions and lay them open to negotiation. Habermas's (1995a) 
thesis is that just as children start out in the world with no understanding of 
the conventions of the society in which they live, they can come to terms with 
the communal and social aspects of their worlds through communication with 
others and with themselves. This is how children come to see their actions as 
having social consequences (Habermas, 1995a). 
Habermas (1995a) describes childhood learning in the following way. During 
the first stage of development, the pre-conventional stage, the child is 
already able to obey cultural rules and foresee the consequences of her/his 
actions. This awareness can only show the child the consequences of her/his 
actions in terms of immediate physical gratification or punishment. Where the 
child obeys the conventions of behaviour that prevail in society, this 
obedience is entirely pragmatic and instrumental. Its main intent is to avoid 
punishment or to satisfy one's own needs. Obedience to rules is not due to a 
sense of the justice or rightness of those rules but instead to avoid sanctions. 
The next stage of moral development is known as the conventional level and 
this is when the child learns to interact with other members of society. Most 
of the effort on the part of the child is geared towards "actively maintaining, 
supporting, and justifying the order, and [of] identifying with the persons or 
group involved in it" (Habermas, 1995a: 79). This increased awareness of the 
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effects of one's actions on those around them, in particular the approval and I 
praise that arises when the behaviour is deemed good, leads to the adoption 
of a law-and-order principle in choosing a course of action. The child learns 
that behaviour which is well intentioned is good for the "maintenance of the 
social order" (Habermas, 1995a: 80). The child, in turn, comes to value the 
stability offered by these behaviours. In effect, the child learns the validity of 
conforming behaviours and becomes capable of considering the possible 
consequences of her/his actions before undertaking them. 
Behaviour like that described above is motivated by a sense that the social 
order is natural and must be maintained (Habermas, 1995a: 80). As the child 
gets older and begins to experience other life-worlds and sees how other 
families interact, the stability of the social order is threatened. The child 
operates now mostly from a conventional level of moral consciousness but 
when faced with new unexpected problems in her/his lives, she/he can draw 
on an extra set of resources at the post-conventional level that can help 
her/him decide how best to act. This is the level that the citizens' jury 
attempts to tap into. This is the stage at which the child is conscious not only 
of the needs and wishes of those around her/him but also of the needs and 
wishes of people she/he has never met and whose opinions she/he will not 
hear, but instead must be able to imagine in order to include others in her/his 
considerations. 
To do this Habermas (1995a: 80) says, a child must have learned to 
110 

hypothesise and imagine a future in which they might be in a similar position 
to the person who is now being affected by their actions (Forester, 1999:85). 
This set of behaviours is characterised for Habermas (1995a: 80) as twin 
orientations, the first he calls the social-contract legalistic orientation and the 
second is the universal ethical principled orientation. The first of these 
orientations allows the child to leave behind the idea of a natural social order 
and instead to see that the right course of action is often a matter of values 
and opinion. Understanding that different people can interpret things 
differently disturbs the idea that standards are incontrovertible and agreed 
upon by everyone. The child learns instead that agreements are made based 
on procedures that can be challenged and therefore she/he too might be 
challenged. This means that when she/he is called upon to explain 
her/himself, s/he must be able to. The law and order position of the 
conventional level is left behind and in its stead the fluidity of the life-world as 
it changes when faced with challenges and "rational considerations of social 
utility" (Habermas, 1995a: 80) is adopted. 
The final orienting principle that the child learns on this journey to moral 
maturity is based on universal ethical principles. Having learned that 
"rightness" is relative and is created in negotiation rather than based on a 
natural order of things, the child creates its own rules of behaviour to cope 
with situations that will arise in everyday life. These rules are abstract rather 
than empirical but involve adapting to the universal principles of ''justice, of 
the reciprocity and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity of 
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human beings as individual persons" (Habermas, 1995a: 80, italics in the 
original). The child has learned that in order to take part in the negotiation 
about what is the right way to do things, s/he will need to behave according 
to these principles. Not because of rules but because to defend one's claim 
to rightness one must be able to use a language that is consistent, 
comprehensible and inclusive (or universal) or otherwise face being 
overruled. When they reach adulthood this skill will normally have been fully 
honed and adults (Habermas, 1995a: 32) will be able to 
embed sentences in relation to reality in such a way that they can take 
on the general pragmatic functions of representation, expression and 
establishing interpersonal relations. This communicative competence is 
indicated by those accomplishments that hermeneutics stylises to an 
art, namely paraphrasing utterances by means of context-similar 
utterances. 
But what does this have to do with the citizens' jurors? 
Learning to deliberate via discourse 
A discourse model of democracy approaches problems in society and 
decisions to be made as issues of social co-operation. It is based on two 
assumptions, firstly that people "can improve, or become accomplished in the 
way they solve social moral problems" (How, 2001: 184), and secondly that 
higher levels of social cooperation lead to a better society. But discourse has 
a logic of its own, a logic which is not easily visible in disputes about specific 
grievances but is best seen when we look at problems from a universal 
perspective (Habermas, 1990). Political theorists in the critical tradition 
recognise that these abilities are central to the extension of the collective 
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understanding of the normative foundations of society, and that these abilities 
will in time deliver the promise of democracy as a system for a decision 
making that is based on equality. 
Actors first coming to a deliberative setting often understand their worldview 
as based on incontrovertible fact, and this is why the decision not to set out 
the learning process that awaits them as well as the challenges of self-
reflection and rational reconstruction, has been detrimental to the project of 
deliberative democracy. Deliberation must involve a reflexive approach to 
problem solving and this means that the participants are made aware of their 
assumptions and encouraged to have them scrutinised (Bohm, 1996). 
Roberts (1997: 128) describes this as follows: 
detaching assumptions and thoughts from the person who holds them 
enables people to become observers of their own thinking and to 
become aware of the potential incoherence in their own 
thoughts ... Through this process, people can begin to treat one another 
like colleagues who are attempting to move towards a greater 
understanding of an issue. The goal becomes creating a common pool 
of meaning that goes beyond stating and defending one's interpretation 
of reality. 
It is this reflexive consciousness that "makes people more receptive to the 
opportunities provided by language and communication for testing 
established ideas and tackling or demolishing blockages associated with 
culturally established ideas and understandings" (Alvesson and Skbldberg, 
2000: 116). 
On the citizens' jury the public sphere that is created is not spontaneous as 
Habermas (1989) described. The fact remains, however, that if the 
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commitment to it is as "an environment in which people are able to learn a 
new self-respect, a deeper and more assertive group identity, public skills, 
and the values of cooperation and civic virtue", this might mean that it 
represents a setting "between private lives and large-scale institutions where 
ordinary citizens can act with dignity, independence, and vision ... where 
people learn a vision of the common good in the course of struggling" (Evans 
and Boyte, 1986: 18). This means that the citizens' jury can be useful in this 
study as a proxy for the public sphere. Bohman (1996) sees that new public 
spheres emerge all the time but, in the case of the citizens' jury, innovation is 
given a helping hand by priming the socialisation processes of the individuals 
who take part. This discussion was begun in the opening chapter and will be 
continued in the concluding chapter presented here. 
Learning as socialisation 
The relationship between deliberation and learning (which is central to this 
study of the efficacy of deliberation) is a direct result of this interest in 
learning as socialisation. Socialisation is about the production of culture and 
culture is produced and reproduced as societies learn. According to Eder 
(1999: 199): "the production of modern culture is perceived by the actors 
involved as a collective learning process". This means that citizens' jurors 
can feel able to approach a seemingly unsolvable problem in a positive way 
because they accept the need to learn and to produce new knowledge and a 
new culture. Therefore differences between jurors that we might expect to be 
irreconcilable are set aside once the jurors agree to allow a learning process 
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to take centre stage. The findings of the interviews described from Chapter 7 
onwards show that this was what the jurors expected: they came to the 
process knowing that they did not know enough but wanted to learn in order 
to answer the questions posed to them and other questions that they would 
face later. 
An approach to learning as socialisation, as outlined above, means that the 
political theorist does not need to engage in debates about social 
programming or the limitations of learning understood as education. It was 
this narrow definition of learning that led to the rejection of Habermas's work 
on learning as a "superiority model" by Eder and Schmidtke (1998). Certainly 
there are problems with Habermas's work on social learning, the most 
significant of these is referred to by Strydom (1992) as the "ontogenetic 
fallacy". This means that Habermas (1995a) was perhaps guilty of attempting 
to transfer the model of individual learning (ontogenetic) to societal learning 
(phylogenetic). I believe my work can help overcome this problem by looking 
at the social relationships of the actors involved and by examining their 
relationships in terms of their use of the principles of discourse ethics in order 
to understand these relationships. 
In the following chapters I describe changes in juror attitudes and reasoning. 
However, the examples given are used because they are outlined by the 
jurors themselves in the plural (we instead of \) and in relation to the 
communicative workings of the group. According to McLeod et al. (1999: 
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745), the process of deliberation can achieve this link between the individual 
and the social because "at the micro level, each person deliberates by 
reasoning internally, weighing the issues, and selecting appropriate 
arguments to make ... Individuals can become more enlightened through the 
skills obtained prior to and during attendance at public deliberative forums". 
Deliberation at the macro level involves "the blending of diverse opinions 
among groups of individuals and interest groups" (McLeod et aI., 1999: 745). 
Matthews (1994: 195) also notes that citizens who have deliberated: 
have actually experienced a measure of the democratic ideal in practice 
[come to see that] if deliberation can happen in one meeting it can 
happen in others; that if citizens can claim responsibility and act in one 
community, they can become the solution they are looking for in other 
communities. 
If the jurors can identify an increase in their discursive skills then Cooke's 
(2000) evidence of transformation has been found. In real terms, this 
evidence will take the form of utterances from former jurors showing that they 
have learned to think of themselves not as private individuals but as 
members of a communication community. If the participants in a deliberative 
process can be shown to consider better the needs of the larger society, then 
what has long been referred to by Habermas (1990, 1995a, 1996) and Eder 
(1993,1996,1999) as a learning process has been found. 
Learning in this sense has been picked up by other writers who show that 
deliberation, understood as a learning process, recreates and transforms 
individuals into citizens. These learning citizens will display "a distinctly 
democratic kind of character - the character of individuals who are morally 
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committed, self-reflective in their commitments, discerning of the difference 
between respectable and merely tolerable differences of opinions, and open 
to the possibility of changing their mind" (Gutmann and Thompson, 1990: 
100). This transformation is seen, according to McCarthy (1995: xiii-xiv), in 
the reconstruction of life history. I attempt to show these same 
transformations by asking the jurors to reconstruct their experience of the jury 
for me, and to later tie these experiences to their own life history. 
The attempt to revive learning 
Since Habermas was carrying out this work in the 1970s, proponents of 
learning theory have sought to show how an investigation of the ways and 
means by which greater knowledge about the life-world is gained proves 
useful to those who want to understand decision-making and political activity 
in the public sphere (Eder 1993, 1999; Bohman, 1996b; Forester, 1999; 
Welton, 2001). Their approach has been to show how the social bearers of 
moral learning processes are members of a discourse community founded on 
a system of communication and reflection, the main articulation of which is 
argument. One of the most prolific followers of this tradition is Klaus Eder 
(1993, 1999), and according to both Habermas and Eder, learning is ordered 
according to the variety of structures for communication available in society. 
For both, these communication processes are tied up with the logic of 
universalisation as it is manifested in the operation of civil society 
(Habermas, 1995a). Eder (1993), who has continued to work on learning 
while Habermas has reduced it to a background principle, says that the way 
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to identify learning is to "look for the social struggles accompanying and 
controlling the processes of discursive communication" (1993: 25). Initially, in 
looking at collective learning, Habermas (1995a) was concentrating on 
applying an evolutionary model to the understanding of the development of 
human society, an approach for which he has been heavily criticised 
(Gilligan, 1982; Benhabib, 1992). However, it is useful to show how problems 
arising at the societal level give rise to learning processes. Habermas 
himself, as he was working at a theoretical level, was not concerned with the 
potential for negative applications of such models and developed them to 
understand how people communicated. 
Since then, Habermas has turned more and more to a concentration on the 
normative implications of learning, a turn which has perhaps increased the 
validity of this work. He now contends that learning alone cannot explain the 
types of interaction being experienced at the societal level, he believes that 
we must always be aware of the communication taking place not only at the 
level of the social but also of the normative undercurrents informing that 
communication. In order to understand socially created worldviews, we must 
be able to uncover the "learning processes [which] take place in the 
dimension of moral insight, practical knowledge, communicative action, and 
the consensual regulation of action conflicts" (Habermas, 1995a: 97-98). 
This move represents an attempt to provide a non-psychological model of 
learning which stresses not the role of the individual but of social 
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relationships. This approach highlights the production of culture as the 
outcome of a learning process and when we look at learning in this way, the 
capacity of the individual to recognise problems is to be seen as a function of 
their learning. Problems can then be recognised, not as exclusive and 
independent, but as part of the overall social make-up (Eder, 1999: 199). 
These problems can be discussed and communication about them set in 
motion. This communication requires the use of the powers of reflexive 
learning. For Eder (1999: 200), the outcome of this reflexive process is an 
agreement that 
norms have to be defined and agreed upon in order to generate a 
minimum of social rationality to be able to continue to exist within the 
social relations from which action started. The interesting implication of 
this is that rationality is no longer located in the individual, but in the 
social context to which [s]he is bound. 
Miller (1986) places the emphasis on the cultural aspects of learning and the 
social relations between actors that create space for rationality. For Eder 
(1999), this means moving away from looking for the meaning of actions to 
looking instead at the creation of meaning and to do this he directs us to the 
literature on recognition (Taylor, 1989, 1994; Honneth, 1995). Recognition is 
for Honneth (1995) a form of rational reconstruction through internal critique, 
essentially what is being sought when we learn together. I will return to this 
point later. 
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Why learning and deliberation? 
This call for a cultural account of learning and deliberation means that social 
learning is treated, not simply as a by-product or as an outcome of the 
process of deliberation but instead as crucial to the process. McCarthy (1995: 
xxii-xxiii) recognises that "the results of the learning process find their way 
into the cultural tradition; they comprise a kind of cognitive potential that can 
be drawn upon in social movement when unsolvable systems problems 
require a transformation of the basic forms of social integration". What 
McCarthy is describing here are the social implications of the learning 
process, which occurs in a situation like the citizens' jury. The obvious 
criticism of the model being presented here is that individuals learn all the 
time but this learning does not necessarily have an impact on the public as a 
whole. In the case of citizens' juries, this criticism is compounded by the fact 
that in Britain only between 12 and16 people take part in any citizens' jury. I 
will deal with this criticism later but at this stage it will suffice to say that this 
is, in fact, a misplaced criticism of the deliberative project because it fails to 
understand that the jury functions within the public sphere, which can include 
such activities as attendance at meetings or, less obviously, the act of private 
reading of political pamphlets. 
This is not the traditional or orthodox Habermasian (1989) position on the 
public sphere as outlined in Chapter 1; it is one that is increasingly being 
accepted by theorists like Oryzek (2000) and Goodin (2000, 2003) who work 
with the idea of the public sphere as the sum total of all discourses that 
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operate at a public level. Both Oryzek (2000) and Goodin (2000; 2003) 
conclude that all communication, whether it takes place with others or in the 
process of internal reflection, can be counted as public (Goodin, 2003), 
provided it displays communicative rationality (Habermas, 1984, 1987b) and 
is carried out with reference to a perceived other. 
I accept this refinement of the Habermasian position on the basis that in his 
work on communicative rationality (Habermas, 1984, 1987b), he sets outthe 
conditions of comprehensibility, credibility, legitimacy and sincerity which 
must be met if utterances are to qualify as communicatively rational. Here he 
is clear that while onlyreciprocal utterances can be counted as 
communication, he further clarifies that only those utterances which are 
reciprocal and oriented to mutual understanding can be included (Alvesson 
and Skoldberg, 2000: 118-119). This points to a possible concession to the 
idea that I raised in the opening chapter concerning reflexive deliberation 
(Goodin, 2003). If "the public" is redefined to refer to "reasons offered for 
deliberation" (Bohman, 1996b: 25), this might mean that we can count as 
public such things as the internal discussion that jurors enter into when they 
work through the issues that arose on the jury. The reading and reflection 
that they report undertaking when at home might also be counted in this way. 
The only stipulation is the intention with which these acts are undertaken. It is 
the inclusive intention that creates the publicity necessary for arguments to 
be accepted into discourse and incorporated into the decision making 
process itself. Forester (1999: 46) refers to a passage from Hannah Arendt 
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that describes how: 
the power of judgement which rests on a potential agreement with 
others, and the thinking process which is active in judging something is 
not, like the thought process of pure reasoning, a dialogue between me 
and myself, but finds itself always and primarily, even if I am quite alone 
in making up my mind, in an anticipated community with others with 
whom I know I must finally come to some agreement. From this 
potential agreement judgement derives its specific validity. 
I return in Chapter 6 to the process of judgement which marks the final stage 
of the task of the citizens' jurors. Here it is important to highlight the need to 
examine intentions to include rather than getting caught up in trying to perfect 
the public sphere as Habermas (1989) describes it. For Alvesson and 
Sk61dberg (2000: 118), discourse which proceeds according to the rules of 
discourse ethics offers the possibility of 
undistorted communication, which is the basis of the highest (or rather 
the broadest, most reflective) form of rationality. Here it is not power, 
status, prestige, ideology, manipulation, the rule of experts, fear, 
insecurity, misunderstanding, or any other objectionable practices that 
constitutes the grounds for the ideas and understandings which 
emerge. Rather, it is essentially one thing, the strength of the good well­
founded argument. 
The above quotations show that the decision to place the emphasis on the 
inclusive intention of the discourse itself, and not the actual physical 
presence of interlocutors, is well supported. This position has also been 
adopted by Benhabib (1992) who notes that, whereas for Habermas, 
legitimacy was only gained in discourse occurring in a narrowly defined 
sphere, he accepts the need to broaden that definition to include any space 
in which individuals engage in practical discourse (Habermas, 1996: 373­
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Understood in this way, deliberation offers the participants in this study the 
opportunity to link micro- and macro-level processes. At the individual level, a 
citizens' juror deliberates by reasoning internally in order to decide how to 
frame a response, a question or an argument. According to Manin (1987: 
348), this process involves "the formation of the will, the particular moment 
that precedes choice, and in which the individual ponders different solutions 
before settling on one of them". The next stage is the public stage of 
deliberation during which these privately arranged and held views are 
presented to the public via publications and so on, or in this case by speaking 
to one's fellow jurors. Similarly, it is expressed in the way opportunities for 
negotiations are sought, including talking to friends and family at the dinner 
table in the evenings between sessions. At this stage, the jurors will need to 
draw on their learned resources of discourse to decide how to incorporate 
dissenting views and how to find the solution that will be acceptable to all. 
The setting of such high standards means that the activity of real deliberation 
will not come easily to citizens, especially those used to conceding the power 
to make decisions to representatives. 
By engaging in deliberation, it is expected that we will either find a way to 
transform problems from irreconcilable to reconcilable or, more likely, we will 
come to accept that while our personal ideals and goals are not met by the 
proposed solution we can live with the solution because it is the best one 
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available to the public as a whole. Thus agreement, if it is reached, will be 
based on a rational discussion of the common needs of our peers - our 
communication community. Most importantly for this piece of research 
Mansbridge (1996: 47) believes that participants in deliberations will "have 
come through learning to understand their interests, including their conflicting 
interests, better than before deliberation". She relates this understanding of 
the benefits of deliberation directly back to the idea expressed by J. S. Mill 
"that the process of taking responsibility for others through participation in the 
making of collective decisions in a democracy produces a enlarged 
understanding of one's interests" (Mansbridge, 1999a: 292). 
But many critics still believe that "there is no reason to expect that ordinary 
citizens with no special talent, expertise, or experience will come up with 
particularly good policy recommendations" (Bell, 1999: 86) merely by taking 
part in a public deliberative process. But this is not, in fact, the expectation of 
deliberative democracy. Deliberative democracy is instead premised on the 
idea that, when citizens enter into a deliberative process, they may not have 
the skills and expertise to make good policies but, by taking part, they agree 
to move out into the public sphere and to accept the norms and conventions 
of public activity. They do this whilst retaining the opportunity to transform 
those norms and conventions (Taylor, 1999). This movement from the private 
into the public is the impetus for the transformation of their skills and this is 
the journey that will be captured in this study. Ordinary citizens who accept 
the role of citizens' juror "emerge from the private sphere, this public is made 
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up of citizens who seek acceptable interpretations for their social interests 
and experiences and who want to have an influence on institutionalised 
opinion- and will-formation" (Habermas, 1996: 366) without becoming 
politicians or policy experts. 
Chowcat (2000:756), in his discussion of one of these processes, notes that 
the participants in a deliberation begin by discussing the problem in terms of 
their own experiences, preferences and needs but during the course of the 
discussion this personalised version of events and so on is increasingly 
rejected. Having exposed their preferences to the group they are asked by 
the group to account for them and to defend them. When disagreements 
occur, a process of negotiation is entered into and the level of the discourse 
moves from the conventional to the post-conventional where, according to 
Habermas (1995a), only reasons based on norms that are accepted by all 
are acceptable. This agreement will be reached because it is based on a 
rational discussion of the common needs of our peers, our communication 
community. 
Learning and the citizens' juror 
The emphasis is placed here on establishing whether, by taking part in 
deliberation, members of the public learn to recognise and filter out irrational 
reasons. Can they come to recognise unacceptable arguments based on 
prejudice and exclusion and to question the authority of experts? O'Neill 
(1989: 34) shows how this might happen in her assertion that: 
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"communication that presupposes some authority other than that of reason 
may fail to communicate with those who are not subject to that authority; they 
can interpret it, if at all, only on the hypothesis of some claim that they reject". 
This means that if the jurors are utilising a form of discourse ethics to reach 
their conclusions, they will be able to describe how they filtered out irrational 
claims based on invalid assumptions. They will also be able to provide a 
description of how the false premises of these claims were challenged. If the 
learning process has been complete they should also be able to identify how 
the experience of these challenges were fed back into the process and 
promoted the learning process even further. If they can learn to do this they 
can also learn to evaluate their own submissions to the group in favour of, or 
against, the proposal and thus achieve the potential of the public sphere 
without having to be exposed to other interlocutors. 
Accepting learning as the adjudicating force in these processes is not 
tantamount to believing in and advocating an evolutionary account of society 
but learning in this model is far more fluid and contingent. This contingency 
or fluidity is what, according to Miller (1986: 12), makes it all the more 
interesting. This is where the need to account for political learning within the 
public sphere becomes paramount. According to Pateman (1970), the idea 
that participation has an educative role has never been dismissed and is 
seen throughout the literature on democracy and, in fact, "the major function 
of participation in the theory of participatory democracy is... an educative one, 
educative in the very widest sense, including both the psychological aspect 
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and the gaining of practice in democratic skills and procedures". I have set 
out to test how the broader notion of learning can not only fulfil the educative 
role assigned to participation, but also provide it with the legitimacy it is now 
perceived to lack. These ideas about deliberation and learning persist in 
political writings. Aristotle described citizenship as "deliberating and judging" 
and "considering ... the interest of others" (Aristotle, in Mansbridge, 1999a: 
295). Mill (1958) in Considerations on Representative Government says it is 
through "political discussion and collective political action that one learns to 
feel for and with his [sic] fellow citizens and becomes consciously a member 
of a great community." This means that a deliberative process should be 
about enhancing the ability of the public to reach decisions based on reason 
and argument and that this learning, if it is effective, will be carried over into 
their lives thereafter. 
In this chapter I have highlighted strong parallels with the idea of 
socialisation, which is essentially about increasing inclusion and therefore 
finding betler-informed arid more acceptable decisions. Deliberative 
democrats have never claimed that deliberation allows universal satisfaction 
with decisions made, but they do believe that deliberation allows citizens to 
engage in debate which is oriented to uncovering the common good. This 
implies that individuals go into a process like the citizens' jury with ideas and 
common sense practices and come out with some theoretical and 
experiential evidence for their worldview. Citizens who participate in a 
deliberative process in order to support and adapt democratic processes 
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undertake this reorientation in behaviour. But it also involves learning to 
reflexively understand themselves and the role they play in the system in 
which they are operating. This shift in priorities occurs through learning and 
corresponds directly to Habermas's move from the conventional to the post­
conventional. It is assumed that learning occurring even at the individual level 
through the internalisation of new attitudes and behaviours and based on 
experiences can then be drawn upon by the actors when they are faced with 
future problems. 
The primary objective of the citizens' jury, as I have shown, is to encourage 
discussion, negotiation, and transformation of preference. This is undertaken 
with the overall expectation that, through argument, we can uncover a more 
inclusive and therefore stronger democracy. On a citizens' jury the learning I 
identify is not seen as spontaneous, in fact the moderator cultivates it. This 
process is then self-replicating and develops a momentum of its own. It is on 
this basis that I contest the idea that the staged nature of the learning 
occurring on a citizens' jury is problematic. Certainly it could be abused, but 
we must accept that individuals are capable of being reflective and becoming 
aware of abuse. Although the jury itself has been planned and is managed by 
moderators and facilitators, the processes that occur as the participants get 
used to the situation cannot be managed. In principle, individuals are asked 
to work together in citizens' juries in order to "practically imagine the future" 
offered by a variety of potentially conflicting schema (Forester, 1999: 85) and 
to "stimulate the discovery of alternative visions of the future" (Roberts, 1997: 
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130). This process of imagining the future asks them to account, not only for 
their group preferences and to describe how they have been formed, but also 
to think about the value placed on the process itself and of the values being 
promoted. 
By engaging in collective discussions about contested preferences, both 
Habermas and Eder believe the individual can benefit from learning 
processes regardless of how these situations originate. Habermas (1995a) 
and Welton (2001) point out that this transformation can be seen where a 
reconstruction of life histories brings an awareness of the fact that 
"specialised languages are available to persons to express their experiences, 
dilemmas, sufferings and longings. The languages of religion, art, music and 
literature .... serve this purpose: the articulation of values and world­
disclosure" (Welton, 2001: 24). Finding a way to translate this language and 
to create a model that can make this language comprehensible to policy 
makers, as well as theorists, is the task of the next chapters. I will argue that 
the value of deliberation is its potential to operate at the cultural and 
ultimately, social level and this is what is investigated below. The rationale for 
this stipulation is addressed in Chapters 5 and 6 since it forms the basis for 
the call to accept storytelling and other forms of illustration from the jurors in 
support of their claims to the legitimacy of the jury model. 
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5: Researching citizens' juries: Reflections on method 
and research design 
Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview of the methods employed to gain an 
understanding of the citizens' jury model and its impact, if any, on the way 
individuals participate in political decision making. The literature review on 
the themes of citizens' juries and deliberation highlighted a number of 
important areas that would benefit from closer scrutiny. In particular, I chose 
to look at the citizens' jury because of a lack of discussion about the claims to 
effectiveness being made by deliberative democrats. The organisers and 
evaluators of citizens' juries also fail to explain what it is that they believe 
happens when citizens deliberate (Delap, 1998) and why they believe that 
deliberation "creates better citizens" (Mansbridge, 1999a: 291). Where there 
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is a discussion about what actually happens on the juries this is usually 
centred on a discussion about their cost-effectiveness. To select a few 
examples: Doxtader (1995) and Aldred and Jacobs (2000: 223) as well as 
Kenyon, Hanley and Nevon (2001: 557) urge us to use a contingent valuation 
model. While Ward (1999: 75) suggests we make use of the principles of a 
cost-benefit analysis to understand the efficacy of the citizens' jury model 
while Price (2000) would prefer we simply reject the model altogether, on the 
basis of poor question setting and misgivings he has about the 
representativeness of the juries. 
I use none of the above methods. Instead I adopt a qualitative approach to 
the notion of citizen participation because I accept Fraser's warning that to 
focus on the effectiveness of processes is to disregard the normative 
premises of social interactions and endangers legitimacy (Fraser, 1997: 154­
160). I adopt a normative approach and investigate it by making use of a 
semi-structured interview technique to uncover the ways in which 
participation in a deliberative process like the citizens' jury changed the 
participants and how this might continue to influence their lives after the jury 
has ended. I asked the jurors about their specific actions on the jury but the 
emphasis was always on why they did or said what they did, and how they 
came to the decisions they made. A quantitative approach would have been 
unhelpful here because what I was essentially trying to understand was how 
the individuals were socialised into a public. By looking for the publicness of 
the jury interactions, I fully accepted the Habermasian stipulation that it is 
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only when lay and expert knowledge are "generated and communicatively or 
discursively related to each other. It is only then that one could at all begin to 
appreciate the potential for collective learning" (Strydom, 2002: 80). 
In the last chapter I also revealed a commitment to treating participation in a 
deliberative forum like the citizens' jury as part of a socialisation process. 
This commitment is not new (Briggs, 1998), but in this study the emphasis is 
clearly being placed on the outcomes of participation in a citizens' jury in 
terms of the changes in the citizens themselves and on looking for evidence 
to affirm or reject Mansbridge's 'hunch' that deliberation makes people better 
citizens (Mansbridge, 1999a: 291). This treatment also takes on board 
Habermas's (1995a) theoretical assumption that if people are "better", the 
evidence of moral maturity will be visible in their use of language and their 
reasoning processes. All of this means attaching a great deal of importance 
to the jurors' own stories and relying on them to engage in the critical self­
reflection and rational reconstruction described above. These commitments 
also mean a change of focus away from the normal approach of evaluation ­
to look for policy changes as a result of the jury as opposed to one based on 
conversations with the jurors themselves. From the outset, it was assumed 
that if evidence of policy change is found, these will be clearly visible and, 
while interesting and important in achieving instrumental goals, such an 
emphasis would not be helpful in achieving the goal of understanding the 
usefulness of deliberative processes. We can achieve a great deal more by 
looking at how citizens approach problems that the local council or health 
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authority is facing, to understand whether the broader goals of deliberative 
democracy, in essence the transformation of passive citizens into active 
citizens, are being met. 
As described in the last chapter, I make use of the idea of social learning to 
understand the potential of the citizens' jury process to reinvigorate notions of 
citizenship. It is assumed that learning that is enabled through deliberation 
can enhance the ability of the public to respond to reasoned arguments and, 
as such, to recognise unreason in their own political lives (Bohman, 1996b). 
Both theoretical and empirical work in general concurs that where real 
deliberation occurs, citizens learn to discard the worst ideas about how to 
proceed and pick up and apply the best (Coote and Lenaghan, 1997). 
I began with a discussion of the theoretical commitments undertaken in this 
study. Special attention must therefore be given to a discussion of the 
relative merits of qualitative methods. To achieve this I look at the research 
process in detail and describe the sampling method used. I also describe 
how I made contact with the citizens' jurors. This leads to a discussion of the 
ethical problems faced and the attempt made to deal with them. Briefly, this 
work was undertaken in a way that sought to remain vigilant to the fact that 
researcher "dominance may be enacted and reproduced by subtle, routine, 
everyday forms of ... talk that appear 'natural' and quite 'acceptable'" (van Dijk, 
1993: 254). I therefore made use of a semi-structured approach that could 

highlight how the interviewee testaments show how they reconstruct 
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themselves and their actions to routinely include their "own reflective 
appropriation of that (life)story" (McCarthy, 1995: xiv). 
The above point actually highlights the most routine criticism of the qualitative 
interview. The use of interviews is often criticised because of the fear that 
respondents will tell the interviewer what they think will meet with approval. 
So, in setting out with a semi-structured approach, I was anxious about the 
"performative level" (Lara, 1998: 44) at which the interview method can work. 
As I will discuss at length in the next chapter, the reconstruction of the self in 
stories proved vital to the analysis. The performative aspects of the 
interviews lend the reflexive dimension to the testimonies that can help me to 
understand "their conceptions of themselves as newly emerging moral 
agents" (Lara, 1998: 45). 
Problems with existing research 
The citizens' jury has been the subject of lengthy discussions in political 
science but most of this discussion has fallen into two distinct categories. It 
tends to be either entirely theoretical or based on the empirical findings of 
user surveys and other empirical methods (Coote and Lenaghan, 1997; 
Kuper, 1997; Delap, 1998; Pickard, 1998). There is a lack of primary 
research on the topic of deliberative experiments and therefore we need to 
develop a model that could indicate the effectiveness of deliberative 
experiments and the citizens' jury model in particular. 
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The measure of effectiveness I have chosen is the level to which participation 
in such a process might or might not lead to a transformation of preference. I 
assumed that transformations of preference, jf found, would be displayed as 
changes in citizen involvement in political life, the use of language and the 
recognition of political problems as normative issues. I chose this because 
few of the existing studies have adequately investigated the jurors' 
experience in a holistic way. Studies that are presented as evaluative of the 
process are mainly based on texts and non-participant observation or on 
questionnaires completed by the participants shortly after the end of the jury. 
These researchers seem to have few inhibitions about inferring motivations, 
expectations and orientations of jurors solely from these sources (Price, 
2000). Price's (2000: 274) dismissive attitude to the jurors and to juries is 
clear, "several jurors had to be reassured that they were competent or 
entitled to make such judgements". This reluctance is treated by many 
authors on deliberative democracy as normal and is easily overcome once 
deliberation undoes the disabling effect of representative democracy on the 
skills required for real participation. But Price takes it as an indication that 
citizens' juries are "democratically and morally irrelevant" (Price, 2000: 272). 
The need for reassurance and for ordinary citizens to learn and come to 
understand what is expected of them should not be treated in this way, nor 
should it be assumed to be a straightforward process of submission to the 
will of the powerful moderators. By relying only on documents relating to one 
of the King's Fund juries, he adopts the perspective of Rousseau, namely 
that deliberation is not useful because it only creates confusion about what is 
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the right course of action. Price, like Rousseau, does not accept that ordinary 
citizens can take part in discussions about subjects that are uncertain 
because he believes they will only end with citizens adopting the will of the 
powerful, or what Rousseau refers to as "the tyrannical aristocracy" (Manin, 
1987: 346). 
This is where much of the criticism that is levelled at citizens' juries and 
deliberative democracy in general is rooted. Many critics assume that the 
opinions expressed are not authentic and that in fact jurors have been 
schooled in a certain way of thinking. In particular, they criticise the "way in 
which juries help to promote one particular moral or evaluative stance at the 
expense of others" (Price, 2000: 275). Understanding how researchers have 
been led to think about citizens' juries in this way is not difficult when we take 
into account the sources they have relied on for their information. By relying 
on the organisers and facilitators to describe and interpret the effects of the 
jury, the existing research suggests thatthe citizens involved in public 
deliberations make decisions that can easily be dismissed. Because the 
citizens seem to learn about the topic under discussion rather than rely on 
their own pre-existing knowledge and opinions, they are rejected as 
democratically irrelevant (Pickard, 1998). However, Habermas (1995a) 
contends that we all have access to pre-existing theoretical knowledge that 
we draw on to solve new problems and this is what I believe the juries will 
have to successfully tap into if they are to create transformations of 
preference. 
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In order to respond to these problems in the existing research and literature 
and to answer the questions set out above, I undertook a qualitative 
investigation of the jury model that looks at decision making strategies used 
by the jurors before, during and after the jury. The assumption made was that 
if the jurors could not identify a change in their skills, attitudes and levels of 
involvement with the public sphere that is related to the jury then perhaps the 
citizens' jury and other deliberative experiments should be looked on as 
merely serving an instrumental purpose (Pickard 1998; Price, 2000). By 
concentrating on the jurors themselves, I attempt to apply the most basic 
principle of critical theory which requires that research must be undertaken 
with a goal of "critically disputing actual social realities" (Alvesson and 
Sk6ldberg, 2000: 110). 
According to Dant (1991), Habermas, like Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000) 
adopts critical theory's "broad concern with culture to an analysis of its role in 
sustaining rationality ... and goes on to develop a theory of communicative 
action which focuses on the exchange of ideas and meanings in contrast to 
the exchange of goods" (Dant, 1991: 76). Thus the first choice that faces the 
researcher, namely who to interview, was not a difficult one for me. I would 
have to interview the participants themselves in order to satisfy the focus on 
the exchange of ideas (Strydom, 2002). This would also mean that the 
interviews should be open and driven by the informant. In any case, the 
citizens' jury itself was a discursive process that relied on the participants to 
verbally formulate their own responses. To try to reconstruct this process 
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through the written submissions of a questionnaire or in a structured 
interview would not, I believe, have captured the way that learning occurred, 
if at all. 
Learning theory relies on identifying linguistic and non-linguistic (albeit 
occurring during conversation) reformulations by the participants of the 
philosophical foundations of their life-world, thus proving that learning has 
occurred. This is crucial since, according to Matthews (1994: 40), research 
takes its starting point from the idea that 
the most basic form of politics is conversation about [these] choices and 
about what is really in the public's interest. Serious political discourse is 
the seedbed, the wellspring, of democratic politics because the public is 
the only legitimate body that can define the public's interest. The quality 
of democracy depends on the quality of this kind of public talk. 
Changing the quality of the public dialogue begins to change politics. 
Therefore, to not collect linguistic information would be self-defeating 
(McCarthy, 1976). 
Qualitative research and critical theory 
The objectives that qualitative research are expected to fulfil are not easily 
achieved nor are the appropriate methods always obvious. But when the 
research is being carried out in the tradition of critical theory, the rational 
reconstruction of events that is required can be best achieved by using the 
interview approach. The use of qualitative methods and the increasing 
interest in developing a qualitative methodology began as a response to the 
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criticism of positivism. This is usually traced back to the early days of the 
Frankfurt school and reached a peak in the 1960s around the same time as 
the second generation critical theorists such as Habermas were beginning to 
make their mark on social research (Alvesson and Sk6ldberg, 1999). By 
rejecting a more positivistic approach according to which the "truth or 
otherwise of a statement can be determined through systematic empirical 
observation" (Stoker, 1995:14), they instead concentrated on process and 
context. This attempt to locate activity within social mechanisms (Keat and 
Urry, 1975) also enabled researchers to understand the meanings associated 
with an individual's behaviour (Miller and Glassner, 1997). Steedman (1991: 
53) states that a growing branch of the study of language in terms of context 
and interpretation meant that, at this time the idea that knowledge could be 
scientifically separated from the knowerwas being increasingly rejected. 
The objective of research in the tradition of critical theory and the Frankfurt 
school is to dismiss the idea of the "original position" (Rawls, 1971: 221-222), 
or the "veil of ignorance" (Rawls, 1972: 136-142). Instead, the critical tradition 
highlights the contingency of social events and knowledge (Alasuutari, 
1998:87). Habermas's (1995b: 170) work on the process of self-reflection 
and rational reconstruction (occurring where we are made reflexively aware 
of ourselves through being deemed accountable) becomes increasingly 
important in justifying this approach to methodology. 
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This approach to qualitative research is unlike the widely used data oriented 
methods applied by the grounded theorists (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). 
Before setting out into the field I had identified and developed a clear 
theoretical framework and had critiqued the existing understanding of the 
citizens' jury as a deliberative forum. As a result, I would use the interviews to 
do two things - firstly to collect data in order to evaluate these expectations 
about the efficacy of deliberative forums, like the citizens' jury. Secondly, to 
develop a model that would shed light on the relationship between social 
learning and deliberation. Essentially, the interviews are used to interrogate 
the theory rather than to generate theory. The final point about the choice of 
method as theory-led is based on my experience of working in a tradition of 
critical theory which is founded on a dialectical view of society and social 
conditions. It was necessary to look at the phenomenon of the citizens' jury in 
its historical context and to this end I made use of the type of interview known 
as the episodic interview (Flick: 2000). 
The task of the researcher working in a critical framework is to dispute 
perceptions of social reality and to "distinguish what is socially and 
psychologically invariant from what is, or can be made to be, socially 
changeable, and to concentrate on the latter" (Alvesson and Sk6ldberg, 
2000: 110). Attempts to carry out primary research from a critical theoretical 
approach are made difficult by the high level of abstraction employed by 
critical theorists. They are also hampered by the fact that respondents often 
describe their experiences in a subjective and concrete way. But, like critical 
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theory, where the emphasis is on seeking out change, the episodic interview 
allows the respondent to make use of narrative and the memory of facts and 
feelings about the experiences to describe how they saw the effects of the 
citizens' jury experiences change them, if at all. 
This approach recognises the need for Social Science to get beyond a 
critique of overt social phenomena to look at the communicative rationality of 
the statements made by respondents, both in oral and in text form. Of 
course, the work carried out by Habermas (1984, 1987a) on communicative 
rationality has been heavily criticised because of its emphasis on systems 
building and the claims made for the rationality of speech acts. There is also 
the potential problem that the very act of carrying out research on any 
phenomenon can inadvertently reinforce the position of the experts and the 
institutions they are working for. Clearly, the citizens' juries had been an 
expensive consultation exercise for the institutions and organisations 
involved, as well as being potentially very lucrative for the companies who 
carried out the sampling and recruitment. One must be clear, though, that the 
emancipatory goal of critical research could lead the researcher into a blind 
alley of simply adopting one set of values as more desirable than another 
(Alvesson and Skbldberg, 2000: 129). The researcher is not immune to the 
values of the society in which s/he is working and the problems the 
empiricists thought they could overcome by employing scientific methods 
prevail within qualitative research. 
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Choosing a qualitative method 
Qualitative research, especially the kind that relies heavily on the interview, 
has become the accepted norm by a large proportion of researchers working 
in the Social Sciences over the last decades (Seidman, 1991; Sayer, 1992). 
This has occurred to the extent that Benney and Hughes (1956) have 
referred to Sociology as the science of the interview. It is particularly 
prevalent where research is undertaken to examine culture and meaning 
and, in the case of this research, where the objective is to understand the 
respondents' life-world and then to interpret it, a qualitative approach was 
deemed appropriate. 
Adopting a qualitative approach and, in particular, the decision to use the 
semi-structured interview is seen as a way to hand over much of the power 
once held by the researcher to the respondents. Since the task of critical 
research is not to identify patterns, or "regularities or causal connections" 
(Alvesson and Sk6ldberg, 2000: 110), I had to find a way to allow the 
interviewees to create and control the space in which they define their 
experience of the juries. This was achieved by asking them to put incidents 
that had been recorded in the literature documenting the juries in context for 
me and to avoid collecting answers that merely "name topics, rather than 
recount[ing] narratives" (Flick, 2000: 88). The intention behind this is that 
allowing the respondents to control the format will enable them to explain the 
processes involved in the jury and to explain the dynamics in their own 
words. In short, the intention is that the respondents should create the 
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emphasis. Alvesson and Willmott (1992: 13) suggest that critical analysis of 
this type should involve 'the questioning and opening up of what has become 
seen as given, unproblematic and natural". The analysis presented below will 
show that, as they reflected upon their own stories, the participants were ably 
pointing out "how asymmetries of power continue to operate within the public 
sphere and in the very dialogical mechanisms that produce agreements" 
(Bohman, 1996b: 113). 
Having made these theoretical decisions, it was clear that interviewees would 
need to be given a variety of means and opportunities to describe their 
experiences and their attitudes to them. It was decided that this recapitulation 
of events would suffice as within-method triangulation (Flick, 2000: 90). It 
was decided that documentary analysis, as well as conversations with 
organisers and facilitators of citizens' juries, would be used to validate these 
data (Scott and Alwin, 1998). Using existing data sources as prompts is a 
recognised triangulation technique used in qualitative research to test for 
reliability and validity of interviewees' recollections and interpretations of the 
events under discussion. 
The legitimacy of the researcher's choice of which methods to employ in a 
qualitative study has emerged as an important topic for the researcher. In the 
late 1970's, Gouldner (1975: 105) highlighted the role of the researcher in 
conceptualising and ordering the objects of their research. 
To say that sociologists are in the business of creating concepts means 
that they are in the business of proposing and fashioning ways of 
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looking at, thinking and talking about - and hence contributing to the 
very constitution of - social objects and social worlds. They are not 
simply studying a social world-apart, but are contributing to the 
construction and destruction of social objects. 
This position is very important to the work carried out by the critical theorists 
working in the Frankfurt school. It implies a reliance on the ability of the 
researcher to accumulate knowledge and learning about changes in social 
systems, attitudes and behaviours (Karlson, 1991; Alasuutari, 1998). 
Using a topic guide 
The first task, having decided that the semi-structured interview would be the 
main data collection tool, was to develop a topic guide. This topic guide 
would be used to guide the interviews and to prompt the respondent for 
information about their experiences. In effect, I took Lofland and Lofland's 
(1984: 59) description of the interview as "guided conversations" at face 
value. They advise that rather than having "a tightly structured set of 
questions to be asked verbatim as written, accompanied by an associated 
range of preworded likely answers", you should use your questions as a 
guide or "a checklist of sorts, a kind of inventory of things you want to talk 
about during the interview" (Lofland and Lofland, 1984: 59). This also echoes 
Arendt's decision to stand "within the circle with her subject, rejecting all the 
viewing posts around the perimeter from where the experts might have 
claimed to speak knowingly about the gazed on subject" (Minnich, 1989: 134­
135). 
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This research relies heavily on the use of the semi-structured interview 
conducted using a topic guide rather than using an interview schedule. This 
enabled me to stay flexible about the questions to be asked and the data that 
was being sought. In turn, it also enabled me to engage throughout the 
fieldwork stage in a process of self-reflection. By making use of a flexible 
topic guide I was able, on the basis of informants' reactions to some of the 
questions or even the style of the questioning, to make modifications to the 
order and style of questioning. I felt that this was necessary in order to 
ensure that the participants could feel comfortable with the research. The 
main purpose, however, was to remain open to the inclusion of emergent 
arguments (Harvey, 1994). After each interview I made use of Miles and 
Huberman's (1994: 53) contact summary sheets to record my initial reactions 
to the issues discussed by interviewee. These also proved helpful to record 
unanticipated themes like voting behaviour that I would ask about in 
subsequent interviews (see. Appendix 1). 
Developing the topic guide 
Qualitative researchers should always remain mindful that "how interviewees 
appear or represent society in specific situations has less to do with how 
they, or reality, really are ... rather, it is about the way they temporarily 
develop a form of subjectivity" (Alvesson and Sk6ldberg, 2000: 193). They 
are also wary that there is the possibility that the respondent will "limit 
answers to what is presumed to be relevant and informative" (Gaskell, 2000: 
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45). Therefore, a topic guide that can be adjusted as the interviewer learns 
more not only about the topic being researched, but also as the interviewer's 
skills improve, is highly valuable. It is important that new questions and 
prompts can be added when the respondent offers only fact-based answers 
to questions and does not seem to be volunteering information about their 
feelings at particular stages of their narrative. 
As already described, I made use of the episodic interview. An episodic 
interview is one that follows Hermanns's (Hermanns in Flick, 2000: 76) 
model. 
First the initial situation is outlined ('how everything started') and then 
the events relevant to the narrative are selected from the whole host of 
experiences and presented as a coherent progression of events ('how 
things developed'), and finally the situation at the end of the 
development is presented (,what became'). 
The topic guide I used was made up of four parts (see Appendix 2). The first 
three parts follow Hermanns's model. I began by asking about their 
involvement with the jury - 'how everything started'. The next part of the 
conversation asked them to describe how the jury unfolded - 'how things 
developed'. The final parts of the interview asked them to describe events 
since the jury - 'what became'. This section also covered the more personal 
aspects of their participation in politics and public life in general. At all times 
they were encouraged to describe why they said what they said, how they 
decided that what they had to say was valid and, if they were responding to a 

witness or a fellow juror, how they decided that the views of others were 
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valid. 
Following the advice of Dryzek (1995), this included a great deal of 
discussion about their cognitive processes that were not necessarily aired 
linguistically during the jury. These discussions also led into asking them to 
describe the non-linguistic processes that they felt they could observe in 
others: fidgeting, laughing, yawning and anything else that might have made 
them rethink their input. This design of the topic guide and this approach to 
data collection in turn enables the researcher to engage with the interviews 
as part of a reconstructive, rather than descriptive project, and in turn to 
"bring[ing] to awareness something that is only latently present. This involves 
eliciting from subjects information about their 'pre-theoretical' know-how" 
(How, 2001: 181). 
Pilot interviews using the topic guide had shown that the best way to 
approach the interview was to begin by talking about the actual jury, followed 
by questions about the aftermath of the jury and, finally, to lead the 
respondent to talk about their family background and such issues. This 
method of encouraging the interviewee to talk in an increasingly personal 
way as the interview progresses is the established norm in Social Science 
(Devine, 1995). Once the pilot interviews were completed, the topic guide 
was revised with some unforeseen issues arising in the pilots being included 
for the actual interviews. However, given the flexibility allowed when a topic 
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guide not an interview schedule is used, one question which later proved 
important, was added during the actual fieldwork stage. I noticed after 
carrying out the first interviews that all respondents volunteered information 
about their voting behaviour subsequent to, and following, their participation 
in the jury. I made a point of asking about this in all of the later interviews. In 
fact, it usually arose in the course of the interview and did not always require 
a specific prompt. In this way, I was able to learn from the interviewees and 
close up any potential gaps during the process rather than going back to 
interviewees for more information later. 
According to Flick (2000: 77), interviews that are carried out using a topic 
guide can be used to collect and identify two types of knowledge. The first 
type of knowledge is the straightforward episodic knowledge about the facts, 
dates, times, who and where. The second kind of knowledge is semantic 
knowledge which is more difficult to distil, especially where the interviewer is 
following a rigid set of questions in a prescribed pattern. The episodic style of 
the interview meant that I could give the respondents space to define and 
categorise the sphere in which they function as agents and to do so in their 
own words. 
Sampling 
The point that the jury members are self-selecting has been made many 
times in the literature on citizens' juries (Pickard, 1998; Price, 2000). For this 
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reason I felt that any attempt by me to develop a sampling system in 
selecting respondents for interview would be superfluous. I had chosen the 
citizens' jury as my case study and the sampling method employed by the 
jury selectors was one I could not break out of. By this I mean I did not set 
out a profile of the people I wished to interview in the hope of distilling a set 
of types that would be essentially "black professionals", "single mums", and 
so on. In fact, I disagree with the idea of sampling in such circumstances 
because of the danger of essentialism it might encourage. However, this was 
the approach that was used to recruit the jurors and the categories named 
above were desired "types" and as such I was forced to use them too. 
It is important to note that, in the final group of interviewees, the so-called 
"notables" (Blakeley, 2001: 164) were not over-represented in the cohort, as 
many critics of the model would expect (Saward, 1998). I do not try to 
describe the interviewees as representative, but I do believe they can be 
considered diverse enough to suffice in this instance. We see in Chapter 2 
the lengths the organisers went to in their attempts to secure a random 
sample; I know what criteria they applied to their selections and I can look on 
this cohort and judge them positively (albeit informally) against the criteria set 
(Briggs, 1998). This leads me to believe that I achieved a heterogeneous 
sample and this is upheld by the work of McLeod et al. (1999: 760) who 
"found participation in public forums to be virtually independent of [the] four 
demographic influences" of age, gender, education and income. They 
conclude that the egalitarian nature and set-up of such forums means that 
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there is a "perceived lack of status influences" (McLeod et aI., 1999:760), 
which discourages over-representation of the notables and encourages a 
wide range of participants to emerge as volunteers. 
McLeod et al. (1999) also point out that because notables are used to dealing 
only with "like-minded others", and therefore more sociable forums, they shy 
away from deliberative forums. In fact, while the type of citizen who is not 
normally prominent in political life is more accustomed to "problem-solving" 
conversations involving confrontation and conflict they volunteer more often 
in this study than might be expected. This finding is borne out by two jurors 
who both tell a story of a fellow juror they saw as a notable who dropped out. 
They believed this decision was made because when the jurors came to the 
initial "get to know you" session he realised how much compromise the 
process would entail and he decided not to participate. The jurors who 
described this story concluded therefore that lack of influence was the reason 
he didn't want to be involved. The only other story of someone dropping out 
occurred on the last day of a different jury but was explained as the result of 
too much socialising among the jurors. 
Weeks (2000: 365) presents a similarly positive account of the retention rates 
for participants in deliberative forums in America. Organisers of the forums 
expected participation to decline as the process went on and became more 
demanding but, in actual fact, the decline was very slight. He believes that 
even this decline could be explained by poor scheduling where the final 
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workshop was scheduled to coincide with the participation of the local team 
in a national sporting event. However, he does also report that an attempt to 
replicate the process in a different American city did have a lower response 
and retention rate that cannot be explained so easily (although the 
scheduling during the Thanksgiving holiday period was probably a factor). 
Davies (1998: 66) acknowledges that "the ones who got away" did create a 
certain amount of anxiety for those who did take the next step. She points out 
that this happened with only three out of 48 jurors, and believes that it was 
overcome after what she describes as the "bonding" work ofthe first day. 
Accessing the jurors 
In addition to the discussion about sampling, one other practical concern 

influenced who was interviewed. The choice about which juries should be 

included in the research was the result of simple convenience sampling. In 

total, 13 jury organisers were contacted. Only ten of these organisers were 

actually able to help. This was due to the fact that two had misplaced their 

lists due to high turnover of staff and other personnel issues. Another 
organising body had destroyed the list in the interest of keeping the promise 
of confidentiality made to the citizens' jurors when they were recruited. 
Having selected the juries that I would include in the study, the first task was 
to contact the main funding bodies that had been influential in the decisions 
taken by health authorities and local councils and so on to hold a citizens' 
jury. These organisations included: IPPR, OLR, the Kings Fund and the 
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LGMB now known as I&DeA. Contact was made by means of a formal letter 
describing the research I was carrying out and asking for their help by giving 
me access to the lists of participants or acting as an intermediary between 
the jurors and myself. Heeding the advice of Burgess (1984: 50) that "a clear 
indication should be given of those aspects of the setting on which you intend 
to focus", a copy of the proposed topic guide was enclosed with the letter. 
This letter also included was a brief description of my research experience. 
The organisations were assured that the information collected in any 
resulting interviews would remain confidential. Some of the organisations 
passed this letter on to the commissioning bodies, while some were able to 
arrange contact with the juries. In some cases, I was required to make 
contact with the local councils and health authorities that had established the 
juries. This was because once the jury had taken place and the report had 
been presented, the organisers who had acted as advisors and recruitment 
and sampling experts had handed over all the jury-related materials relating 
to the juries to the commissioning bodies. 
None of the organisers was able to directly pass on participant details or lists. 
They acted on my behalf by forwarding my letters to the participants in order 
to protect the promise of confidentiality made to all jurors and in order to 
satisfy data protection rules. These letters gave my details as described 
above and asked participants in the juries to complete an enclosed contact 
details slip and return it to me in a prepaid envelope. This meant that 
participants could get in touch with me directly if they were willing to be 
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interviewed. I could then telephone them to discuss the arrangements and to 
make appointments. To facilitate the much-discussed need for informality in 
the interviewing process, the interviews were to be carried out in the 
respondents' own homes. Interestingly, in spite of the fact that in my initial 
contact with jurors I stated that I could arrange an alternative meeting place if 
necessary, it was only in the town in which I was based at the time that two of 
the jurors expressed a preference to be interviewed in my workplace. One 
further respondent also in my local area, requested a visit at his place of 
work. 
Contacting respondents 
The list of juries contacted was compiled in order to access individuals who 
had taken part in juries run by the main convening bodies as well as some 
independent juries. A total of 147 letters was despatched and 10 were 
returned, "not known at this address". Follow-up cellis to the organisers to find 
out if they had received new postal addresses for these individuals were all 
unsuccessful. I also received one written response from a woman who, for 
health reasons, felt unable to be interviewed but who wanted me to know that 
she had enjoyed the jury and felt it was worthwhile. In the end, I secured 
access to 10 juries. This meant that I had available to me a revised total of 
136 potential interviewees. 
Contact was first made with potential interviewees via formal and 

anonymised letters sent by using the organising bodies as go-betweens. The 

153 
letter explained the nature of the research and my status and asked them to 
send me their contact details if they thought they might consider taking part. 
This did not commit them to be interviewed but meant that they were willing 
for me to contact them by telephone to talk it over. I believe that having the 
chance to talk to potential interviewees maximised the number of positive 
responses I received. It allowed me to deal with Hammersley and Atkinson's 
(1983: 78) observation that people who are selected for interviews are "more 
concerned with what kind of person the researcher is than with the research 
itself'. A significant number of people who signed and returned "no 
obligation" reply slips later told me that they might not have done so if they 
thought they were then committed to meeting with me. 
The conversations I had with these potential interviewees were very 
important; I was careful to keep the conversations as informal and relaxed as 
possible by stressing the fact that there are no right or wrong answers and by 
avoiding the use of the subject-specific terminology. These conversations all 
led to face-to-face interviews, the vast majority of which were held in the 
respondent's own homes. 
A response rate of just over 25% (35 out of 136) was recorded. All of those 
who responded positively to the request for a meeting were later interviewed. 
I did not turn away any potential interviewees. They were all interviewed for 
three reasons. Firstly, on a practical level, it can be difficult to get people to 
agree to be interviewed and therefore it would have been foolish to turn them 
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away when they had agreed. Secondly I didn't want to engage in any 
"phoney essential isms" (Phillips, 1996). I have already made clear that I do 
not agree with the idea of sampling for jurors because I believe that it is the 
arguments that should be represented, regardless of where they come from. 
The third reason is the most important and relates to the essentially positive 
objective of this research. My object from the outset was to look for evidence 
of transformation of preference through exposure to arguments. Since I 
believe it does not matter who takes part in the deliberative process, it follows 
that I do not see any problem with who recounts it to me. Therefore, while a 
seemingly low response rate might lead critics to point out that I only spoke 
to people who actually valued the experience of the jury, I would not be 
disturbed if this were the case. However, I believe that the jurors who did 
come forward for interview did come from a wide range of educational and 
socio-economic backgrounds, with a wide range of age and ethnic groups 
also represented (see Appendix 3). I reiterate that the objective of the 
research was to learn about and uncover potential for the transformation of 
preference in order to better understand the potential for the ideal of a 
deliberative democracy. I have already made clear that I see the citizens' jury 
'" 
itself as a compromise on the ideal and therefore to try to find an ideal 

sample of participants to interview would be futile. 

1 
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Carrying out the interviews 
For this research I interviewed 35 former jurors (21 male and 14 female), 
drawn from 10 juries held around England between March 1996 and April 
1998. The jurors interviewed were aged between 23 and 82 at the time of the 
interview. The youngest had been only 18 when he took part in a jury. 
Interviews were carried out over a six-month period. The interviews varied in 
length with the average interview lasting about 60 minutes. The only 
stipulation in relation to the sampling process was that the juries included 
should have been held at least three years earlier. It was felt that a significant 
lapse of time between participation was necessary to overcome the short­
term euphoria of participation described by Davies et al. (1998). Many of the 
jurors who had already been consulted about the experience of being a juror 
had told very positive stories and made strong claims to having been 
transformed. It was therefore felt that leaving time for these feelings to 
possibly cool off might enable me to collect findings less open to the criticism 
of being skewed. Evidence of short-term effects is clearly given in the juror 
questionnaires and has been recorded by almost every writer on citizens' 
juries but the evidence of transformation of preference, which is essentially a 
moral phenomenon, will be better collected after a lapse of time has allowed 
the jurors to establish whether or not they really had experienced a 
transformation. This decision meant that in some cases I spoke to individuals 
who had served as jurors more than five years earlier. The jurors I 
interviewed are described in Appendix 3. I met each of them only once. 
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The interviews were carried out according to the topic guide and the order of 
the questioning was predefined to the extent described above. The use of 
prompts was spontaneous depending on the respondent's use of recall and 
their willingness to contextualise the information they were passing on. If the 
respondent was making statements without including a story or an example 
they were prompted for one. This system of prompts was also used if the 
respondents were having difficulty remembering events. I was able to 
maximise their contribution, since I was able to remind them in a rhetorical 
way of specific events that I had read about in the reports or had been told of 
by other informants. In this way I could still keep the emphasis on their 
subjective knowledge. 
Each interview began with me explaining the reason for the interview, 
repeating the promise of confidentiality and the need for them to give me as 
many examples as possible. To ensure that the respondents were giving 
their informed consent to the interview, a brief description of the research 
project as a whole and the principal questions they would be asked were 
outlined (Bulmer, 2001: 50). In addition to the opportunity to ask questions, 
they were asked to sign a consent form allowing me to record and transcribe 
the interviews (see Appendix 4). No one refused permission to do this. 
Each of the four aspects of the interview was tackled according to the model 
outlined in Flick (2000). This means that each stage was treated as separate 
with the approach being to "ask the interviewee about a specific situation and 
157 

to recount it" (Flick, 2000: 86). Each interview began by inviting the 
respondent to recount concrete events. In order to facilitate this respondents 
were prompted to explain specific processes, attitudes and reflections. The 
next task was to gain as much semantic knowledge as possible about the 
experiences being recounted. This was made easier when I could draw on 
factual knowledge of events to show that the facts were not my main 
concern. Instead, I was interested in the respondents and how they 
experienced the process. 
Having completed the interviews, I first recorded my initial obseNations about 
the interview on interview summary sheets (Miles and Huberman, 1994). I 
later transcribed the recordings verbatim. A sample transcript is included in 
Appendix 5. I later worked on the transcripts to highlight areas of interest to 
my chosen research field. In each case, the interviewees are anonymised to 
protect their identities and their stories were summarised in storyboard 
fashion to identify the before, during and after aspects of their lives which 
they describe in relation to the jury experience. In order to create the 
storyboards, I made use of Miles and Huberman's (1994: 110-113) guidance 
on role and time-ordered displays showing the jury itself as the jurors 
experienced it. This meant recreating their experiences as a sequential 
journey from the moment they received the request to take part until the day 
of the interview (see Appendix 6). It soon became clear that while the time 
ordered matrices were useful to identify themes and patterns, the analysis 
itself would require a more complex role oriented approach that could 
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account for relationships between the jurors and the process of teaming that 
was occurring on the juries (Miles and Huberman, 1994: 123). 
In this study no software packages were used in the analysis since as the 
following discussions will show much of the most compelling evidence of 
social learning occurring is contained in fairly minor and sometimes 
seemingly trivial remarks made by the participants. To capture this involved 
careful and close reading of the transcripts. This decision is supported by a 
body of literature that is concerned with the constraining nature of the 
computer packages currently in use (Seidel, 1991; Kelle and Laurie, 1995; 
Coffey and Holbrook and Atkinson, 1996; Kelie , 1997). In place of 
computerised analysis, the use of the matrices proved invaluable to the 
process of modelling described in detail in the next chapter since it 
highlighted processes rather than individualised accounts. The matrices 
allowed for greater comparison of stories and anecdotes and simplified the 
process of comparing the accounts of different individuals. One of the 
greatest challenges facing the qualitative researcher is the fear that 
informants are simply trying to please the interviewer - a role-oriented 
approach can overcome this challenge by removing peripheral events from 
the analysis and concentrating on what the informant has to say about their 
role and the roles played by others in the events described. 
I was also conscious of my own relatively novice status as an independent 
qualitative researcher and wanted to treat seriously the advice of Kelle (1997) 
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that, even among highly-experienced researchers, it is not unusual to 
encounter confusion about the extent to which the computer or the 
researcher controls the analysis with qualitative software. Kelle (1997:22) 
points out that software packages also regularly make use of the language of 
quantitative methods and as a result can lead to "various misinterpretations 
of the role of theories and hypotheses in the qualitative research 
process ... the notion of hypothesis testing would be rather misleading here, if 
one understands it as an attempt to falsify an empirically contentful 
statement". It was important to be clear that, before beginning the data 
collection, I had already identified the hypothetical propositions I was using 
and these were, "sometimes very vague assumptions and conjectures about 
possible relations between certain domains" (Kelle, 1997: 22). 
As mentioned above, due to my reliance on the reconstruction of events, I 
shared the concern that many qualitative researchers have about the 
possibility of the jurors interpreting their actions rather than simply describing 
them. A certain amount of performance, in fact, proved important to this 
study. According to Lara (1998: 45), performance serves an important 
purpose for the respondent as "tools of self-presentation, have performed 
important cultural transformations that have made us aware of the 
importance of discursive practices aimed at redefining justice on the basis of 
recognition of life projects". This was primarily a theoretical decision but, for 
the sake of establishing reliability in the more traditional sense I made use of 
established probing techniques. This meant relying upon using individuals 
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who served on the same jury to check the veracity of some statements or 
claims being made by individual jurors. For each of the juries under 
investigation I had access to the jury report (see next section) and the jury 
agenda. In some cases, video recordings of jury sessions were also 
available. In one case I had a transcript of the jury deliberations. To establish 
greater external validity I also decided to avoid the use of snowballing to 
recruit new interviewees in spite of the fact that it would have offered an 
easier and more efficient way of making contact. I found during the fieldwork 
that many of the jurors had remained in regular contact with their fellow jurors 
and formed important friendships as a result. Six of those interviewed offered 
to contact other jurors who had not volunteered to be interviewed. I declined 
this offer in the interests of the promise of confidentiality made in the letters 
and because snowballing does have the potential to introduce some 
important biases into the sample. I was mindful that people might not have 
put me in touch with people they didn't like or had not "clicked" with (Aber, 
2001: 63). In fact, in the case of two juries, the jury members were 
particularly keen that I should interview the person who had been their 
chairperson because they felt he was the most eloquent and most committed 
and would be the most helpful. Although I explained that he had not 
responded to my request for an interview two of them were quite determined 
"to talk him round" (F02), for me. 
Whilst the interviews themselves are an invaluable source of knowledge 
about the workings of the juries, I have also been able to make use of 
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another source of information that has been highly valuable. 
Documentary analysis 
The current interest in participation and deliberation as one means of 
improving political life in Great Britain meant that interest in citizens' juries 
has been strong and documents relating to the process itself are numerous. 
The documentary evidence available to me took four main forms. Participant 
surveys carried out in the aftermath of the juries; the reports of the juries 
which were presented to the organisers at the end of the jury; and copies of 
the handouts, timetables, witness lists and so on collected by the jurors 
during the course ofthe jury. The fourth source is the writings offacilitators 
and organisers that have appeared in jury reports, books and journals and 
have been used to highlight the areas in which juries (which might be 
assumed to have followed the same model) have differed (Kuper, 1996, 
1997; White, Lewis and Elam, 1998). For instance, the organisers of juries ­
often the same people employed on a variety of contracts did modify their 
approach to juror selection based on experience and feedback from jurors. 
Each of these sources helped to supplement the interview transcripts. For 
example, the first impressions left on former jurors by the process have been 
included in some of the discussions about citizens' juries. Where this is the 
case, the information used has been drawn from short questionnaires . 
completed by the jury members immediately prior to or very soon after the 
jury ended. Other follow-up work has been carried out with jurors after an 
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intervening period but, again, this takes the form of a questionnaire. 
To date, the most comprehensive piece of follow-up research was carried out 
by the Institute for local Government Studies at Birmingham University on 
behalf of the LGMB. Hall and Stewart (1996) were asked by the LGMB to 
carry out follow-up surveys with members of the six juries they had funded 
during 1996. Participants completed these questionnaires during the same 
year as the jury was held with an average response rate of 81.2%. While I did 
not have access to the original questionnaires, the results have been 
comprehensively reported in the Hall and Stewart study (1996). 
I also made use of the citizens' jury reports. Over the period of the jury, the 
jurors work towards writing a report on their deliberations and their 
recommendations to be presented to the convening body for consideration. 
These reports, alongside copies of the agenda, juror handouts, witness lists 
and so on, were an invaluable source of cross-referencing material and 
provided me with a set of prompts to jurors during interviews. These reports 
describe the way topics were presented, the sequence of events and the 
techniques used to elicit discussion from the jurors. They also contain 
important information about the witnesses. Many of the handouts given to the 
jurors during the course of the jury include data about the selection of jurors 
and the arrangements made for their food and travel. Where pre- and post­
jury questionnaires were available at the time of writing some findings are 
included in the reports. 
163 

Ethical considerations 
Every researcher faces ethical dilemmas and must resolve ethical problems 
during the course of any research. However, the increased use of qualitative 
methods such as interviewing has placed the researcher under increasing 
pressure to ensure that issues like confidentiality and anonymity are dealt 
with as a priority. In attending any interview the researcher is not only 
entering into a pact with the respond~nt or participants on these matters but 
also plays a part in how proceedings will unfold. Although the question of 
confidentiality and anonymity had been dealt with in the letter and initial 
telephone contact, it was reaffirmed at the start of each interview. Individuals 
who were interviewed are referred to only by their respondent number and 
the letter F (for female) or M (for male). 
Interviews were usually carried out in the jurors' own homes. Everyone was 
offered a copy of the interview transcript or a copy of the tape recording. I 
also wrote to thank any of the respondents who gave me copies of their jury 
notes and any handouts they were given to take away for copying. Where 
possible, when participants asked for information about citizens' juries in 
general I tried to send them copies of key materials. 
The documentary analysis was also a potential source of ethical problems. 
Many of the jurors I met had preserved all of the materials relating to their 
jury and were willing to hand them over to me. In some cases, these folders 
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contained full jury lists with addresses, telephone numbers and some 
profiling data such as the ages of jurors. In each case, before I left the juror's 
home with the material to copy and return by post, I checked the contents 
and removed any material of that sort. I also made the decision not to use the 
notes taken by jurors during the sessions that were often included in these 
folders because of the confidentiality issues that would have involved. From a 
methodological point of view, too, I could not be sure whether or not 
everyone who had materials like this had offered them to me. Additionally, I 
could not draw any reliable conclusions about the reasons why some had 
held onto notes while others had possibly forgotten they had them, lost them 
or even thrown them away (Burgess, 1984: 138). This seemed the only 
practical way to handle this matter given that I had not expected jurors to 
make such materials available and that each time it happened was not as a 
result of a request by me. 
The above discussion describes in detail the decisions made in the process 
of data collection and attempts to ensure that the data collected was as 
reliable and valid as possible. Qualitative research can achieve the aims of 
reliability and validity if decisions about which variables to include are 
rigorously made (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). While the research relies on the 
recall skills of the participants (Cronin, 1989), the precautionary mechanism 
of documentary analysis was used to crosscheck the information being 
collected. Most importantly, however, the object of this chapter was to 
describe how the data used in the next and subsequent chapters was 
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collected and analysed. 
This chapter has given an overview of the data generation and analysis of 
this research. In it I reiterate my commitment to understanding the potential 
for a real deliberative democracy. The findings from the interviews with 
former citizens' jurors will provide the main data source. The data gathered 
from the documents pertaining to the citizens' juries were used to add depth 
to these findings through triangulation. The next four chapters will present 
findings from the study_ In order to understand the potential of the citizens' 
jury to create transformation of preference among individuals the meaning of 
the citizens' jury experience for the people involved is also explored in these 
chapters. A more theoretical discussion of the meaning of the citizens' jury 
model itself is included in the concluding chapter. 
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6: A Model of deliberative learning 
Introduction 
The last chapter contained a description of how the empirical material used in 
this, and the next three chapters, was gathered. This chapter presents a 
semi-structured description of the jury experience in terms of what I referred 
to earlier as the juror journey. In the course ofthe citizens' jury, the 
participants are offered a variety of different schema on which to base their 
decision. These schemas are generally presented in a cumulative fashion to 
build up the juror's knowledge of the issue with each section of the jury being 
followed by a session in which the options are summarised by the facilitators. 
In practice, this means that the jurors are first presented with a general 
overview of the issue under discussion, a discussion about why it has now 
come to the fore and the various solutions that have been put forward by 
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different interest groups. The final day of the jury is spent gathering their 
thoughts on the various options and they are then expected to choose the 
option, or a combination of options, which best meets the ideal of the 
common good (Dienel, 1999). 
Both Forester (1999) and Davies (1998) have already likened the processes 
involved in deliberation to a journey. In fact, Davies (1998) quotes a number 
of jurors who described the experience as a steep learning curve that they 
refer to as "an emotional journey" that led them to a "changed destination" 
(Davies, 1998: 67). I find this term useful because it is suggested not only by 
these writers but also by the jurors themselves. The metaphor of a journey is 
used to show that in a deliberative process the participants are moving 

towards a more public understanding of themselves as members of a 

communication community. As one of the jurors quoted by Davies (1998: 72) 

remarked: "we met as strangers, admired the patients' courage, heard the 

specialists, listened as individuals, discussed as a group, recommended as a 

team". This sense of an emergent public consciousness is also captured by 

the jurors in this study who consistently describe their experience in the 
plural. 
It was like a journey and you were going on it with .Iots. of.other people 
but really you were forced to spend your time looking mSld~ your~elf 
and you had to face up to yourself .... You heard people saying thmg~ 
that you might have thought for years but suddenly you heard t~em In 
slightly different words or in front of the people who they were aimed at 
and you realised that you were wrong. 
Fi8 
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Another participant describes a similar change in her own attitude. 
It is hard to discuss something with complete strangers when you feel 
you don't really know anything about the topic and you don't know what 
the others know, but it did get better ... more because I think we knew 
we wouldn't be laughed at. ... It was friendly you see. Some of them 
went in thinking they knew it all, this is the way to do it, the council is 
wrong. But they had to learn too. That's hard, it's hard to admit you 
were wrong but we did. But once we listened to each other we were 
able to grow together. .. that doesn't mean we all agreed, because we 
didn't but we did start to see a wider view of things. 
F29 
She later added to the journey metaphor by saying: 
I suppose you have to begin ... start somewhere. I think in cases before 
that I would have said 'you're not listening to what I am saying so I'm 
not going to bother' but I didn't do that and I think aI/ of us felt that way. 
Once we'd taken it on to do this thing we weren't going to give up until 
we'd .... 1 suppose until we'd reached our destination. 
F29 
The jurors themselves are sensitive to the fact that, at the end of each day, 
they appear to have moved up a level in their understanding of themselves 
as jurors and in their understanding of the substantive issues. As mentioned 
in Chapter 2, some juries did not meet on consecutive days and those jurors 
who had rest days might be more likely to see these levels in a more 
pronounced way. Unfortunately, I did not interview many jurors who worked 
in this way and cannot draw any firm conclusions about its impact. 
In any case, as the following discussion will show, I describe this journey in 
terms of the activities in which the jurors are engaging with at different points 
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in the process. This means that while I am interested in the different levels of 
jurors' activity, I am more interested in the journey between these levels. 
What was it about day 2 that was different from day 1? For me, the key to 
understanding how the jurors progressed through the jury has not been to 
compare the levels, but to examine the activities that enable the journey to 
continue and one role to be superseded by another. These activities have 
already been listed as listening, storytelling and deliberating. I have also 
shown above that, while the interview topic guide included questions about 
identifying change, there were no questions about listening or storytelling and 
no references were made to the jury as a journey. Instead, the jurors 
described processes that could usefully be categorised in this way and I 
adopted them. I found it useful to use the jurors' own terms of reference to 
highlight the fact that they were able to identify changes in their approach to 
problem solving. 
The jurors used terms like example, story, anecdote, and analogy to describe 
what I refer to as storytelling. They also refer to a number of processes like 
hearing, understanding, and turn taking. For simplicity, I refer to these 
processes here as listening. The jurors use these terms when asked to 
describe how they learned to formulate their opinions into accessible 
accounts of the problem being discussed. They say that the opportunity to 
listen to other people made them see what the most appropriate and effective 
way to explain their position was. They also found the experience of being 
listened to very affirming, and they say that being aware of having an 
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audience made them more careful to express themselves accurately. In 
some cases, it involved making decisions about their own identities, as they 
learned how others perceived them. They are fully aware that their 
participation in the jury involved a process of identity formation and 
resocialisation. This is what is most important here, these processes gave 
them time for reflection or exposed them to other ways of seeing and it is the 
transformative potential of these processes that is concentrated on here. 
As shown in Chapter 5, information about this journey was gathered in 
interviews with former citizens' jurors. Theorists who support the principles of 
citizens' juries understand this potential for transformation as the key to the 
success of a forum like the citizens' jury. The emphasis from the start is on 
the transformations of preference occurring as a result of self-reflection and 
rational reconstruction, and only the jurors' own words can capture how this 
occurred. This is where the emphasis has been placed from the outset. 
I now need to begin setting out the process of transformation. To rely on a 
description of those transformations at the individual level will not suffice 
since it is the process itself that is really being described. To this end, the first 
part of this chapter identifies some of the most general changes that were 
noted by the jurors themselves. The second part will concentrate on 
developing a model to describe these changes at a more systematic level. 
The discussion that will be entered into by making use of the model shows 
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how individuals who take part in citizens' juries come to act as members of 
the public. In order to facilitate this discussion, I have developed a model of 
deliberative learning amongst citizens' jurors on the basis of the role-ordered 
matrices, described in Chapter 5. These matrices were used to compress the 
raw data on all of the interviewees into manageable bundles that are then 
used to address the issues raised in the earlier theoretical discussion (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994: 141). 
The jurorjourney 
In the interviews, the jurors for the most part told their stories in a 
chronological way. This might have been for two reasons: firstly the 
arrangements made for the juries lent themselves to episodic retelling; 
secondly the topic guide also followed the timeline of the juries in order to 
facilitate the jurors' recall. Although the interview topic guide was arranged in 
this way, their tendency to split the jury experience itself up into four distinct 
levels was more pronounced than expected. 
The first level I identify covers the period of time from being invited to take 
part in the jury and ends once they have taken part in the "get to know you 
sessions". The second level covers the initial stages of the jury when their 
time was mostly spent listening to and questioning the witnesses. The third 
level covers the time period during which the jurors begin to work together in 
small and large groups to discuss the evidence they heard. The final level 
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covers the longest period and includes the period of time from when they 
begin to make recommendations and they start to ask each other to offer a 
judgement. In terms of the timescale of the jury, this level also covers the 
period of time from the writing of the jury report to the date of interview. 
The intention here is not to suggest that the movement from one level to the 
next is entirely linear and continuous. I do not mean to suggest that these 
levels represent stages that are merely being simply passed through on the 
way to some enlightenment and final stage of full citizenship. Instead, I make 
use of these divisions for a more pragmatic reason and because, as work 
carried out by Simon and Xenos (2000) show, participants in a deliberation 
proceed in a logical manner, considering one argument after another. Even a 
cursory reading of the jury reports and the style in which interview 
respondents recounted their experiences to me would support this argument. 
But the decision to accept these timeline divisions allows me to highlight 
points when different ideas are gaining strength over others and where the 
relationship between the individual and the group is being redefined. The use 
of a timeline model to describe these redefinitions of role is not uncommon. 
Strydom (2002: 12) identifies a similar set of changes in the composition of 
the participants and their discursive logics in relation to risk, albeit over a 
longer timescale. In each of the different levels of the jury that they occupy, 
the jurors I spoke to describe adopting different roles at different points in the 
process. They also describe how they moved out of one role and into 
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another. I attempt to capture these movements. I liken the processes 
identified by the jurors to Arendt's (1978) subdivisions of learning into three 
processes of willing, thinking and judging. These correspond directly to the 
activities of listening, storytelling and deliberating identified by the jurors. 
Some preliminary findings 
Before describing the implications of the research in terms of the model that I 
have devised, I first describe some broad changes in behaviour that the 
interviews have highlighted. The reason for introducing a model will become 
clearer once the findings that represent an "ad hoc" approach to politics 
(Parry, Moser and Day, 1992: 144) are made clear. One possible way to 
understand the juror journey had already been established in work carried 
out in the United States (McLeod et aI., 1999). These researchers were trying 
to establish who participates in deliberative forums and identified a number of 
characteristics that they believe should be measured to establish the validity 
of the sample of the public who actually takes part in these types of activities. 
Although I disagree that juror sampling was necessary, I have already 
conceded that it is of practical use in conferring a perceived sense of 
legitimacy on the group's decisions. I found McLeod et al.'s (1999) work 
useful in the initial stages of the research to help me organise my findings, 
according to certain characteristics. Some of their observations are 
supported by my work and others are refuted. 
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McLeod et al. (1999) show in their study of deliberation in America that the 
usual measuring sticks of gender, age, education and income are not 
significantly influential on participation. They do, however, identify some 
correlation between network size, network heterogeneity, media use, 
experience of issue discussion and reflection on deliberative participation. 
They use these criteria in a hierarchy of importance. They describe a 
participant's previous experience of issue discussion as being the most 
important influence on their decision to participate. This is closely followed by 
their network diversity and their media use and finally by their tendency to 
reflect on public issues. McLeod et al. (1999) conclude that each of these 
variables is a more important influence than the measures of age, gender 
and education that can normally be accounted for by the use of sampling. 
Network size refers to the number of people with whom an individual is likely 
to enter into problem-solving conversations. In general, McLeod et al. (1999: 
747) found that the young and better-educated as well as women in general, 
will have a larger network size. They have found that such people are more 
likely in turn to be attracted to deliberative political participation. Because the 
sampling process was long over when I met the participants I am unable to 
comment in this research on how much more likely these types of people 
were to volunteer. McLeod et al. (1999) also discuss the effect of network 
heterogeneity on deliberative participation and conclude that people with a 
more diverse friendship and family network are more likely to take part. This 
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is borne out to some extent in this research. One of the jurors I spoke to 
described her family background as a "mixed bag" (F14). Others pointed out 
that they were used to mixing with all types of people at work and at home. 
Eight of those interviewed said they would not describe themselves as 
English and twelve said that they had not grown up in the place where they 
now live. 
More importantly, McLeod et al. describe how deliberative participants are 
more likely to make "attentive use of local news media" (1999: 748). This is 
certainly not the case with the citizens' jurors. More than half of those I 
interviewed claimed to not read a daily newspaper, and ten of them claim to 
read neither a daily nor a national newspaper. Most claim to look at their local 
newspaper but they point out that the issues discussed in it are more 
"gossipy and trivial" (M09), and are not useful in helping making "decisions 
about the bigger picture" (M23). My interviews, however, did highlight some 
interesting findings about media use after the jury had ended. One man 
made the decision to change from a red top newspaper to a broadsheet. This 
did not happen immediately after the jury but he believed that the skills of 
critical reading that he learned in the course of the jury made him aware of 
the agenda of his local free newspaper and, more particularly, the tabloid 
paper he usually bought. 
I can see now why people don't like the Sun and those papers. I used to 
buy it every day, it was cheap and covered the main news and gave 
you the lists for what's on the telly and the crossword and all that, but 
it's trash, isn't it? When we had witnesses come to see us, and they 
were saying all these things about why we should do this or that, we 
insisted they give us good reasons why and if they couldn't we would 
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dismiss them. Yet those bloody papers they print what they want and if 
they get caught they just put a small notice in the back somewhere the 
next day apologising. That's no good. We rely on them to tell us how 
things are and they just do what they want. 
M23 
McLeod et a!. (1999: 765) also refer to the process of reflection as a deciding 
factor in taking part in a deliberative forum. They define this as how the 
participants deal with new information and incorporate it into their worldview. 
They conclude that people who claim to actively reflect on issues and to think 
about information that they hear on the television news might be more likely 
to participate in deliberative forums. I did not find that this held true, people 
who I spoke to routinely claim that actually thinking about issues that did not 
directly relate to them, as they did on the jury, was very new and unusual for 
them. Three participants describe being kept awake at night precisely 
because they were not used to discussions of this type. At first they felt that 
the burden of what they were being asked to do was too great. 
I didn't want to say one way or the other. I didn't want to be the one who 
was blamed if people thought we got it wrong at the time. I worried 
about that a lot. I knew that whatever we decided some people were 
going to be hurt. If we said yes they should use the information when 
calculating premiums then that was going to disadvantage lots of 
people. I worried about it and I remember feeling that I wasn't the right 
person ... we all agreed that it was difficult though and they [the 
moderators] tried to support us. I did feel better in the end and felt that 
with all the information we were being given I wasn't just saying what I 
wanted, I was giving a considered opinion. And that's when I started to 
relax into it. There were a few of us and nothing was going to happen 
because of just me. It was a group thing and a group responsibility. 
M35 
Two participants recall their partner's reactions to them during the jury. 
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I think at times I'd come home and [husband's name] thought they had 
been beating us or something. He kept asking me 'are you okay? Is it 
too much?' He said to me one morning 'you don't have to do it you 
know. You've been tossing and turning all night.' But I wanted to do it. 
I'd started it so I wanted to finish it. I knew I wasn't sleeping too well. I 
knew I was completely absorbed in my own thought for that whole 
week. The kids got a bit sick of fish fingers (laughs). But' had to do it, I 
could feel myself changing and I liked that. I wanted to be more 
involved in things and I liked being listened to and learning so much. 
F27 
The final category of people who McLeod et al. (1999) found likely to 
volunteer to participate in deliberation are people who are used to engaging 
in issue discussion. This is defined as "the ability to generate heated 
interpersonal discussion" (McLeod et ai., 1999: 750), and they claim that this 
is by far the most important factor in determining participation in deliberation. 
They conclude that people who are used to engaging in discussion and used 
to arguing about issues at home or at work will be more inclined to volunteer 
for a deliberative forum. My research does not support McLeod et alan this 
point. Perhaps the citizens' jury might have managed to attract less vocal 
participants because of the payments made to participants, but my 
respondents tend to describe themselves as generally inclined to avoid 
disagreement as much as possible. However, they agree that when it arose 
naturally and out of the issue rather than out of personalities then they would 
fig ht it out. 
I wasn't going to waste my breath arguing with him on stupid things like 
the way we were seated or how the issues should have been something 
entirely different. I always try to keep out of things like that, what's the 
point in getting all worked up? We had been asked to talk about this 
redevelopment in [name of place] and I tried to stick to that. If he had 
something to say about that that I disagreed with, then I surprised 
myself because I did speak up. We all did. It did happen once or twice 
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that things got a bit heated. And that was good for us. It kept us awake. 
M15 
My research shows that the people located by the citizens' jury recruiters do 
not fit their definition of the typical deliberator. The jurors I interviewed are 
more likely to be the generally disinterested and not natural joiners as 
Lowndes, Pratchett and Stoker's (2001) research suggests. While the jurors I 
interviewed may not have had a great deal of interest in politics and issue 
discussion before the jury, all claim to have at least a slightly greater interest 
after the jury. More than 90% claim to be more interested in politics as a 
direct result. They describe themselves becoming "participation seeking", but 
they also say they are more sensitive now to the motivations behind their 
political acts. 
I really did get the bug for it after that. I always volunteer nowadays to 
do anything like that, market research, anything. I just really like having 
the time to think about things and be able to put my say to people who 
can do something about it. 
M35 
Their participation that arises as a result of the jury is also more than simply 
"personal and situational" (Parry, Moser and Day, 1992: 143). They do not 
show any particular preference for local issues or group-specific issues. In 
the immediate aftermath of the jury, the participants who served on health 
issue juries do, however, display a slightly greater desire to seek out 
participation in the health area, and women on the childcare jury do seem to 
actively look for family issues to get involved in. This is one key difference 
between the men and the women. Male jurors are more likely to expand their 
interest in politics to issues outside of the jury remit. However, in time, the 
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women who get involved in what they describe as political activities after the 
jury gradually describe a similar shift in their interests. 
At first I thought I could do something for young mothers, I mean I have 
a daughter and I know how hard it is for her to get good childcare, and 
not to be treated like a nuisance at work if she has to take her daughter 
to the doctor. I did try to get them to discuss that within the Labour party 
but that was a waste of time. Anyway, in time I realised that we had 
complained that men had been left off the jury because it's not a 
women's issue it's a question of fairness and justice. It's about 
employment law and equality. That's another reason I left the party and 
joined the socialists. 
F18 
She has recently been challenged for a second major time about that 
decision when her husband wanted her to help canvass in the general 
elections in 2001. 
He was talking about 'for old times sake' and I was thinking that's just 
not a good enough reason and he couldn't come up with a better one. 
F18 
She also said she really felt that she could no longer take part in canvassing 
for a party that she sees as undermining democratic debate and says that 
she saw it as: 
dishonest and immoral to do it for those reasons. His reason was that I 
would be helping him but that wasn't enough. 
F18 
After lots of rows and debates about it, she believes she feels she is now 
close to changing his mind. 
Something else that seems to happen to the jurors is that they move away 
from a commitment to a politics of presence. 
I used to think that the only way to get real representation for women 
like me was to vote for a woman ...But it's the ideas that count not the 
person they come out of. I mean there was a man there whose life 
couldn't have been more different from mine ... He understood better 
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than any of those other women how I felt. 
F22. 
She, like many others, had entered into the process with the idea that only 
women can represent women and so on but left this behind as the 
commitment to a politics of ideas grows. 
To spend all your time as I did at the start being suspicious and 
counting the number of black faces, the number of women and so on 
you are in danger of missing the point. I didn't trust them to be fair or to 
really include real people but even though most of the people were fairly 
well off and well dressed and that I think they were able to see all sides 
and that's what it was about. .. 1 know I dressed up a bit for it so maybe 
we all looked well-to-do but what matters was what was said. 
F27 
This issue of ideas becoming more important than representativeness arose 
in all of the juries but was more pronounced in relation to the single sex 
juries. It also arose in terms of the selection of witnesses. While, at first, 
jurors felt it was necessary to ensure women or disabled people had to be 
present to make the process legitimate, they changed their minds as time 
passed. In fact, the report on the second ITC jury (although not covered here) 
records the jurors asking for information about the witnesses, their 
credentials and their status (lTC, 1998). The report also highlights a 
discussion among the jurors about the legitimacy of the ITC since it was felt 
that its board was not democratically selected (lTC, 1998). 
Juror criticism of the arrangements made for the jury also covered the 
selection of jurors. Criticism was recorded from participants on those juries 
that had a preference for parents (ITC) or for single-sex juries (Women's 
Unit). The jurors criticised these juries for these exclusions. Some jurors 
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admitted that, while at first, they thought the decision to exclude men from 
the Women's Unit juries was a good thing, by the end they were sure that it 
had been unnecessary to segregate the juries. In fact, they felt that not only 
would it undermine the jury in the public's eyes but also that it had prevented 
the discussions being more public. 
I think we all felt that men should have been there. I know it was nice 
and cosy for us women and we could complain all we wanted about 
lazy husbands and that but once we got into it we realised we needed 
to hear from men. The government as well wasn't going to be able to 
act on recommendations made by women alone and employers would 
also need to take into account what men wanted to see done. Even 
though lots of women now work, I think there are still more men in the 
job market and we couldn't be seen to be just reactionary women. If 
men had been involved then we could say this is what parents want not 
just women. 
F20 
Lowndes, Pratchett and Stoker (2001: 448) found that the jurors went even 
further than this and came to support the use of random selection to select 
the jury. I also found that, by the time the juries came to an end, all the jurors 
interviewed were convinced that any group of people who are committed to 
the main principle of deliberative democracy, "no force other than that of the 
better argument is exercised" (Habermas, 1976: 108), can be trusted to make 
any decision. This is discussed by one of the participants in the following: 
I think there was one black man but that would be about right if you're 
talking about the population of [name of town], it's not a very mixed 
area. I suppose they could have included one or two more ethnic 
minority people but I don't think it mattered real/y. We all just talked 
about it I don't think colour or sex came into it. 
M33 
But at the start of the juries it may have been an issue for some of the 
participants, like for instance the male participants on the ESB&H jury on 
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gynaecological cancer who felt uncomfortable at first with discussing such 
private "women's issues". These men were persuaded by the female 
participants that as fathers, brothers, husbands and so on they had 
something very valuable to offer. 
They persuaded us we needed to get involved and to have our say ­
the thing is we were discussing health and healthcare and that really is 
the only issue that affects us all equally. 
M03 
The jurors were equally unequivocal about another change. This change was 
more fundamental and involved a change in their sense of efficacy as 
citizens who had a duty to others. 
Normally I wouldn't say boo to a goose but they just kept moving you 
around and putting you in with people who were coming out with all 
these prejudiced things that you just had to get in there. Just to stop 
them, you know. And then once you found your voice. 
F11 
On top of the aforementioned interest in politics, almost all the jurors report a 
greater interest in social issues. They also attribute this new level of 
awareness to the jury. Davies (1998), records the remarks from the jurors 
that include "there is a sense of duty with this now", and "I have more care of 
health authority issues now, and feel a better person for this" (Davies, 1998: 
68). While these remarks were collected by the King's Fund soon after the 
jury had ended, similar thoughts remain with the jurors whom I interviewed 
even as much as three to five years later. These include: 
I pay more attention to it all now, the news and local things going on 
and I keep an eye on the papers to see what's going on at the town hall 
and if I think I can get involved I will. Not just the waste stuff but 
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anything that matters to the community around here. 
F08 
And: 
I think if they decided they were going to build one here [an incinerator], 
I would want to be sure that people knew about it and maybe organise a 
protest or a petition or something like that...Anything that would get 
them talking to us again. I might even chain myself to something. 
M05 
In some cases this has resulted in behavioural changes. 
R: Well, I tried to stay involved, I applied to go on the board of the ... a 
non-executive appointment on the board of the NHS Trust so I 
applied but they wrote back and said they'd had 1400 applications 
(laughs), probably people with much more knowledge than me. But it 
hasn't turned me off and I will probably go and try again. 
I: On a health related issue? 
R: 	I wanted to do something in the health area but I suppose if 
something else came along that I felt I could contribute to. I did get 
more involved in the local neighbourhood watch afterwards but that's 
not got quite the wider impact that I wanted. 
F02 
Similarly one of the men who had been involved with his local victim support 
group became more heavily involved in its running after the jury. 
Victim support was something I had done for years but only as a 
volunteer. I'd go in and do my shift and then leave and that was about it, 
but in the last few years [his jury was held in 1997] I have got more 
interested in the awareness raising campaigns as well as the offender 
rehabilitation programmes. 
M12 
This man had served on the ITC jury and he claims that it was the process 
itself and not the topic of the jury that had sparked his interest in being more 
involved. 
I don't even watch much telly. It's never on in the house since we don't 
have any kids or anything so that wasn't it for me. I can't really say I did 
it for any good reason I just thought it might be interesting and it was. It 
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really was. I wanted to do something different and this was as good a 
chance as any. I've been in the law for years now and I always just 
listen and I thought I would like to say something instead. When you 
work for the courts you always have to stay neutral and this time I could 
speak up ... 1 felt I had something to say about how these violent 
television shows lead to children ending up in the courts having got into 
gangs and into fights and stabbings because that's all they see around 
them. I did think that the producers of these shows are to blame but it 
[the jury] changed my perspective on things. We can't blame the telly, 
it's the lack of care for others in the community, its poverty, injustice, its 
all those things and that's why I felt I had to do more with the victim 
support and with helping offenders. To say it is all because of TV is too 
easy and anyway so many of these kids spend their time on the streets 
not in warm houses watching their televisions ... 1 went in thinking I knew 
quite a bit about the effects of television and instead had to listen and 
learn. 
M12 
Other jurors tell similar stories about how being asked to take part has 
awakened a whole new interest for them. One of the men has volunteered to 
join his local council's citizens' panel (M35). He admits that he would prefer a 
more deliberative involvement but is happy to give his opinions to a council 
he now has more faith in to use the information fairly. Other participants have 
also become more conscious of the need to carry out good consultation and 
research into people's preferences, such as the two men quoted here: 
I'd never been on a focus group but I knew people who had and I 
expected that sort of arrangement. But I don't think a focus group would 
have produced the same thing at all. By comparison a focus group is 
quick and nasty. You learn from talking to other people, not only on the 
exact topic but around the topic. And on a jury you get to know people 
and based on what you find out about their attitude to, say animal 
rights, you can decide how to evaluate their evidence about other 
things. You need that level of insight into them to do that. If you just fill 
in a questionnaire or go on a focus group it's an unreflective view that 
you are giving, you don't give it consideration really you are doing it for 
X amount of time and that's it, get it over with ... But at least in this way 
something had to go in just from being there, on a focus group you just 
say what you think and you hear what the others there think but you 
don't go the extra step to arguing it out. It's not real you just say what 
they want you to say and get out of there ... (later) actually I have done a 
few focus groups since for the hospital and that and I really don't think 
185 
they are sufficient but at least they are trying to find out what people 
want. 
M13 
And: 
I was on a focus group about it [the council tax referendum] afterwards 
and I think we all felt it was the wrong way to handle it. Instead of giving 
people lots of information and then trusting them to make up their minds 
they tried to get people to simply react there and then. They behaved 
very badly and very cynically. I was pleased when it backfired. Anyway 
it was totally unfair because the turnout wasn't great. I did say a jury of 
16 or so people would have been fairer than that group. They spent a 
fortune on it as well. I really did think they should have spent the money 
on a series of juries instead. I told them that. But I do like to get involved 
in research now and I've done all sorts of things in [name of town] 
M35 
Both of these men are describing getting involved in public opinion research. 
They both maintain that it is not something they would have done before the 
jury. They have made a conscious effort to participate but have been left 
unsatisfied by processes that do not involve deliberation. 
This is one of the issues that arise regularly for the jurors. They want to 
replicate what they see as the perfect process as by now their understanding 
of what constitutes democracy has become more sophisticated (Doxtader, 
1995; Gastil and Dillard, 1999). In some cases, this has had negative 
repercussions on their previously existing involvements. Especially, when in 
the light of the jury, these other groupings are seen as attempting to reduce 
the time for deliberation as Fishkin (1991: 36) argues: 
The distinction between the inclinations of the moment and public 
opinions that are refined by 'sedate reflections' is an essential part of 
any adequate theory of democracy. Political equality without 
deliberation is not of much use, for it amounts to nothing more than the 
power without the opportunity to think about how that power ought to be 
exercised. 
186 
j1iP 
The woman, whose decision to change her political allegiances I have 
already referred to, felt this keenly and subsequently decided to leave the 
Labour Party after many years membership (F18). However, as most of the 
above has shown, the effect has not always been negative. One juror claims 
that the experience opened him up again to the possibilities of a discursive 
resolution to political problems that he had all but rejected. As a younger man 
he had been an active member of a political party. 
I got fed up a long time ago with politics, the thing that's wrong with 
political parties and the party system in general is that people going into 
a debating chamber have a set of attitudes and values and they listen to 
the arguments and feel defensive. We all do it. If somebody is arguing 
against you, you build up bridges against what they are saying except 
very occasionally when you go 'oh my God, she's right and I'm wrong 
all along.' But it takes a very big person to do that frequently and I 
suspect that most people have entrenched attitudes and that no amount 
of debate changes them. I used to get very fed up, you know, knowing 
that the whole thing was just a complete waste of time because 
everybody was going to vote for the motion or against the motion. There 
are very ... hardly anybody would ever change their mind during the 
debate, at the jury I felt and again this is perhaps to do with the 
facilitator explaining that we had to have open minds and that you know 
we had to examine our prejudices to see if they were genuinely-held 
beliefs or whether in fact they were being modified in any way and to 
keep an open mind. That's what people did in the end, I'm sure they 
did. 
M04 
This juror is perhaps the one who went furthest on the road to fully embracing 
the deliberative approach to politics to become what I describe below as a 
deliberator. The participants found the experience of what they describe as 
the "right way to do things" (M03) so empowering that five people interviewed 
claimed to have become very interested in politics as a direct result of the 
jury. One woman in her forties voted in a general election for the first time in 
her life after the jury, one woman left the party she had been a lifelong 
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member of to join a different one and one man is planning to run in his local 
elections as an independent candidate. Two of the jurors have since decided 
to stand for a position on local boards such as urban community councils. 
One woman has become involved with her local health authority on a 
citizens' panel and one man, as already mentioned, has volunteered and is 
waiting to be called. 
But another group of jurors who described themselves as quite interested in 
politics describe a new urge to engage with others about community issues 
and they see these decisions in a moral way. This is captured by one male 
juror who intends to run for election, he says: 
It is right thing to do. I have the time and I think I can see the big picture 
better than I used to .... 1 can try to speak up for people who don't get 
heard. People like me. 
M21 
This brief description of changes in the jurors I spoke to refers to how they 
noticed changes in their attitude to politics and these changes differ for the 
men and the women who were involved. For women, on the whole, the 
changes were more informal than those experienced by the men. In fact, the 
women when asked if they see these changes as political were unwilling to 
accept that description or label for themselves. Their new behaviours tended 
to include "activity intended to influence public policy which is not formally 
integrated into the normal politic~1 processes or which has not been 

institutionalised" (Parry, Moser and Day, 1992: 144). One of the women has 

been instrumental in setting up a child care network in her area offering 
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informal advice on tax breaks for working families, back-to-work training 
allowances and other incentives, through her children's clothing retail 
business. While this activity includes handing out leaflets to customers and 
offering advice on a telephone support line she sees it as an act of solidarity 
rather than a political act. 
When they come in the shop to buy a pram and things like that, 
especially the younger ones I can usually have a chat with them and I 
ask them "have you applied for your child benefit? Do you know about 
working families' tax credit?" As well as that if I see anything in the 
paper about training courses or benefits in general I can stick it up in 
the window and I think that helps people to try and find out about their 
rights ... they can ask me and I can tell them who to call or where to 
go... It's not a political thing it's just that I've been there, as a single 
mum and I know how hard it is to find out what you are entitled to. I can 
pass on my experiences to them to make it easier. And now with the 
jury I have the knowledge and the confidence to do that better than I 
could have done before. 
F19 
As I have already shown with the health juries, the theme of the jury she 
served on might have been a factor in her decision to give this advice. This 
woman served on a jury that looked at the issue of working parents and she 
does admit that the subject matter of the jury, as well as her work in the baby 
supplies business, makes it easier for her to have the confidence to do these 
things. However, in other cases, changes in behaviour have not been so 
directly associated with the subject matter of the jury. When the women tell 
their stories they tend not to be framed in terms of specific skills. Instead, 
they describe the changes they experienced in terms of their impact on the 
private sphere. The changes in their activities identified by the women related 
to: education, work, relationships and family decision making-processes: 
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It made me decide to go back to work. A few of the people on the jury 
remarked that I was good at making complex ideas very simple and 
could help people to figure out what the key issues were. I toyed with 
the idea of being a counsellor or getting involved with marriage 
guidance and I did a few courses but I now work for a local 
homelessness charity giving out advice, helping people to fill in claim 
forms, that sort of thing. 
F27 
For most of the female jurors, the jury had been a new experience and in 
many cases its effect on them had taken them by surprise. One woman had 
started helping out at her son's school and had a job interview arranged 
within days of the jury ending. She says: 
Once my son was older about a year or so ago I asked a few of the 
other mums I knew about maybe starting up an after school club and 
we're doing that now. This area really does need things like that 
especially for the younger ones. And that was something I would never 
have ... I'd have never put myself forward like that. .. think it started with 
the jury because at the time I was thinking about going back to work 
and it really encouraged me. I had gone out there and held my own ... it 
gave me the push I needed and the jury ended on the Monday and on 
the Wednesday I applied to Smith's, where I work now, for a job and the 
week after I had an interview. I got the job the following Friday. 
F22 
One woman, who lives in a community with a lot of older residents, began a 
local "bottle bank run" (FOB) to enable her neighbours who do not drive to 
recycle their bottles and newspapers. The local council does now provide 
doorstep recycling but her neighbours have told her it was her 
encouragement and conversations with them about the need to recycle that 
persuaded them to start recycling. They have told her that without her leaflets 
that came through the door from the council offering this service would have 
simply been ignored. This same woman described how her confidence in 
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dealing with experts was raised on the jury to the extent that she felt able to 
complain to the general medical council about the care received by her father 
from his doctor. Her father died after he failed to be diagnosed with cancer. 
For men the most commonly identified changes were either work-related or in 
areas of formal political activity. 
When I chair a meeting now I find I can get more done and it's more 
effective. Not so much in my work because I'm not really one of the 
chiefs there but in my charity work. Although at work I have a few times 
said, 'if we did it this way', but in other things (the charity] I am much 
clearer about writing the agenda and making sure everyone is clear 
what is to be discussed. It's much more effective when people know 
why and when. I try to copy what they did [the facilitators] because that 
worked very well and we all got to have our say without going over old 
ground all the time. 
M06 
And similarly: 
After the jury I changed jobs, to be honest I had always been interested 
in financial issues and that and I wanted a new challenge but the jury 
showed me how to present myself to employers in that field in order to 
get the job, so I learned that. I had a better sense of how it applies to 
real life. 
M35 
The model 
The jury organisers and facilitators also collected stories such as those 
related above in the course of the interviews. But how can we understand the 
above stories that are essentially ad hoc individual changes in terms of their 
social impact? To do this I refer to the experiences of the jury and examine 
the different roles the jurors seem to be adopting as they undergo the 
191 
p 
different processes. The jurors are fully aware that, in many ways, the jury 
experience was like role-playing 
Sometimes it was like playing a part because we all had to try to 
imagine how other people might feel about the issues. There were only 
twelve of us or thereabouts so we had to try to find a way to work out 
what the public would want and that meant playing the devil's advocate 
from time to time. By pretending to disagree with something you 
actually believe you get a real glimpse inside the arguments against it. 
That helped me to search deep inside myself to see that I'd understood 
the other person's point of view. If I was still going to argue against it to 
be really confident my beliefs were genuinely held and that I'd thought it 
through properly. I think before then I was a bit too ready to say "well 
this is what I think" and then if people argued with me I'd argue back at 
them. I suppose it was possible that I could have my views more 
modified but by and large I held to be·liefs. But now I think I understand 
them better and why others disagree with me. I think it's as a result of 
the jury I'm more prepared to listen. To listen to other arguments and 
maybe modify my own. 
M04 
The adoption of different roles is crucial to the transformation of preferences, 
as over time the work of the jury: 
becomes more fluid, and roles often change; work identities become 
broader and more multidimensional ..... [each participant] frames 
problem solving (far too instrumental a language with which to convey 
democratic purposes) in a fashion that draws attention to the larger 
significance of local and community efforts: what it is that people 
actually create or build of lasting social and civic value (Boyte, 1999: 
276). 
In my analysis of the interview transcripts I identify four juror roles that are 
used to describe the main aspects of juror development and the transition 
from one role to another. These roles are identical to those described above 
and are simply used to describe a starting position from which each new 
process can begin. The emphasis here is always on the process and for ease 
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of understanding the term phase is used. 
The diagram below introduces a number of variables to describe the juror 
journey. Inside the circles the juror's self-defined roles are identified. The 
arrows between the circles describe the process that is occurring as one role 
is left behind in favour of another. In the rectangles across the top of the 
diagram the citizens' jurors' sense of power at that point is described and the 
arrow across the top shows how this shift is occurring. 
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Once power is mentioned deliberative democrats are exposed to 
considerable criticism. Critics are keen to point out that power corrupts and 
rely on a definition of discourse used by Foucault and his followers that 
defines it exclusively as a power phenomenon (Foucault, 1979; 1981). From 
the Habermasian perspective, discourse is a normative issue and it will be 
treated as such here. The idea of power as something that is "up for grabs" is 
captured in the above model by the idea of it shifting as the process 
progresses, and the intervals at which I measure it highlight where it is most 
strongly experienced at that time. It is not meant to suggest that when power 
is rooted in argument that it is entirely egalitarian and that the educated will 
not be able to make better arguments than the less educated. The idea 
instead is that power has shifted to the potential for a more democratic 
application where the people who have lost out in the past can address this 
imbalance by collecting the information and the facts as the jury progresses 
and can operate on a more equal footing. Deliberation is all about the ability 
to construct reality, and because this is being treated here as something that 
is learned through intersubjective communication the problem of unequal 
power residing with different groups at intervals is not treated as 
insurmountable. 
According to Strydom (2002: 117), the way people communicate together 
"reflects the relative command of the participating actors to create resonance 
among the public as well as the power of the observing, evaluating and 
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judging public who ultimately determines what becomes accepted as 
collectively valid". This approach to power effectively captures the approach 
being taken here that treats power as something that is not always disabling 
but enabling. The jurors come together with different strengths and abilities 
and a fluid definition of power describes better the way they sometimes 
surrender power to the witnesses, sometimes to the more eloquent jurors 
and sometimes to memory and anecdote. The discussion in the following 
chapters will show how this is the case. 
The arrow down the left-hand side of the diagram describes the transfer of 
the discussion from the private to the public sphere as role changes occur. At 
the bottom of the diagram the type of reasoning employed by the jurors as 
they occupy these different roles is described. At the outset they are tentative 
about the real deliberative value of the process and agree to take part either 
because they have been paid, because they have nothing better to do, or out 
of fear that the "notables" will again be able to determine the future of their 
community. This is the instrumental level. The next level is more strategic 
and involves the jurors trying to use their input to achieve change but this is 
mostly still motivated by their own needs. The final level is governed by a 
more discursive rationality and is by far the most difficult level of rationality to 
achieve. The adoption of a discursive rationality is the expression of the 
capacity for judgement that is the culmination of the deliberative process. 
The jurors' roles identified are that of envoy, regulator, advocate and 
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deliberator and each role is adopted in sequence during the course of the 
jury. When occupying level one, the jurors are acting as envoys. This is when 
the jurors are able to remain most detached from the experience and at this 
point in the proceedings they feel confident that they will be able to maintain 
their position in relation to the topic to be discussed. In some cases, they 
admit to feeling nervous about what lies ahead in terms of public speaking, 
but they do not feel that their worldview will be realistically challenged or 
undermined as a result of their participation. They are there to protect their 
own private interests and their participation in the jury is instrumental. They 
all appear to enter into the process with the expectation that they are the only 
authentic jurors and are determined that they will represent "the real people" 
if no one else will. They are soon made aware that this expectation is 
erroneous as they realise that everyone else present expected a certain 
amount of "skulduggery and brainwashing" (M04), and this leads them to 
adopt a more open and less-defensive position in the second level. 
At the second level of the jury journey, the role I refer to as regulator comes 
into being. Having already seen some of the jury processes in action in their 
role as envoys, jurors are satisfied that the other jury members are not 
merely notables. They spend much of their early participation checking out 
the other jurors on the assumption that they have been selected because 
they will "toe the line" (M09), but their conversations particularly during the 
"get to know you" meetings have undermined this and forced them into a 
more trusting position vis-a-vis the organisers and their fellow jurors. 
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The move to a regulator status that represents level 2 does not mean that 
they are fully trusting of the jury situation. As regulators they do not attempt 
to query the nature of the evidence, the facts being cited and the statistics 
being presented but they can verify other things such as whether the jury 
membership is representative and not made up of people who have been 
chosen because they will agree with some preordained set of decisions. 
They feel they are unable to critically question the experts but as regulators 
what they can do is crosscheck the evidence. 
When the jurors occupy level three of the jury they undertake the role of 
advocate. At this stage the jurors are actively inputting their own 
understanding of the issue into the discussion. They are behaving in a 
strategic way but their goal is to ensure that what they sometimes see as the 
narrow focus of the witnesses is challenged. They do this by seeking out 
fresh information and by imposing a new way of describing the problem. This 
includes the telling of stories and the use of examples from their own lives. 
They use these methods to check that the jury processes are fair and not 
based on excluding the less-educated or less-experienced public speakers. 
Having tested the process and verified that their input will be treated with 
respect, the jurors can start to come to terms with the moral implications of 
their discussions. 
The final level of the jury journey involves the jurors adopting the role of 
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deliberators. At this level they begin the real act of deliberating, which is 
imagining the future and anticipating the needs and rights of others (Gimmler, 
2003). They have come to understand that discourse should be oriented to 
mutual understanding and this involves giving reasons rather than simply 
listing their preferences. By this time they have already gathered a significant 
amount of information about the issue and now they are more or less left 
alone by the facilitators to make their decisions. They have come to terms 
with the basic principle: decisions should be based on the best reasons. The 
envoys have become deliberators and have reached their post-conventional 
level. 
The most prominent marker on the above diagram is that of the juror roles. 
While the idea of juror roles is useful to enable this attempt to build up a 
theory of how transformations of jurors' preferences occur in deliberation, 
and therefore how resocialisation occurs, they are not to be seen as concrete 
positions. I do not mean to suggest that each of the jurors will fall rigidly into 
each of these roles at a prescribed time. In fact, not all of the jurors complete 
this journey in the same way as each of the others. 
You could tell straight away who they were, you know who the better off 
ones were, who the educated ones were. But I think everyone had 
something to say, everyone wanted to contribute and that came across. 
We waited for each other to catch up, we relied on each other to explain 
difficult things, put things in context. People were willing to do more 
than take their own situation, to take an overall view of things. I've 
always thought that was what is lacking in England. We all tend to think 
things happen to me rather than things happen to the area. 
M15 
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Some jurors describe only really coming to terms with what happened after 
the jury had ended and they had put some space between themselves and 
the jury. This is why I concentrate on what I refer to above as phases. I use 
the levels of envoy, regulator, advocate and deliberator to highlight the role 
that the jury is leaving behind and the one that they are moving into, but the 
emphasis is on the changes occurring that enable them to make these 
transitions. By emphasising the importance of change as a gradual 
cumUlative process, this approach also enables me to include changes 
noticed after the jury has ended in my search for evidence of transformed 
preferences. 
It was only really after it had all ended and I met one of the others on 
the street and during the jury we had been on opposite sides but we 
went and got a coffee and we said 'that was a good thing we did' and I 
had to admit she'd been right, I hadn't really been able to see how we 
got around some of the issues until then. I hadn't seen my way out of 
the problem until I'd thought about it later. 
F10 
Making this distinction is important because completing the journey and 
coming to terms with the compromises that it enabled does not have to 
involve agreeing with the majority opinion. Instead, it does require a 
recognition that the decision should be made on the basis of the better 
argument. In order to understand the juror levels of envoys, regulators, 
advocates and deliberators, we first need to understand the roles of the 
jurors and how they are dealing with the changes in their status as citizens. 
But their sense of who holds the power to make "real decisions" is also 
challenged. These two disturbances in their worldview also lead to changes 
199 
in their knowledge not only about facts and events but also about the 
decision making process and the rules of discourse. 
Just prior to any transition occurring, the jurors describe engaging in a new 
activity that provides the key to the next level. The activities they describe are 
listening, storytelling and deliberating. I already pointed out that these 
correspond to the more abstract Arendtian (Arendt, 1978) processes of 
willing, thinking and judging. These processes are also similar to processes 
highlighted by Yankelovich (1991) in his three-stage model of the evolution of 
public judgement. He labels the activities as: consciousness raising, working 
through and resolution. But these are not categories that the jurors 
themselves would use. Instead, they describe what they were doing on a 
day-to-day basis and it was up to me to remain open to less obvious forms of 
discourse. Forester (1999: 4) records observing similar processes occurring 
and advises the theorists to remain open to these: 
without supportive and safe settings that foster mutual recognition and 
respect, practical storytelling, surprise, and insightful listening, planning 
processes will degenerate into knee-jerk 'us against them' adversarial 
bargaining. But when planners can facilitate processes of multiparty 
inquiry and learning, trust and relationship building, public participation 
can result in not just noise but well-crafted policy strategies that address 
real needs. 
In the juror list of activities, the last one of deliberating is the most abstract; 
and, unlike listening and storytelling, it is not a term that interviewees 
themselves use. Instead they refer to a range of activities that they call 
"coming to terms", "agreeing to disagree", "compromising", "communicating" 
and "changing". Importantly, none of the terms used by the jurors to describe 
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this phase have negative undertones. They do not feel that they had been 
pressured into the decisions they made: 
It wasn't about being walked all over. It wasn't like that. We agreed that 
this was the course of action that would benefit the greatest number 
and we left it at that. I didn't feel like I had been defeated. It was what 
the group wanted to say and I could accept that. 
M34 
The next three chapters describe these phases in detail according to all of 
the factors listed by Forester (1999), but under my own labels of a personal 
journey, a cultural journey and a social journey. These distinctions are made 
to refer not only to the different activities but also to the dimensions of the 
life-world of the juror in which they are best observed. The jurors themselves 
recognise some changes as intensely personal. The jurors are aware that 
some of these changes have been determined by the nature or culture of the 
group. Finally, some are seen as determined by their vision of society that is 
formed by imagining the future when they re-examine their current 
preferences in the light of what they have learned from each other. 
The learning juror 
The next stage of my analysis will be to turn this discussion back to the 
theoretical level outlined in Chapter 4 thus demonstrating how pre-
conventional human activity is transformed into post-conventional activity. 
This abstraction process allows me to establish whether or not the 
experience of participating in a deliberative forum affects the individual's 
perception of their role in society. This abstraction process has brought me to 
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the work of Arendt (1978) who, like Habermas (1995a, 1996), believes that 
what is needed is a theory of how the capacity for judgement is achieved. 
Wellmer (1998), too, is seeking a theory of judgement that can account for 
the 
institutional conditions under which everybody has a chance to develop 
his or her political, moral or aesthetic judgement; for these are the only 
conditions under which a political, moral, or aesthetic culture can exist 
and therefore the only soil, as it were, from which good judgement may 
still spring in those moments when the world is in shambles (Wellmer, 
1998: 308). 
This reframing of deliberation as the source of a capacity for judgment 
requires the separation of the learning process into what are referred to 
above as Arendt's categories of willing, thinking and judging. For Arendt 
(1978), learning culminates in the attainment of the capacity for judgement. 
Judgement is nurtured in deliberation and is only achieved after the individual 
has been transformed through the other two learned capacities of willing and 
thinking. Between them, these three capacities frame the deliberative 
experience. In a deliberative process, thinking is the key process that 
signifies that deliberation is real. For Arendt (1978: 4), processes such as 
discourse are only set in motion after some kind of disruption in the 
communication process. She believes we have to experience some rupture 
before we can "stop and think" (Arendt, 1978: 40, italics in the original). 
Habermas (1984, 1987b) builds upon these distinctions to show how, in the 
context of communicative action, the participants in the conversation bring 
three different aspects of learning to bear on their utterances. The aspects 
202 
Habermas chooses are personality, culture and society (Honneth, 1993). The 
formation of ideas and decisions occurs between these domains and 
it is through the processes of cultural reproduction, social integration 
and socialisation that the life-world is constantly reproduced. The life­
world both provides the basis of meaning on which the communicative 
action can draw and it is also a product of the exchange of meaning 
(Dant, 1991: 97). 
Habermas's Know/edge and Human Interests (1972) shows how it is the 
interaction and coordination between these three distinct parts that creates 
action. This action involves compromises that will serve to enable action to 
be taken but also to maintain the autonomy of the actors who take part in 
these decisions. They will be able to maintain their misgivings or uncertainty 
about a course of action to the degree that "yes/no decisions that sustain the 
communicative practice of everyday life do not derive from an ascribed 
normative consensus, but emerge from the cooperative interpretive process 
of the participants themselves, concrete forms of life and universal structures 
of the life-world become separated" (Habermas, 1987b: 343). 
For the sake of simplicity, these constituent parts are treated separately in 
the next three chapters even though they do not occur separately (Arendt, 
1978: 69). The personal is twinned with the process of willing and describes 
the move from the envoy role to that of regulator. The cultural is twinned with 
thinking and describes the transition from regulator to advocate. The social is 
the most important and it is twinned with judging, the very pinnacle of 
deliberative skills. I make use of these transitional models because in a 
process like a citizens' jury, the will effectively surrenders to thinking and in 
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turn to judging along a time line as the urgency of the deadline for the jurors 
to make their recommendations and write their report looms. 
I n this chapter then I have shown how the processes of the citizens' jury are 
effectively about compromise and change. Habermas (1996: 160) describes 
this compromise as central to the very act of taking part in deliberation since 
deliberating forces the participants to recognise that: 
contested interest positions and value orientations are so interwoven 
with a community's intersubjectively shared form of life that serious 
decisions about values touch on an unclarified collective self­
understanding. Ethical-political questions pose themselves from the 
perspective of members who, in the face of important life issues, want 
to gain clarity about their shared form of life and about the ideals that 
shape their common life ....... The identity of a group refers to the 
situations in which the members can utter an emphatic "we"; it is not an 
ego identity writ large rather it supplements the individual's identity. 
How we make our native traditions and forms of life our own by 
selectively developing them determines who we recognise ourselves to 
be in these cultural transmissions - who we are and would like to be as 
citizens. 
While judging as the final stage of learning is crucial, it is very important to 
also understand the earlier processes of willing and thinking. In these 
processes the individual seeks out the opinion, support or input of others in 
the decision-making process, even where the decisions are about individual 
concerns such as career choices. As a result, the individual moves into the 
public sphere and it is in this way that for most people the "I" becomes 
connected with the moral "ought" of ethical political discourses (Habermas, 
1996, 160-161). Similarly, from the Arendtian position, it is "as we practise 
thinking, judging and acting, we become who we are" (Minnich, 1989: 141). 
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The task of identifying how and where learning occurs for the citizens' juror 
remains. This discussion has detailed the components of a theory of learning 
but when can we be sure we have observed social learning? By 
concentrating on the processes outlined above, I can pick out instances 
where learning is occurring. These are divided into three key types of 
learning experience. They are the reconstruction of ideas, changes in levels 
of confidence, and changes in relationships between actors. Some of these 
transformations have already been highlighted in the literature on deliberation 
as a journey of personal development but this study identifies whether or not 
these changes remain with the participants after the jury has ended. Do they 
amount to the transformations sought by deliberative democrats? Finding the 
answer to that question is the task of the next three chapters. 
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7: The citizens' jury a personal journey 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I describe the transition from the role of envoy to the role of 
regulator. This covers the jury experience from the time they receive the 
request to take part in the jury up until approximately the first time they work 
together in their sma" groups and therefore move onto the second level of 
regulator. As already described in Chapter 6, this period covers what I refer 
to as the personal dimension of learning during which time the juror is most 
influenced by the aesthetic structures of socialisation. These structures are 
characterised in the juror discussions as the articulation of aspirations about 
the willed or desired make-up of the society. 
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Willing 
The first process, willing, is intensely personal. This process covers the 
transition period between the roles of envoy up to the role of regulator. The 
jurors learn to rely on their will because it is reinforced in the listening 
process which takes up much of this stage of the jury. It is during this stage 
that the participants in the jury can engage in the process of reflection that 
will be crucial to the outcome of the jury. This can be done without fear since 
it is about self-presentation. 
For Arendt (1978: 36), self-presentation "is distinguished from self-display by 
the active and conscious choice of the image shown ... self-presentation 
would not be possible without a degree of self-awareness - a capability 
inherent in the reflexive character of mental activities". Although it is 
occurring in public in the sense that the jury is made up of people who are 
still strangers to each other, it is not occurring in the public sphere as yet. 
However, by agreeing to take part in the jury and thereby adopting a reflexive 
approach, the jurors are tacitly agreeing to a move out into the public. 
At this stage, the citizens' juror can still control the perception that others 
have of her/him, by engaging mostly in the passive behaviour of listening. 
But, in fact, this involves willing the other members of the group to see us in a 
specific way - as the conscientious notetaker, the sympathetic listener, or the 
disgruntled voter - but this sense of control over the process is short-lived. 
The use of the term will corresponds to Arendt's discussion of willing as one 
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aspect of social learning. Habermas relates the personal to the aesthetic, for 
him where the aesthetic structures are operating, the outcome of the process 
of deliberating over questions will be articulated as feelings and attitudes. 
These will, in turn, find expression individually in acquired expressive actions. 
At this level, learning is not geared towards the collective good, the 
democratic principle of seeking out the best option as the one most likely to 
yield the highest level of acceptability is not going to be best served, since 
the will is opposed to the communal. The aesthetic concerns the 
meaningfulness of proposed actions in the pursuit of fuller identity formation 
at the individual and communal levels. In order for learning to occur, the 
participants rely heavily on particular, culturally-specific values which can 
only really be tested in terms of the feelings and emotions which they make 
manifest. The individual is searching for a way of operationalising these 
feelings but the outcome is a variety of options for action, which will need to 
be examined by channelling them later into the normative domain where their 
validity can be judged. But how is this observed among the jurors? 
The envoys 
I have identified the first juror role with behaviours that I describe as envoy 
type activities. The jurors behave as envoys during the period in which the 
decision is made to take part in the jury and in their early contacts with the 
jury. The jurors I interviewed describe this decision as a fairly passive 
process, dictated by circumstances. The jury participants begin for the most 
part without a perception of themselves as part of a public. While they might 
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in the past have been canvassed for their input into an aggregate pubHc 
opinion, this was as part of "the public", a more passive and instrumental 
category. In effect, they seem to decide to take part in the jury because they 
were asked to and could think of no good reason not to. Lowndes, Pratchett 
and Stoker (2001: 448) support this assessment. They show that while, for 
some, the invitation was initially seen as flattering and therefore they might 
have been tempted for that reason, they are soon shown that this is not the 
case. Their conversations with the organisers make it clear that they have 
been randomly selected and therefore not chosen. This means that they 
have to revert to a more instrumental way of making the decision. Instead 
then, they seem to have approached the decision in a number of different 
! 
ways. These approaches include the following: 
• 
~ 
I' 
the availability of time.t.......•..•.,.·· 

I was interested in sort of like seeing how it works, and it was nice to ber paid for doing something that I would never be able to do without being 
paid. I was interested in seeing what it was all about and as it happened 
I was owed a few leave days. 
M12 
A vague interest in the topic to be discussed. 
I thought it would be interesting because now we have a doorstep 
recycling programme but we didn't at the time ........and it was really 
because I wanted to find out why we didn't have one. I joined the jury 
for that reason. 
M07 
The need for a change of scenery. 
At the time I wasn't working and my little boy was only about two or 
three and I was thinking about going back to work and well then this 
lady just turned up at my door and asked me that question, what do I 
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think about, you know, doing this jury service. I just thought it would be 
nice to spend the day with adults and it would get me out of the house 
F22 
Professional curiosity: 
Obviously as a police officer I'm used to hearing and giving evidence 
and I wondered how they would do it. Would it be very different, would it 
be better? You see their witnesses were going to be experts in their 
field whereas very often in court it is ordinary people, bystanders, who 
find themselves in court and are understandably very nervous. And of 
course we got to ask them questions and I thought it would be 
interesting because as a police officer at the decision making stage in 
the court we don't get to ask the questions. The citizens' jury was 
different in that sense and that is what is intriguing. 
M32 
In some cases, the payment helped to finalise their decision but this was 
more likely to provide the final push rather than the initial incentive. 
I think they offered money and expenses to us but it was very little. You 
wouldn't have done it for the money. You'd have had to have been 
interested to do it. But even so it was very little money ... 1 don't have a 
paid job, I tend to be interested. I have more time than other people. 
F19 
For women, the time involved was a more important consideration. Where 
payment was a factor, I found that it was more likely to influence the men 
than the women involved. 
So I could learn something and of course I would be earning at the time 
as well. 
M12 
Three of the men interviewed mention the payment as an important factor 
influencing their decision. Only one woman claims to have taken any account 
of the offer of payment at all. 
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In some cases the decision to take part was influenced by a sense of public 
duty or a commitment to political participation, but this was usually secondary 
to practical concerns. 
I just felt like I should do it and I had the time and all. We are always 
complaining that they don't listen and this was our chance. I felt like I 
had to do it or else I would somehow lose my right to 
complain ... anyway I'd had a heart attack earlier in that year in June and 
I got marvellous treatment at the [name of local hospital], the Intensive 
Care Unit and then up in the General Ward for about two weeks and I 
couldn't fault them actually for what they did through the NHS, 
marvellous, how they dealt with me anyway and I wanted to make sure 
they knew that. 
F25 
And similarly: 
I felt it was something I should do - like legal juries and that and 
everyone has to have their turn. I thought it would be important for the 
area as well, we all complain when the council makes a decision that 
affects us for the worse so we have to stand up and be counted. 
M04 
One man also raised an important procedural point that helped him make his 
decision. He had served on a legal jury before and been impressed with it, 
therefore when the invitation to serve on the citizens' jury came through he 
was worried about the possibility for misrepresentation. 
With the legal jury service you sit there and you learn from the facts and 
that's all you get and you aren't really influenced by anything else and 
that was my biggest issue with this whole citizens' jury. Certainly, on a 
legal jury you talk about things but you haven't been setting the 
questions to the witnesses so you weren't influencing the information 
you are getting and that means the information you get is exactly the 
same as the information that any other 12 people would get. That 
means that if they try to be honest with themselves you are guaranteed 
to get the same result, it's not so subjective. The citizens' jury I thought 
would be a bit too personality-driven, everyone has a certain personality 
and certain ones of us are stronger than others and that was why I 
wanted to get involved. I was far younger than the rest of them and I 
have a disability. I'm deaf. So I decided to do it to ...not to represent 
211 

people like me but to make sure ... 1 suppose to represent the younger 
element. 
M24 
This man, like the rest of the citizens' jurors, is describing his journey as a 
public event for him and he saw it begin the moment he decided to accept 
the invitation to participate in the jury. For him, like the man quoted below, his 
decision was an ethical one based on Rasmussen's (1990: 62) ethics of 
suspicion. 
It was an opportunity to be listened to and i thought I should do it. If 
people want anything to change they have to get involved from the 
bottom and get other people to speak up as well. Before this I would 
have been much more likely to give out about the government. I mean, I 
hadn't bothered to vote for years because I thought it was a waste of 
time but this appealed to me. It gave you a chance to do your bit. To 
stand up and be counted as it were. We knew it was going to be in the 
papers, so we had to be aware that we might be blamed by the public, if 
they didn't like what we said. So you didn't do it lightly. It was a political 
decision but it was a personal one more than anything. But I knew that 
this was going to be about ordinary people paying for their healthcare 
and I wanted to oppose that but there was also the fact that I sell 
alcohol to people to make my living and that can damage their health 
and I have a responsibility to try and prevent people going over the top. 
M31 
Like many of the participants, these two interviewees both told me that they 
would not have taken up the opportunity to be citizens' jurors if they had not 
felt they would have anything to offer or felt that they were entirely ignorant of 
the area to be discussed. The first of these men felt he had something to 
offer because of his age and his experience of having a disability, although 
he is uncomfortable about saying he could represent others. The second 
man also felt that his years spent working for a brewery as a pub landlord 
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meant lots of people talked to him about lots of issues and he could filter 
them up to the decision makers. 
I suppose when you work in a pub, especially in a place like this, you 
hear everybody's worries and complaints. You get to know them all, 
what they want, what they think should be done ... This town has had a 
very hard few years and lots of people here got the stuffing knocked out 
of them during Thatcher and that and I thought I could tell people about 
that. The last thing we need around here is a situation that means the 
worst-off have to go without a doctor or hospital. I know some of my 
customers would have to choose to go without. I wanted to make sure 
someone spoke up for them. 
M31 
But this didn't mean he could speak for them, instead he could act as a 
source of public opinion and try to ensure these sorts of ideas got heard. 
Other jurors offered similar explanations for their involvement but expressed 
the same anxiety. 
I just thought it would be nice to have a chance to say how I feel about 
something. I didn't think I could tell them what to do or nothing but I 
wanted to be there. I told a few people about it and they were very keen 
and kept saying 'you tell them we don't want anymore of those 
telephone masts' things like that. I didn't see myself as a representative 
for other people but that's how we were seen I suppose and that was a 
burden at the start. Just 'cos I lived on benefits at the time doesn't mean 
I can speak for all unemployed around here. I mean we are all different. 
But in a way I had to. 
Mi7 
Even though he doesn't want to be seen as a representative, he does feel 
that he come from the pool of those who will be affected and like the other 
jurors who feel that perhaps their input can, in some ways, mimic that of any 
"little person" or the ordinary citizen he tries to engage in some "'perspective 
taking" (Asen, 1999: 117). The jurors all expressed some anxiety about 
representing others but they made an interesting distinction between 
representing people and representing ideas. Already, in the earliest stages of 
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the jury, evidence of the move from a politics of presence to a politics of 
ideas is starting to show through (Phillips, 1996). 
At first I thought to myself they need people like me, people who can 
really show them what's what. You know, tell it to them straight but then 
as the day of the jury came round I got a bit nervous about that. I spoke 
to friends and family about it and even though we are all short of money 
and we all live in fear of factories closing, things like that, we didn't 
always think the same way. Alii could try to do was to sell them our 
ideas about how things should be done. 
F27 
And similarly: 
I think I was the only one who lived in one of the tower blocks around 
here and I did feel that I should say something about it. It's not so bad 
for me here, I don't have kids or anything like that but if they wanted to 
fix this place up that's where they have to start. For the children'S sake 
and for the parents, those poor women with the prams and sometimes 
there's no working lifts and the doctors can't get in and it can be awful. I 
had to try and speak for them even if I wasn't really the right person. I 
could see the problems and understand them even if I hadn't 
experienced them all myself. 
M17 
One other notable factor at this stage is that the jurors regularly rely on the 
term "cynic" and often use it as a badge of honour (SSG, 2002). For some of 
the jurors to be cynical meant to be aware of the unfair exercise of power by 
elites who might wish to encourage the ordinary person to go along with their 
plans. 
I don't think, certainly where politics are concerned, I think they can do 
more or less what they want to do and they'll do what they want to do 
anyway. I mean, for example, they could well have a people's jury on 
whether we go into the Euro and go to Europe fully, but if they want us 
to go to Europe fully and to go into the Euro then we'll have it anyway. 
Whatever the result of any referendum is, I am very cynical where 
politicians are concerned. 
M10 
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This wearing of their political disengagement as a sign of their authenticity is 
echoed in the findings of the BBC research, which observes how "a sense of 
pride exists in being one of the 40% who did not vote" (BBC, 2002: 5). By 
deciding to take part, they are showing that they felt it necessary to try to face 
up to the power of the usual decision makers. 
To be honest I was being selfish. I was concerned whether they were 
going to put up another one of these chimneys ... As I'd moved away 
from one I didn't want to be again in an area where they are going to 
put one. 
FOB 
And: 
I thought it would be good to allow people have a say in how things are 
done. Usually it's only the gays who get any say in how things are clone 
around [name of town] and people like me can't usually have a say and 
we are the ones who should be asked. 
M16 
When they first join the jury, the jurors feel they will be the only "real people" 
(F01) present and, while they try to accept this self-imposed responsibility, 
they are not convinced that they or anyone else could ever represent the 
general population or even their alleged group. They are aware that they 
have been selected according to a stratified sampling technique and feel that 
the onus is being placed on them to represent "students", "working mums" 
and other categories. This awareness is potentially intimidating but they do 
claim to feel that they could at least ensure that people like them are seen if 
not heard: 
But what you can do is see that your kind is not being excluded. It was 
very important to us to see that. 
Mi5 
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Therefore, what we have at this stage is a group of jurors who see 
themselves as envoys and who believe that their task is to safeguard the 
position of the ordinary citizens like themselves and to make sure that their 
situation is protected. Their participation is, on the whole, instrumental and 
their main participation at the moment involves observing the process. Even 
when they are unsure that they can add anything to the discussions they feel 
that their presence might potentially prevent damaging decisions being 
made. The woman quoted below had worked as a home visitor for her local 
council. 
I'd seen all sorts of things like this come and go when I had worked at 
the council. They bring you all in to a meeting, brainstorming they call it, 
that usually only means that they ask you what you think and then a few 
days later they tell you what they are going to do. You read the memos 
and you think 'was I at that meeting?' ... So now that I've left the council, 
actually I left quite a long time ago but I assumed it would be the same. 
I thought I could really tell them what I thought. What I wanted them to 
do for the area and where I thought they had gone wrong in the 
past. .. Just by being there and them knowing that I know what it is really 
like for older people who get care at home I thought they would have to 
be more careful and maybe even more honest. 
F22 
These jurors all came to the process with one thing in common. They wanted 
to have an input. This was mostly fuelled by a fear of being "done to" (F01) 
rather than a desire to help form the future. For the most part, they spend this 
early part of the process observing what they see going on around them 
expecting to spot a flaw in the design or to uncover some attempt to "play us 
for fools" (M03) on the part of the organisers. 
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These suspicious feelings are usually allayed once the jury itself begins and 
by the time they exit this stage they feel that they can do more than observe 
the process. Where they agreed to take part out of suspicion and fear, the 
get-to-know-you sessions prove to them that, to some extent, the other 
people who have been chosen are just as ordinary. Their motives were at 
first clearly personal but later they come to be fuelled by a feeling of 
identification with the project or the topic. The sense they already had that 
things can be made better by involving ordinary people is built up as they 
gain confidence in the organisers and their fellow jurors. 
It sounded like a great idea, I don't know if I believed they were serious 
but if they were 
F01 
And similarly: 
It is the only way to do things that people will support. It's like if you go 
into the street and you see they are now charging for parking you think, 
'bloody hell here they go ripping us off again' but it's like if they tell you 
why and when and explain how they set the charge and so on it's not so 
bad. It's like the dentist he always says 'now I'm going to do this' and 'it 
will hurt but only for a few seconds' and then ... you don't mind then, but 
if they just did it. 
M03 
Also: 
I thought that sounded like a good way of resolving issues. I think there 
are far too many issues being resolved, you know especially by 
newspapers, newspapers seem to be manipulating public opinion, they 
give you a ready-made set of ideas about the world, and you can 
almost pick and choose a whole world perspective on any issue you 
can imagine from them. You don't have to think for yourself. It seemed 
that the jury would be a nice change, to be in a sort of group that could, 
you know, make its own mind up. 
M21 
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But at this stage they are still mostly concerned with thinking about what 
would be better for them and their families. The envoys operate at a private 
level, they are on a personal mission to educate themselves about policy 
making and to have a chance to let off steam. They describe their decision to 
take part as based on common sense; they have something to contribute so 
they might as well take part. 
I know my wife said to me 'there's your chance, you're always 
complaining you could do their job with your eyes closed'. So I had to 
do it, didn't I? Or else anytime I said anything it would have been 'you're 
all talk'. I only did it at the start to get her off my back but I suppose it's 
my duty innit. I did think I could show them a thing or two about the 
reality of living round here and raising a family and that. 
M35 
They do not expect to change the way the decisions are actually made, 
especially given the way that the remit of the citizens' jury has been 
explained to them. It is made clear to jurors from the start that the jury has no 
legislative power and all that they can expect is to have their report 
responded to. While this may seem disempowering in some ways, for the 
jurors on the whole it means that they are not constrained by the fear of 
failure or fear of being exposed as having too little knowledge. Because they 
do not expect their ideas to be implemented, they can be a bit more creative. 
Turning envoys into regulators 
Listening is one of the participation rituals that best characterises the shift 
from their first role as envoys to the role of advocate. This shift is similar to 
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the process of willing as it works to convert desires into intentions (Arendt, 
1978: 78). It is also similar to Yankelovich's (1991) process of consciousness 
raising where citizens become aware of the issues and their importance. One 
of the jurors summed it up as follows: 
We had to learn how to listen, how to discuss things, how to reach a 
certain (long pause) It's a bit like climbing a mountain and trying to get 
to first and then the second camp and then on. And now you've reached 
the camp and absorbed all you need to absorb then you can go on 
atone, discussing things, without the facilitators or in small groups. We 
needed them less and less. 
M04 
His reference to the gradual reliance on fellow jurors rather than on the 
organisers is very significant and shows that the listening that characterises 
this phase is creating trust between the participants (Putnam, 1993; Delap, 
1998). By being listened to, they are granted legitimacy and, while this does 
not mean their ideas and input are accepted uncritically, it means that they 
agree that they will work together (Forester, 1999: 110). During their time as 
envoys, the jurors have only embarked on their journey and are very wary of 
the process. While they initially accepted the offer to take part because they 
think they can bring something to the process, almost as soon as they enter 
into the process they begin to feel disempowered. 
one being built if the council actually had other options. As I had moved 
away from one I didn't want to again be in an area where they were 
going to put one. When it first started I was working in the job I'm in 
now, which is basically catering and I'm more or less my own boss. The 
only problem really was my own confidence, I wasn't sure I'd be able to 
understand what they would talk about and at first I found it hard to 
keep up. I thought to myself, I'm never going to get used to all the new 
language but one of the ladies in it, her daughter is at university and 
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she found it hard to understand some of what we had to read but you 
soon got into the swing of it. At first I kept asking them to explain the 
new words and all that and then it wasn't so hard anymore. I think we all 
felt the same. I wrote down a lot of what they said and if I didn't 
understand it I put up my hand, it was like being back at school, but not 
as scary. 
FOB 
But by listening to each other and reassuring each other about their right to 
be there, things quickly improved for them. They began to regain their sense 
of confidence but this time based on a more solid foundation of actually 
knowing about the issue and knowing and trusting each other. Listening then 
is a key process in what Forester (1999: 101) calls the transformation from 
"adversarial expectations to collaborative exploration". For him, listening 
fulfils the role of a trial run for the jurors who test out what the required co­
operation will mean to them: 
[By] listening together, we recognise as important not only worlds but 
issues, details, relationships, and even people we may have ignored or 
not appreciated in the past. .. [by] acknowledging them in participatory 
groups, we come not only to transform our shared senses of what is at 
stake today in our deliberations but to shape our new commitments to 
new ends and to one another as well (Forester, 1999: 140). 
This is a recurring theme in the jurors' discussions of the initial stages of the 
jury. 
Listening to each other helped a lot, it was good to have different 
people there as well because that meant we couldn't assume anything 
and when you have to explain things to them. Then we realised where 
the gaps were or we realised that we had misunderstood each other or 
where we had understood things differently. It helped you to see if they 
were genuine and if you could trust each other. 
M2B 
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Listening as well as hearing, not only from the witnesses but also from each 
other, seems to have been pivotal in their assessment of the process as 
being worthwhile - despite the fact that it was painful at times, especially in 
the early stages. 
There really aren't many times when you get to hear how other people 
feel. It's easy to think that everyone else is irresponsible but really it 
wasn't the case and that was an eye opener. Before it all started I 
thought I've been a working mum and I know what it's like but then I got 
there and I met women who are married and work, women who don't 
work, single parents who have two jobs and so on and that was very 
humbling. I mean I'm still amazed at how some people manage, 
especially nowadays when there's so much more pressure to have a 
career not just a job. It made me question lots of things about my own 
way of doing things. It was hard sometimes to realise that for years you 
had looked down on women who don't work but then you meet them 
and you hear about disabled children, parents who need constant care 
and all that... No choice is ever easy is it? 
F18 
Listening to each other also alleviated their sense that acting on behalf of the 
public as representatives is something to be feared. 
I think I was apprehensive about it because I didn't want to be the one 
who had to explain to my neighbours why the local pool was being 
closed down to pay for the pensioners. That was the scary thing ... it 
would be easy to please myself, I can't swim. I've always been terrified 
of water ... but other people like the baths. So it was important to 
remember that we were there to represent others and that made it hard. 
I realised I couldn't just give my opinion I had to think about everyone 
else in [name of town] and that was scary ... but everyone felt that way 
and that was why we were glad to hear from as many different 
witnesses as possible and to have each other to listen to. There was 
one woman on the jury who was able to tell us about how much her 
children like the pool and there was a man who had been in the war and 
he knew about the war widows and so on. So we did get to hear all 
sides even if they might not have intended us to. We found out together. 
F26 
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However, it was seen as important for the jury to have been open to anyone. 
But while writers on the subject cite the payments and the provision of 
creches as important in enabling this, it is not the inclusive principle that is 
more important to the jurors. For the jurors, the fact that the other jurors 
seemed willing to listen to each other from the start was the most important 
factor in gaining their trust. They are interested in who the jurors are and are 
fearful that everyone else will be a notable while they are just ordinary - but it 
is not the key thing for them. Listening to each other allows them to "learn 
about new options together" (Forester, 1999: 101), and while this listening 
was sometimes described as "essentially critical" (M33) and "searching" 
(F02), this was meant in the sense of the evaluative rather than as something 
disparaging. 
We had to listen carefully to what each other said because you knew 
your turn was coming and you were going to have to put your ideas in 
context of what had already been said. You had to concentrate so that 
you didn't just come in and say your piece, instead you said what you 
now think after hearing this person and that person. And if you wanted 
to say you disagreed with what X said then you had to say why, so you 
really did have to listen. 
F20 
Listening to others also improves an important practical skill among the 
jurors. Ritualised turn-taking is used in the early stages of some juries to 
allow time for people who are less vocal to gather their thoughts, but it can 
also serve to focus the mind on issues that might not be raised. 
R: 	 I remember at the start being afraid to talk up and hoping I wouldn't 
have to say too much but we went around the table and I had a few 
ideas but before they came to me they had already been said and 
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you had to think of something else. But it was often the less obvious 
things that were the solution. I remember that from school, being 
asked for an idea about a poem or something and because everyone 
else had already listed off what was in the book you had to think for 
yourself and it felt nice if you got it right. 
I: 	 Did you feel you found any right answers? 
R: 	 I suppose not. No. On this there wasn't really any right or wrong, no 
one laughed at you. It wasn't about who is right and who is wrong it 
was about what was best. 
F10 
During this phase, there begins the recognition that jurors can only complete 
their journey when they work together and develop a supportive culture to 
gradually draw out public reasons in defence of certain preferences. They do 
this by selecting a course of action that is backed up by the most public 
reasons and therefore represents the fairest way forward. 
I was convinced that if we were all honest and open and willing to listen 
as a jury we would work out what was best... you have to commit to 
treating each other equally and that was what had to happen in the jury. 
We did get somewhere. It started off as a massive wave in that room 
until it calmed down and that was the best thing. When you are in a 
group of 12 you have to put all your opinions on the table, all your 
opinions, jumble the whole lot up and I'll give you my opinions to defend 
as though they are your own and I'll try to defend yours and then we'll 
see where we stand now. That's the way you learn to see and evaluate 
other people's points of view. And then you start to say 'oh, she's right'. 
But that's hard work; it took up quite a while for us to get to that. 
F26 
By listening to each other and feeling that they had been heard the jurors felt 
able to actually deal with the first change in attitude that they were to face on 
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the jury. Listening as it is described above, allowed the fearfulness of the first 
part of the jury to abate and instead of reacting against the jury they begin to 
accept the role they have been given. At first, this change is difficult to cope 
with and that is why I have divided it here into two parts, novice regulators 
and regulators. 
Novice regulators 
Having spent some time on the jury getting used to and observing the 
protocols, the jurors tend to be less fearful about being asked to represent 
others. They have reconciled themselves to their role as part of a group who 
have a deliberative task ahead of them. 
I didn't think I could represent all single parents but I had experiences 
that the others didn't have and it was important to me to make sure they 
heard our side of things. I wanted to at least tell them to think about 
people who don't have choices. 
Fig 
They have moved away from the idea of themselves as isolated individuals 
who are merely there to observe and begin to look for ways to act on behalf 
of ordinary citizens. 
We knew we were all picked to do justice to the area and that's not the 
same as speaking for yourself. It was about what was right for the 
community and of course we knew that this was a pilot thing that they 
were only trying out that meant that we could have decided it was a 
waste of time and what we decided to do was to understand from that 
that we could influence how other councils made similar decisions. We 
started off with what we wanted as individuals and then as a group and 
then came down to what was right for the area, that's the opposite of 
what you would expect. Mostly when I go to community meetings, it's 
everyone shouting each other down and calling for what they want. 
Mi5 
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The jury as a deliberative space begins now to take on a more public 
atmosphere with the medium of talk becoming increasingly important 
(Mansbridge, 1999b). However, they are not yet sure that the jury process 
itself will be trustworthy. At this stage, the jurors are not attempting to query 
the nature of the evidence, the facts being cited, the statistics being 
presented. This is how they move into the cultural domain of the life-world, a 
move that I have shown from the outset to be crucial to the success of 
deliberation. Instead of simply reacting in a passive way to what they are 
hearing and trying to safeguard their existing ways of seeing, the next stage 
involved a more active and public role for the citizen who must be able to 
provide reasons to support their arguments. 
Regulators 
When they reach this stage, the citizens' jurors are still adjusting to the need 
to introduce a more public aspect to their discussions. They feel unable to 
critically question the experts but, as regulators, what they can do is 
crosscheck the evidence. 
I've never been one for the television so I really couldn't disagree with 
what they said about watersheds and all that. I felt in some ways that I 
had to go along with the others but I don't think I did do that in the end. 
You see the thing was we did talk to each other about it and that though 
to see if we agreed and one of the women there was a media student 
and she was able to verify a lot of it for us. Otherwise, we would have 
had to go along with what they told us and that wasn't the point was it? 
M09 
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Some of the regulators will work by checking up on the information being 
given to them by looking in text books between sessions, visits to libraries, 
talking to family members, searching their memories for evidence that will 
discredit what they are being told or even by talking to each other outside of 
the formal deliberations. 
My husband worked in the building trade all his life and he had 
managed big sites like schools and hospitals and I was able to ask him 
what he thought of the amounts they were suggesting. Some of the 
figures sounded crazy but he thought they made sense with public 
liability insurance and labour and all those extras you don't think 
about. .. One of the other women whose daughter was involved in the 
NHS somewhere else asked her about the costs as well and she 
agreed so we had to accept that what they were telling us was true but 
we didn't just accept it, we checked it as well. 
F01 
These are what I call "product" regulators. Other regulators operate at a more 
procedural level, cross-checking participation levels and so on. They work to 
find out about their fellow jurors, their ages and backgrounds for example, 
and much of this suspicion arises out of a knowledge that the jurors had not 
been chosen at random which some interpreted as a chance for the 
organisers to exclude certain perspectives. Hence they set great store by 
verifying with one another who they are and where they come from. 
We talked a lot about our own lives, our kids, our jobs and all that. 
Especially when we had coffee breaks and that helped to reassure me. 
I think I did feel bad at first about who was there. At first I thought they 
won't listen to the likes of me and I'll just be sitting there on me 
own ... befriended another lady who was on the jury with us and I found I 
could to talk to her very easily and together with another woman and 
most of them were just like me. I think everyone was nervous and 
everyone was a bit suspicious that they were the token this or the token 
that. .. 1 think now looking back it was genuine. Some of them were a bit 
snobbish but that's life, isn't it? 
F27 
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And: 
Before I got there I thought I was going to be the only one who hadn't 
been to college but I think we all felt the same way and I know that I 
as~ed around about that, and what people do for a living, if they had 
children - that sort of thing. And I wanted to be sure we were a good 
mix. I think they did that very well. We all got on fairly well, obviously 
some of them wouldn't be my cup of tea but I think we worked together 
because for most of us this was about all we had in common. So we 
had to make it work because there were no loyalties to draw on if things 
didn't go your way. We were all very different and that made it all the 
more interesting. 
F02 
This strategy of regulation is often exaggerated on some juries where there 
was a suspicion that some jurors who seem to be more astute might have 
been put there by the organisers to manipulate the jurors in favour of the 
organisers' preferred outcome. The regulator's role is to expose this if it is the 
case. This happened in the case of the second Norwich jury where one 
woman seemed to the others to be particularly willing to agree with the 
organisers. The jurors I interviewed from what I call the Norwich B jury all 
described feeling suspicious of her and attempting to question her in order to 
possibly "blow her cover" (F26). 
The opportunity to check up on the process usually left them satisfied that the 
jury process is a genuine and legitimate attempt to include them. They then 
move onto the next stage in the decision-making process. 
I think once we all settled down to the job it got better, the fear went 
away and for most of us it was just nice to see that they wanted to hear 
what we had to say. 
F11 
Participation at this stage is still largely instrumental and this is shown by the 
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way they deal with the witnesses. They address the witnesses as experts but 
encourage them to speak about the issues in an experiential way because 
they want to get out of it what they can for themselves. 
Some of the witnesses were great and they made it very simple but 
some of them, I don't know, they couldn't talk to people and we said to 
them but what if I came to you and you diagnosed me with cancer and 
you were explaining the treatment to me and I couldn't understand it all 
what would you tell me ... and [Doctor's name] said ovarian cancer was 
the worst because it was very difficult to locate it and you didn't know 
whether you had got it or not. She said if you can just imagine 
somebody opening a bag of cornflakes like that and sort of showering it 
everywhere, that's what ovarian cancer is like so it's very difficult, it's 
not a tumour it's all over so that sort of thing is pretty graphic and easy 
for a layman [sic] to understand. 
F02 
Once the jurors have actually joined the jury and met their fellow jurors, the 
feeling of identification with the issue that motivated them to join the jury 
becomes less important. Instead, they begin to criticise their motives for 
taking part: 
All the men felt absolutely useless and embarrassed at being there 
because this is a disease that doesn't affect men ... but I know I felt 
almost like that I shouldn't have been there until- and it was a lot of the 
women in the groups - the women jurors were saying 'no, your input is 
going to be valuable' and I wasn't sure how it was going to be valuable 
until we had gone through a lot of the ideas and broadened our 
horizons. 
M04 
While this man was sure at the outset that he could make a contribution to 
the jury, once faced with the actual reality of the jury he suddenly feels less 
convinced. He claims he had assumed that common sense would get him 
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through what is going to be a difficult and challenging experience but that 
once he was on the jury, his self-assurance was lost. He was instead forced 
to draw on his own resources of experience and to rely on the experiences 
recounted by the other jurors and the witnesses in order to understand the 
task set. They have to draw on each other more and more. As another 
female juror explains: 
She [one of the jurors] interpreted lots of things as being racist and at 
first I couldn't see it, but later I did see her point, it does depend on how 
you look at things, Just because I don't feel like her doesn't mean it 
doesn't hurt her, she has had more prejudice in her life. That is what I 
mean by power of television, I had never thought about it but she said 
that showing black women always as cleaners, even if that is the reality 
of many black women's lives it makes it worse ... but now when I watch it 
I can see that sort of thing. 
F11 
And similarly: 
I had always thought of myself as sympathetic and had felt that I could 
understand other people's lives and how they live but this was new to 
me - I couldn't imagine what it must be like to be in their position. I 
mean I am a single mother and my partner barely pays his child support 
and we never see him. But I have a job and a home of my own and 
although it's not ideal it's a million miles away from what some of the 
women we met on the jury or who come in my shop have. I mean even 
the married ones, some of them have husbands who never help with 
the children or around the house and when they try to work they face 
resentment from their husbands, from the people at work when they 
take time off for a parent-teacher meeting and that. .. it opened my eyes 
it really did. I could draw on their experiences and the experiences of 
the professional women who have nannies and that, to really see the 
big picture. It changed my perception of the problems that women face 
everyday. 
F19 
At this stage the jurors are still prone to behave in an instrumental way to 
229 

= 

protect their private position in public. They are, however, beginning to think 
of themselves in a less private way and to recognise that the only way they 
can influence the process is to question the evidence being offered to them. 
As I will show in the next chapter, they decide not to try and beat the 
organisers at their own game but instead to redefine the boundaries of the 
discussion by defining the discussion style. As envoys and regulators they try 
to do this not by questioning the facts and figures but the representativeness 
of the witnesses and the jurors. As they move into their role of advocates 
they try to do this by using stories and anecdotes to challenge the culture of 
the jury. 
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8: The citizens' jury a cultural journey 
Introduction 
As the previous chapter has shown, the jurors face a great number of 
personal challenges to their own worldview in the early part of their jury 
experience. In the next part of my discussion of the jury journey I explore the 
experiences of the jurors from a more cultural perspective. During the final 
stages of their involvement with the jury, the jurors undergo a transition from 
the role of regulator to that of advocate juror. By this time they have made 
their move out into the public sphere but their behaviour is still largely 
instrumental, based on fear of being tricked by the organisers. As they are 
being turned into advocates, their learning about themselves and others as 
well as about the problem they have been asked to consider moves into the 
arena of cognitive decision making. This corresponds to one of the 
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fundamental principles of Habermas's discourse ethics, which states that in 
discourse moral problems can be reformulated in cognitive terms (Habermas, 
1990). This change can be seen as the practical interventions, which 
individuals make in the world and, while they were fearful in the early stages 
of the implications of their involvement and their inability to really understand 
the issues, what emerges here is a determination to reformulate the moral 
problems through the use of stories and anecdotes. 
The cognitive structures available to them - namely stories and anecdotes 
that each individual can access - are mobilised in search of the facts about 
events and so on. This knowledge is used in order that jurors can fully 
explore the options and that practical decisions can be reached. This 
exploration involves them critically reflecting for the first time on the 
information they are being given and this corresponds to the second aspect 
of Arendt's learning process (Arendt, 1978). It is now that the jurors 
themselves will for the first time start to make decisions. They are given 
opportunities to select and question witnesses. Learning, when it occurs here 
will be a product of the investigation of the evidence in support of, or against, 
various courses of action. The citizen will be left with a variety of choices 
about how to proceed, but these are informed by a moral or normative 
examination of the possible outcomes. 
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Thinking 
In the transition from the second to the third role of advocate, the jurors are 
relying on what Arendt describes as the capacity for thinking. This is mostly 
operationalised by the jurors as storytelling and I will show that the use of 
stories can tell us a great deal about the culture that is being created in the 
citizens' jury. Thinking is crucial for Arendt (1978), as it is in my model of 
deliberative learning, since the success of the jury depends on the jurors 
developing the ability to make the judgements that will later set them apart as 
deliberators. 
Arendt (1978:60) defines thinking as "following a sequence of reasoning that 
will lift you to a viewpoint outside the world of appearances as well as outside 
your own life" (Arendt, 1978: 60). The process of thinking expressed in the 
jurors' stories and analogies allows them to do this and in so doing 
participants can adopt a public approach to problem solving and decision 
making (Smith, 2002). According to Minnich (1989: 136), when we think "we 
awake from the bemusement of our certainties and are thus thrown back into 
the world, back into genuine open converse with others ... Thinking, like love, 
effects a kind of propulsion out of ourselves toward others". Even though the 
stories will enable them to engage in hypothesising and eventually in judging, 
thinking is not sufficient to demark the participants as public actors. Without 
learning to judge, they could regress into a more private understanding of 
themselves. It is during the thinking phase that the rules of their engagement 
are still being made in "internal conversation" (Minnich, 1989: 136). 
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Because of their involvement in the jury, the jurors can experience how 
"thinking actualises the split between 'me' and 'myself and invokes the voice 
of others within us with whom we think" (Minnich, 1989: 137). They learn, like 
the child in Habermas's (1995a) account of the move from the conventional 
to the post-conventional, that "each time you are confronted with some 
difficulty in life you have to make up your mind anew" (Arendt, 1978: 177). 
This realisation is what shifts them into a process of telling stories and, 
perhaps more importantly, into learning to recognise others' stories as having 
a moral imperative. This means that the jurors are learning how to take the 
opinions of others into account when they make their decisions. Thinking is 
then essentially the communal aspect of learning, where the experience of 
the life-worlds of not only the self but of others as well can be taken into 
account in attempting to evaluate the validity of any proposed course of 
action. 
Turning regulators into advocates 
The transformation from regulators into advocates occurs as the jurors begin 
to tell stories. They use the stories to construct narratives that will allow them 
to use the information the witnesses and facilitators are giving them. The 
jurors use stories to put this information into context and, as noted above, 
this usually involves adding personal anecdotal information to the facts and 
information but, as I will show, the use of narrative also serves a more 

pertinent function. According to Taylor (1989: 51), "we understand ourselves 

inescapably in narrative". The use of stories serves the purpose that 
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Yankelovich (1991) calls "working through". This means that the jurors can 
combine the information they are receiving from the witnesses with their own 
ideas and knowledge to invent and evaluate possible solutions to the 
problems. While, at the start of each interview, there is no hint that 
storytelling was important to the jurors as they describe how they regained 
their sense of efficacy and sense of empowerment, they later began to 
explain how they interacted with the other jurors and many of their recounts 
involved them explaining their input to me in terms of stories. This is how the 
importance of the stories became clear. I understand the use of stories as the 
move towards a more cultural commitment to deliberation and the use of 
stories sets the agenda for the next part of the jury journey. 
The theoretical work on storytelling used here shows that stories are ethically 
selected for their relevance and their ability to contribute to priority-setting in 
a deliberative process (Forester, 1999: 45). The jurors rely most on the 
stories as they are transformed from regulators. Wiland (2000: 468) sums up 
the importance of stories as follows: "the whole point of using analogies in 
moral philosophy is...to get us past our self-interest, inertia, lack of empathy, 
lack of imagination and defensiveness." At first, the use of stories and other 
non-traditional techniques of arguing was valued by the jurors as a technique 
that could help prevent the jurors from simply slipping uncritically into the 
language of the experts. It was felt that if a person was able to select from 
memory a story to illustrate their point it meant that they had understood the 
point. A person who had a story to illustrate a point or an opinion was felt by 
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the others to have at least "chewed it over" (M02). As they understand it, in 
order to tell a relevant anecdote or to compose a rhetorical questions or 
"what if' scenarios, the participant must have first understood the facts and 
events being discussed and incorporated them into their knowledge base. 
The jurors also use stories to explain to me the effect of the jury on them. 
The woman quoted below took part in one of the first juries held in Britain, 
almost four years before I interviewed her, and she is still sure that she was 
transformed by the experience and learned a lot. 
R: 	They gave it [the evidence] to us in such an easily-absorbed form I 
didn't really feel I was being over technical when I talked with the 
others because I mean the body is not technical, but there were one 
or two terms obviously and my husband noticed that I had gained a 
lot [of new words] but he just laughs at me and calls me an 
oncologist now even now if there is something on TV or the rad io 
about it he calls me '[woman's name] oncologist' come on in and see 
this'. You see in the past I wouldn't have looked at that sort ofthing I 
would think leave that to the experts but I am more alert to it all now. 
I ask questions. When I go the doctor I don't just say, 'yes 
Doctor. .. thank you Doctor'. I ask questions. I really do consult him 
now rather than just trust him. It certainly changed me in that way. 
I'm much more confident to ask questions and to question the 
answers. 
I: 	 Do you ask more questions in general? 
R: 	Oh, yes. When they come to the door to ask for your vote you know 
how they do that I used to always just say to all of them 'yes, I'll vote 
for you'. I wouldn't mean it of course but I just did it to get rid of them 
but now I say 'before I say yes or no I need to know, where do you 
stand on X and V?' 
F02 
The above quotation refers to her awareness that she was learning facts but 
she also points out that she has learned how best to gain new and more up­
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to-date information. This is how to get the most out of the experts by asking 
pertinent questions and getting as she says "to the heart of the matter" (F02). 
She feels that the other jurors responded to challenge of the jury in the same 
way. 
We got better at timekeeping and at asking questions, some of the men 
felt they couldn't really comment on women's cancer but by the end, 
yes I'd say we dug out the issues around care and got beyond the 
obvious things like the actual treatment. We realised we couldn't 
change the treatment or make it less sickening, we were there to fix the 
provision, we had to move onto that level. If we got too caught up in the 
sad stories we wouldn't get to the actual tasks and J think we learned to 
do that. But before we could do anything we did have to put our cards 
on the table and talk about our experiences because if a person is 
bottling up bad memories inside them there is no way we can break 
those down. I told them about my mum and how she felt when the 
doctors didn't explain things and just tell her what was going on. We 
had to do that. .. sharing the memories is what brought us together as a 
team. 
F02 
This feeling of having a job to do as a team is also addressed by another 
juror who says, 
there was no point in us sitting there if we just went over and over what 
the witnesses said ... and I'd say the important thing [was] to get each 
other to talk in our way especially when it was something technical that 
we'd never heard of before. We told each other about our past 
experiences and that helped. I told them about how it felt to live here 
and to feel unsafe at night if you are walking home and I told them 
about being mugged and all that. 
M17 
This is where the course of the interviews changed and it appears the juries 
did too. By this time they have come to terms with the fact that there will be 
some issues on which they will inevitably have to defer to the experts 
(Bohman, 1999a: 590-591), and this means that in the areas where they feel 
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they can have a real input, they are more determined to make a personal 
mark on the decision. The move to the use of stories characterises a shift "to 
the public processes of self-reflection" (Bohman, 1999a: 604). The stories 
can then be used to highlight opportunities for a "distinctly moral 
compromise" out of which they "modify their interpretations of the framework 
(for democratic deliberation] so that each can recognise the other's moral 
values and standards as part of it", and when this is successful lithe parties 
will accept the new framework for different moral reasons, in light of how 
common deliberation and dialogue with the conflicting view has changed their 
original beliefs" (Bohman, 1996b: 91-93). 
The emphasis again shifts, this time away from facts and events to an 
emphasis on how they as a group can challenge the way things are and help 
define how things ought to be. 
At first I felt like I was going to be totally lost on this thing. I mean some 
of them ran their own businesses and all that so they understood tax 
and that but I really didn't know what they were talking about. .. but 
during lunch one of the days I was talking to one of the organisers and I 
was telling her about my wife's illness and how she had been treated in 
the Caribbean when we lived there and what friends had told me about 
the situation in Ireland and that and she said I should tell the group 
about it. She thought it would help them to think about the alternatives 
and I did do that and it got the debate going. 
M23 
Another participant on that jury also told me of a similar event. 
I have a hearing problem and I've been attending hospitals all my life so 
I knew about the services first-hand and I was able to stand up for the 
hospitals and that. Some of the people there were ready to just dismiss 
the NHS as a failure because of the bad press and because the man 
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from BUPA was so polished but I told them about how well I'd been 
treated and soon other people were doing the same. And it wasn't all 
stories of doom and gloom although some were ... but one story that I 
think turned the thing around for many people was the man (I think he 
ran a pub) and he pointed out all the things that he has found that his 
private insurance can't insure and the SUPA man had to agree they 
could never provide those services like casualty and stay in 
business ... that was important to the whole thing ... Being able to pick 
holes in the experts made us feel like we really had something to offer. 
Not just for the sake of it but to really get our teeth into it and to grasp 
the nettle so to speak. 
M24 
This sense of actually steering the course of the jury and changing the 
course of the discussions won back the sense of empowerment that they felt 
was promised by the invitation to take part in the jury. While the invitation to 
take part was for the most part greeted with enthusiasm, most found the 
reality of the task ahead of them when they attended the first session 
overwhelming and disempowering. In Chapter 7 the loss of this sense of 
empowerment in the early stages of the jury was already described when we 
see that the jurors began to question their ability to do something as simple 
as to listen. As they rediscovered their confidence, they were able to use the 
telling of stories to confront other concerns and the stories begin to form a 
very important part of the legitimating process for them. But the stories also 
operate at a theoretical level. 
My decision to highlight these stories, while not originally foreseen by me, 

should in fact not come as a surprise. For Arendt (1958) and for Forester 

(1999: 209-212), the telling of stories is a sign that people are operating in 
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the public sphere where they can use storytelling in order that "experience is 
relearned in the political world" (Lara, 1998: 5). The sharing of stories 
operates at three levels, firstly and perhaps most obviously, the jurors use 
stories to create a sense of group identity in the hope that this will create a 
sense of trust. Secondly, the act of disclosure through the use of stories 
reveals the truth of participants' worldviews that they might have been able to 
hide from each other if they continued to operate only on formal terms, which 
merely required them to relate facts to each other. 
Gamson (1992) describes how in his recordings of peer-group conversations 
about political issues, the participants were aware that the statements they 
made were directed to a "gallery". His participants were aware "that remarks 
people would make in a strictly private discourse violate norms of public 
discourse" (Gamson, 1992: 19). He found that this awareness of the potential 
for conversations that occur in public to backfire on the speaker was 
particularly evident in topics where race played a role. Awareness of the 
"gallery" seems to Gamson (1992) to have made whites clarify their remarks 
where they thought their opinions might be seen as prejudiced. But, while the 
jurors are more likely to think before they speak, and in fact do not speak in 
the same way as they would at home, the use of stories breaks down their 
reserve. Stories put them at ease in a way that makes them more likely to 
give the real reasons for their preferences (Forester, 1999). Thirdly, as a 
result of this disclosure through the use of stories, the normative dimensions 
of their opinions are opened up to scrutiny because "once the story is retold, 
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it is possible to grasp the narrowness of previous conceptions of justice; 
debts to the past that take the form of moral responsibilities in the present are 
thereby incurred" (Lara, 1998: 5-6). One of the participants sums it up as 
follows: 
It was only then that I realised that it was really silly to think like that. I 
was telling them about the time that they started advertising tampons 
and things on television and how I am embarrassed when those ads 
come on. I think a lot of the other men on the jury felt it too. But anyway 
I was saying this and one of the women got very annoyed with me and 
asked me why I was embarrassed about something so natural and she 
said it was being anti-women to be ashamed ... 1 don't really think I am 
anti-women but I think it made me realise that it is unfair on girls to 
make them embarrassed by acting embarrassed about these things. , 
had been brought up to keep the whole thing secret and that's not right 
is it? I hope I'd be more open with my kids. 
M12 
Arendt also sees the use of stories as an opportunity to understand the past 
and she believes that "action reveals itself only fully to the storyteller" 
(Arendt, 1958: 192). Through the use of stories we can provide new 
meanings in the present and therefore practically imagine the future. This 
process of imagining the future was already identified in Chapter 4 as the 
most basic requirement of deliberation (Forester, 1999: 85). Stories used in 
this way became the key source of plurality for the jurors. The creation of a 
sense of community through the use of stories is not unusual and has been 
noted by Peace (1986: 107) He explains that people attempt at all times to 
"render a social unity out of a disunity of parts" and this unity is only possible 
if participants possess and can disclose a vast fund of intimate knowledge 
about one another (Peace, 1986: 107). He also believes that people can 
learn, through the use of stories, to put this information to use in a variety of 
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"socially responsive ways" (Peace, 1986: 108). 
For the jurors, this involved telling stories that shared painful memories of 
medical mistakes, or divorce, if they think it will be of help to the group. As 
Arendt (1958) notes, private stories when shared in public represent an 
attempt to share points of reference in order to share power. A woman juror 
describes her decision to share her memories of cancer. 
R: 	 The jury was actually very hard for me at first because my daughter­
in-law had cancer and sometimes on the jury I got upset when 
people were suggesting that all the money should be spent on the 
clinical end and I agree with that but they also need to look at the 
disruption it causes to people's lives and to their mental state. 
Sometimes when I used to visit her she used to say that what she 
really could have done with in the hospital was a good cup of tea or a 
bit more privacy with her husband or someone to help her to fix her 
scarf after she lost her hair and that. But I had to open up to them to 
make them aware that health is about much more than blood counts 
and screening, it's much more than that. 
I: 	 How did people respond to that side of things? 
R: I think they listened to me, yeah... 1think it did get through because 
we did recommend very simple things like better parking for cancer 
patients and their families you know near to the hospital so they don't 
have to walk through in front of everyone else who can see 'oh, she's 
got no hair - it must be cancer'. It made us listen to each other 
better. At the start you could see that some people might have had a 
tendency to talk over others but if someone is telling you that their 
wife died of cancer or their daughter-in-law was sick then everyone 
listened and people who you thought were maybe meek and shy had 
everyone hanging on their every word. 
F01 
She felt that the use of personal stories actually "strengthened the group, 
perhaps because of the reciprocity enacted in the mutual work of telling and 
listening carefully, sensitively and respectfully" (Forester, 1999: 211). 
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This sharing experience is, according to Bandura, how identities are 
reproduced and transformed as a result of deliberation when 
people's conceptions about themselves and the nature of things are 
developed and verified through ... direct experiences of the effects 
produced by their actions, vicarious experience of the effects produced 
by somebody else's actions, judgements voiced by others, and 
derivation of further knowledge from what they already know by using 
rules of inference (Bandura, 1986: 27). 
In this case, the vicarious experience is achieved through listening to stories 
and hearing about the effects on others of the decision to vote for tax cuts 
and so on. 
I wanted them to know what it would mean to real people. People who 
don't have ... [or] could never afford private insurance. People who 
would simply have to wait for a hospital bed or just do without. I was 
very young when my Mum was sick, we had to just cope, they sent her 
home from the hospital to die because that's what she wanted and we 
all had to take turns to sit with her. There was a nurse who used to look 
in on her everyday and say 'oh, you're coping very well' but we weren't. 
I don't remember it all but in the end she had to go back to a hospice 
and we had to deal with the guilt of that but if we had to pay she 
wouldn't have gone and I think the stress of it would have killed my 
sister and my Dad. 
F25 
These stories create a unity of purpose for the group and cement their 
relationships with each other. According to Beck (1997: 1), it is only by virtue 
of this unity that the participants can transcend the Either/Or dichotomy 
characteristic of the emergence of modern society or what Habermas 
(1995a) terms the conventional level of moral consciousness. But in order to 
participate in an era of And (Beck, 1997), which characterises a participatory 
political climate of post-conventional morality, participants in any discourse 
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must be able to access a shared language. By encouraging each other to 
adopt a new style of discourse through the telling of stories, the participants 
are creating this shared language through the creation of a shared history, 
however short-lived. The jurors were able to call on this collective memory. 
After a while it became more obvious that if you wanted to influence the 
outcome and really playa part in the report writing you would have to 
be able to get into it all. That wasn't easy for any of us ... but what 
happened is that when we started to refer to the witnesses you could 
say something like 'the woman about the grim reaper advert said 
this' ... but we also have to remember what the others said that it was 
only this one person who complained. 
M10 
By referring then to specific events that occurred on the jury, this juror felt 
that they prevented themselves from simply being carried away by one single 
piece of evidence. In this way, relations which could otherwise have been left 
at a superficial and uncritical level, where the most articulate or the most 
sympathetic witness is agreed with, are pushed out to a more formal plane of 
speaking as the jurors are called upon to give reasons for their 
recommendations and conclusions that transcend mere pity, thus paving the 
way for the transformation of preferences to take place. For Bell (1994: 173), 
it is via the "construction of meaning, where narrative does not merely reflect 
or embody significance, it may self-sufficiently create it. If this is so then 
narrative provides a fundamental model for the creation of human meaning at 
large." 
At the same time, the jurors who knew from the outset that they were not 

experts come to realise that they will not become experts in such a short 
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space of time and instead they look on the information being provided by the 
experts as a resource not to be accepted uncritically but on which they could 
draw. As time passes and this realisation dawns, the jurors who are 
considered to express preferences which are entirely mediated by facilitators 
come to be seen by the jurors as unreflective and are dismissed. They 
criticise each other for merely repeating evidence they have heard. 
The job was made harder when we got bogged down in their ways of 
talking about it. It's about people's lives, isn't it and about how to make 
them better. That's why we used to stop each other and say 'yeah we 
know that's what the doctor said but what do you think?' 
M31 
One female juror, already referred to above, when faced with real stories of 
people's lives realised that she was guilty of unfairly judging women who 
choose not to work. She had always thought that those who stay at home are 
lazy or dependent and do a disservice to other women who had fought hard 
for their employment rights. What this means is that by disclosing their 
position in stories, the participants hold their sense of rightness up to scrutiny 
and can only reclaim normative legitimacy when these stories are passed 
through "the filter" of the public sphere and accepted as legitimate (Fishkin, 
2000: 3). This woman, who looked down on stay-at-home mums, was forced 
to hold this attitude up to the scrutiny of the group and, as a result, to 
reassess the legitimacy of it. 
Listening to each other you realise that it isn't an easy choice, or in fact, 
it's not a choice if there's no affordable child care offered in your area, or 
no transport or of course if you have other responsibilities like a 
disabled child or elderly parents of your own ... you realised sitting there 
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that these are issues for government to address and issues of public 
responsibility ... lots of women don't have choices about whether to work 
or not so the issue really isn't a private one is it, it's about the society. 
F18 
By telling this story of how she came to see the flaws in her own logic by 
listening to stories told by the witnesses and other jury members, she saw 
how "the values embodied in the practices of a society and its individuals are 
made public and legitimised in the narratives surrounding them" (Lara, 1998: 
43). In this case, where the values she had supported are shown to be 
lacking they are delegitimated and she like many other jurors was forced to 
change her worldview. 
These examples show how use of stories is an important aspect of learning 
to engage in discourse, a position which is supported by both Habermas 
(1995a) and Welton (2001). During the jury, stories are used by the jurors to 
illustrate a point or to explain something that is difficult to express and these 
stories are treated by them as evidence. The use of stories shows how the 
public can gain a value for public discourse. By increasing the value placed 
on discourse, we see evidence that citizens are better able to reach 
decisions based on reasons that are acceptable to everyone affected. 
Citizens who understand the value of discourse are better able to look at 
what were deemed personal problems in the past, and to re-imagine them 
from a public perspective. This, in turn, allows them to transform the world to 
one where the inclusion of the other is the objective of political activity 
(Habermas, 1998). 
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But what do these stories mean? The clearest thing about these stories is 
that they involve the acquisition of new moral language to describe how the 
participants have now come to think about themselves and their place in 
society. The stories are used by the participants to create a sense of trust 
between them and their fellow participants and this is what Lash calls 
"hermeneutic knowledge" (1994: 151). He believes hermeneutic knowledge 
can only be created "[and] is only possible when the knower is in the same 
world as and 'dwells among' the things and other human beings whose truth 
she seeks ... [It) ... is rooted in shared meanings and routine background 
practices" (1994: 151). The stories retold above are simplistic and relate to 
the everyday, but the discussions they ignited were thoughtful and occurred 
at a level that was surprising to the jurors. But their use is not surprising. 
Gallo (2001: 112) describes a similar effect of non-native English speakers 
bringing their family and their workplace snapshots to English lessons, just as 
the jurors bring their stories to "initiate discussions about workplace 
inequalities and health and safety issues". The stories also create a common 
language between the jurors and this leads to greater jury solidarity. 
Advocates 
Having told their stories, the regulators are transformed into a new role - that 
of advocate. This role is taken on once the jurors are satisfied that the 
processes being used to engage with them and to challenge and potentially 
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transform their views are broadly fair and egalitarian. This involves their 
recognition that information and facts are the central resource in a modern 
democracy and the source of the facts is not necessarily always the most 
important factor. They realise that a piece of information about illness and its 
effect on families can be just as legitimate if it comes from a grandparent or a 
consultant oncologist. They have learned to challenge the culture that led 
them to assume that they, as ordinary citizens, could not bring knowledge to 
the process. Instead, they have learned that influence over the outcome of 
any decision making process lies with the people who can offer the best 
resolution to the moral dimension of the problem. The jurors gain this 
knowledge by shifting the focus of the discussion onto the social level where 
they will engage in making judgements about what to do next. This is the 
stage where critical self-reflection, discussed at length by How (2001), is 
finally coming to fruition and can be succeeded by rational reconstruction. 
This is another crucial stage in the jury and those jurors who can embrace 
the role of advocates can have a real influence on the outcome of the jury. 
The jurors are now satisfied that the process and the products being used to 
enhance it are trustworthy. They have verified that the decision makers value 
their experiences and having gained this confidence they can start to take on 
a more active role that they had previously left to the organisers and the 
witnesses. This is the crucial stage in the jury and those jurors who can 
embrace the role of advocates can have a real influence on the outcome of 
the jury. Advocates who embrace their new role agree to act as 
---~,----,--~~------~~ 
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representatives. They do this by beginning to ask questions about those 
ideas, communities, ethics that have not been accounted or formally included 
yet. 
I feel men ought to have been involved, because I feel that a lot of men 
nowadays get made redundant and very often it is their wife who is the 
first to get a job and that means they take over the responsibility for 
child care. It certainly would have been interesting to hear their opinions. 
F18 
This idea is also expressed by another woman in relation to the gender mix. 
We all said that in order to be fair there needed to be a better mix and 
they needed to include Asian women [none had volunteered] and that. 
Can I say also that I thought there should have been men there as well? 
I think we all said that. We all felt that by not including men that we were 
sending a message that childcare is primarily a female role and that. 
Personally I think that is wrong. It might be reality but it's not a message 
we wanted to send out. 
F19 
One of the jurors was very clear that these problems were more than mere 
shortcomings of selection processes, in spite of whatever attempts are made 
to resolve them. For instance, the participants for the second women's unit 
jury had already been finalised before this grievance about the exclusion of 
male jurors was aired. But, in an attempt to resolve this, the question posed 
to the jurors was reworded to ask about the role of parents who work (see 
Table 1). The man quoted below similarly bemoans the shortsightedness of 
some aspects of the jury organisation and felt that more planning would have 
prevented ideas and potential witnesses from being excluded. He suggests 
that the steering group could have done more to avoid these exclusions. But 
while he sees the exclusions as problematic, he believes that the jury as it 
was assembled did get around these problems. 
If they had included a few other witnesses as weill think that would be 
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a good thing, for example I asked that we have a moral philosopher as 
a witness to explain the ethical implications to us. That was where the 
majority of the issues we were discussing could be resolved as far as I 
was concerned. i think if that had happened we might have had a 
different outcome. The problem is they knew what they wanted us to 
say and they brought us in and looked after us very well for five days 
but I do think they tried a certain amount of brainwashing. Not in any 
terrible sinister way, don't get me wrong, I suppose they knew that by 
feeding us certain information we would come to certain conclusions ...1 
can't say though that they did that, not really. Of course we would have 
ignored them anyway, but we didn't oppose them strongly enough. I 
think it went quite well but a bit more faith in us to deal with the real 
issues ... the bigger picture might have gone a long way. 
M34 
His main problem with the jury, as it was set up, was that it took longer than 
might have been necessary to get to the real issues whereas a moral 
philosopher might have got them there more quickly. This is an interesting 
but questionable point since a more esoteric discussion might have alienated 
some members of the group in the early stages. When I raised it with my final 
interviewee, who had taken part in the same jury, whom I met the following 
day, he admitted that it had seemed a strange suggestion at the time. But he 
felt that having gone through the process he could now see that it might have 
been a good idea, but at the time it would have been too daunting. The man 
who made the suggestion held an honorary doctorate and, more importantly, 
the topic itself - genetic screening, might have required a more philosophical 
approach. 
At this stage, the jury members begin to take over the process that has so far 
been staged by the moderators. They call for new witnesses to be added to 
the timetable and they begin to bring materials they have uncovered on the 
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Internet, and through other means, to the discussions. They begin to look 
outside of the original remit of the discussions which they had originally been 
wary of tampering with and begin to suggest, for instance, that a discussion 
about waste management in their local area should not concentrate only on 
waste management but on waste avoidance and should include a wider 
discourse about the environment, health concerns, global warming and the 
use of fossil fuels. 
They wanted us to talk about [name of town] and I think we did but we 
had to talk about other things as well, we needed to look at the big 
picture, it's about waste but it's also about health, the environment and 
our grandchildren's future. 
M07 
At this stage, the jurors are practically imaging the future as learning theory 
tells us they will and they are challenging the rigidity of the elites. Their 
understanding of the power that they initially saw as something they were up 
against also changes to a more public conception where they are more 
aware of negotiation and give and take. 
You go in there and you think oh here we go we'll have to rant and roar 
if we want anything done around here .. , but all the while they were 
saying you are the taxpayers, tell us what you want. You are the voters 
and that sort of thing. I think I had even felt at the start that they were 
passing the buck asking us to do this thing at all but they kept on saying 
how we had to decide as a community. We had to negotiate. No one in 
the room was really that much more powerful than anyone else at the 
end of the day we all had only one vote and we had to take turns and 
we all got our say ... Of course it did help if you could say it better but 
even if you couldn't when the people who said our bit to the press and 
that at the end came back and summed up everyone's input was made 
to sound equal. They expressed it all in a simple straightforward way. 
So that way no one sounded more important than anyone else. 
M35 
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The above quotation shows that power is now vested in the information they 
have been given and have been asked to evaluate. At this stage, they are 
working more and more as a group and are relying less on the facilitators. 
They are also calling their own witnesses and asking to change the agenda 
of the jury. 
The key activity for participants in their new role as advocates is not, then, 
comparing and cross-checking information but hypothesising about 
alternative information. This is how they move on from here to begin to 
deliberate. This tendency to change the nature of the discussion is also noted 
by Bohman (1999a: 600) in his discussion of Epstein's (1996) work on public 
forums that have discussed issues of AIDS treatment and research. Epstein's 
work, reported by Bohman (1999a: 600), found that participants in AIDS 
discussion groups, when faced with the inevitable asymmetry of knowledge 
between them and the experts gave their continued co-operation but 
"perhaps surprisingly, [this depended] upon deliberating about epistemic 
norms". Similarly with the citizens' juror who describes how the jury sought to 
broaden the base of the discussions: 
The fact [is] that healthcare is dominated by a culture, it may be a 
different culture in different areas, but a culture that the people with 
power, the consultants have enormous power and they don't follow 
established best practice and yet they are paid by the state. That's 
what we needed to talk about. I can't say whether chemotherapy is the 
right way to go about things, or if cutting out a tumour is the right thing. 
So we had to meet them at a different level. 
M04 
This involved a shift to deliberating about moral norms because by now the 
jurors quite clearly saw the process as being about challenging not actual 
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knowledge but the epistemic culture of the people who hold the knowledge. 
It's like I used to laugh at Tony Blair 'culture of this', 'culture of that', but 
it's more than that isn't it? I understand now what he means. We need a 
culture change; we need to open things up and get people in. Not the 
doctors and the accountants, I think they are in anyway but the 
housewives and the unemployed people. You get a better society. 
F22 
The ability to broaden the question represents an ability to challenge the 
definition of the societal good used in the juries and which the jurors are 
being asked to protect. This clearly refutes one key objection to deliberative 
politics that represents the public as fearful of change and motivated by 
selfish parochialism (Lake, 1993). 
The advocates are also learning that they can force the experts to reassess 
the legitimacy of the goals they are setting for society without them having to 
do much more than simply question the model of societal good that is used. 
The jurors, unlike Epstein's (1996) AIDS forum participants, are not activists 
so they were perhaps less able to attribute reliability and validity to the 
evidence being given by the experts. However, this distance can also be an 
advantage. 
To us, well to most of us, it was new and to some extent that was a 
good thing. None of us had an axe to grind...Some of them had some 
experience of childcare and so on but in a more private way that meant 
most of us were fresh to the issues about benefits and all that 
F18 
They could not tap into a pre-existing cognitive schema but this meant that 
they relied on their own newly-emerging schema which priorities the moral 
and forces the experts to come along with them. 
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At first I thought that the older ones like me wouldn't be able to really 
have any input because as I said I don't watch much television but we 
realised that everyone who wants to try and understand can learn about 
what people want to see on the television. Why people like to have a 
watershed and why people are upset about some adverts. I mean they 
had people there who had complained about certain ads and I mean I'd 
never seen the ones they were talking about but that doesn't mean I 
COUldn't understand ... 1didn't agree mind you but I understood. I've dealt 
with people all my life who have different opinions and some are more 
sensitive than others and some are very easily offended but you have to 
listen to them. And maybe even compromise, not always if they are 
wrong they are wrong and then you have to explain why you won't do 
what they are asking. But you have to listen. That's really all we did. 
Listen and learn and apply that learning and our bit of logic to the 
problem. 
M09 
That recognition of the value of their own knowledge base which seems to 
have grown in each of the juries and for each of the jurors does not mean 
that they reject things they are being told as facts simply because the 
information or the way of looking at the world is new to them. They do 
express an appreciation of the expert knowledge but they also worked hard 
to incorporate it into their own knowledge base even where that meant 
altering the founding principles on which they have built their worldview. This 
is helped by the fact that, although they are being given lots of information, 
the witnesses and facilitators are making it as accessible as possible. 
They certainly tried to make us understand and it did get better. .. we 
learned a lot about [name of town1 and what is needed round here but 
even the most argumentative ones among us ... sometimes we just had 
to accept [that] what they tells us are facts are facts. They knew what 
they were talking about and even though in some cases at first we. 
thought that's not right we talked about it and we could see the logic of 
it. 
M17 
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The jurors explain again and again how they as individuals lacked certain 
skills or the relevant training, but what is beginning to emerge here is a 
recognition that they can pool their resources. However, they also 
understand that as a group they might still lack the relevant training, so that 
even in spite of the best intentions of the jury, they remain unable to "render 
medical diagnoses, to test the purity of food and drugs before ingesting them, 
to conduct structural tests of skyscrapers before entering them" (Shapiro, 
1987: 627). But, while at the outset, jurors feared their lack of knowledge and 
saw in it the potential to be abused, they no longer think in this way. Instead, 
they employ a strategy to test "both values and strategies ends in light of 
available techniques and also techniques and strategies in light of shared 
interests, norms and values" (Bohman, 1999a: 597). 
I had to rely on my wits and the wits of the group. Lots of us have lived 
around here for years and seen things come and go ... 1 was sat there 
thinking ... ifthey are the experts how did they get it so wrong, 'cos that 
is what they are telling us now. They got it wrong in the past but this is 
now the way to go and we should agree with them but we said 'no', that 
people want them to keep the market because it is a link to the past. It's 
traditional isn't it? So what they are proposing, how do they know it will 
fit in and why should we agree with them? 
M15 
This was a deliberate strategy, the jurors are keenly aware that they cannot 
challenge the experts about their professional knowledge, but they still need 
to establish whether or not they should trust these people. As Habermas 
expects when they make the decision to trust these people "they are not 
measured against the truth of historical statements but against the 
authenticity of the presentation of self' (1995b: 168). By getting people to 
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describe themselves, they are looking for flaws in the moral presentations 
(1995b: 169). 
For the identity bestowing self-understanding of a person has no 
descriptive sense whatsoever; its sense is that of a guarantee and the 
meaning of this guarantee has been completely grasped by the 
addressee as soon as he knows that the other is vouching for his ability 
to be himself. The latter shows itself in turn through the continuity of a 
more or less consciously assumed life history. 
If the experts, organisers and other witnesses can satisfy this test of 
fi authenticity and show that they really have taken other things, not only facts 
E 
Ii' 
~ but also the history of the site and the nature of the community into account, 
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then they will be deemed acceptable and their ideas will be incorporated into 
the final deliberations. 
It was the little things that made you sit up and listen. If they knew the 
area and what it was like then you felt more like you wanted to listen to 
them. We had to be sure they cared about us, the people who live in 
[name of place] and it was easy to suss that out. Some of them you 
could tell didn't care about this issue, not really they just wanted to get 
us to agree to this and that and then to go onto the next place and say 
'the people at [name of place] agreed that this was the best option' but it 
was the ones who knew about the layout of the town, stupid things like 
the road numbers or that they were the ones who had done their 
homework and we felt more of a bond with them. 
M06 
The jurors also submit each other to this test as well when they insist on a 
more personal input. 
It didn't matter to me too much what someone had to say but more that 
it was real and that they meant it. Did they have experience of what 
they were talking about? I wanted to hear from the other jurors and to 
have my say because we are the people who are going to have to live 
with these changes if we allowed them to do what they were planning. It 
was no good someone saying it will be okay to get rid of the market or 
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to change the library, things like that if they never shop there, if they get 
their shopping delivered from Harrods (laughs). We heard a lot from the 
witnesses about what would happen if we agreed to this or that but did 
they live here? Would they simply be gone next week and we'd have to 
get on with it. .. It was important to me that we thought out the 
implications of the whole deal and the only way to do that was to say 
what we thought and why. I said to one woman who was saying we 
should let them do this and that: Do you live here? Do your kids have 
anywhere else to play? The test of everything we all said was, can we 
live with this? Will it make our lives round here harder? Some of them 
couldn't answer that very easily. 
M15 
The jurors apply a similar questioning attitude to fellow jurors who seem to 
them to be too eager to agree with the organisers. The jurors at this stage 
are very concerned that they start to develop their own ideas, to take control 
of the agenda and to broaden the scope of the discussion. One key way of 
broadening the scope of the discussions is to insist that when jurors offer an 
opinion on the topic that they support this with some evidence of their own, 
either hypothetical or real. Jurors who can't do this or seem to have entirely 
accepted the evidence of the witnesses are treated with suspicion. 
It would have been easy for us all just to go along with what we were 
being told. It was nice and cosy and they really did look after us and 
they were convincing but we had to add something to it, even if it was 
just to show that we had understood. At the start some of the people 
didn't want to do that they would just say 'oh, I agree with him' or 'that 
idea sounds good, I agree with that' but we had to add something to it 
as well. We agreed on that and we were always asking, why? 
F20 
Broadening the scope of the discussions also serves another purpose - the 
jurors have for the first time set down a ground-rule for the jury. Whereas the 
moderators are clear that shouting and interrupting one another is 
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unacceptable, the jurors have determined that when we throw a hypothesis 
into the ring we must be able to defend it. 
Some of the ideas were a bit mad but we just tried to work out what 
people living round here would prefer. Personally I'd like a bigger gym 
and that, but not everyone likes to lift weights so if you wanted to argue 
for something it had to be practical as well as sensible ... Those of us 
with kids liked the idea of playgrounds, a skate park and so on but other 
people have to live here too and we had to cater for them. It was about 
compromise and about being realistic and fair. 
M15 
Advocates are clear that this change in outlook is not spontaneous. Instead 
the moderator helps to cultivate it by encouraging storytelling and so on at 
the earlier stages, but by now the transformations of relationships is such that 
they can manage the process more ably for themselves. 
One of the women was really good at reminding us to explain why, why 
we thought it was best, why we wanted this instead of that? She kept 
our feet on the ground and prevented us all getting carried away. We 
agreed that whoever could make the best case would have to be taken 
seriously. 
M13 
Once they occupy the role of advocates, the jurors have almost reached the 
end of their journey and have come to terms with the task they have 
undertaken when they agreed to become jurors. They have learned to 
communicate with each other and with the expert witnesses and have used 
their own communication skills to take control of the process thus pushing it 
out into the public sphere. The next chapter brings us to the end of the jury 
journey and examines how they fare in developing the capacity of judgement 
- the final aspect of learning. This group are known as deliberators and, at 
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this level, the jurors are able to make their decision and explain the reasoning 
they employed in doing so. Understanding these processes will bring this 
discussion to an end and will enable me to establish the extent of the impact 
of participation in a deliberative process. 
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9: The citizens' jury a social journey 
Introduction 
This chapter covers the final phase of the juror journey and examines the 
overall effectiveness of the jury model in transforming the jurors' attitudes to 
political participation. Do the changes and new preferences, the generation of 
which has already been examined, remain with the jurors after the jury has 
ended? Does the jury experience itself leave them with a new outlook as a 
result of being resocialised? This is what I mean by the idea of the jury as a 
social journey. While Chapters 7 and 8 described the jurors' reactions to 
changes they perceived in their attitude and outlook, this chapter will 
describe how these changes are seen and identify moments when the 
learning the jurors identify is used by the jurors as a resource in their later 
dealings with other citizens. This means that we need to look at the sphere of 
interpersonal and intersubjective relations, and hence of moral insight, and 
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how it is being developed at the post-conventional level (Habermas, 1995a). 
The reasons for this approach have already been outlined in Chapters 4 and 
6 and call upon that aspect of learning that governs our ability to deal with 
normative problems. 
Essentially, we are looking for a change in the ability of the jurors to use 
discourse ethics. This change in the ability to deliberate comes to fruition 
when we see if the jurors are able to formulate all problems, including moral 
dilemmas, in a way that can be made accessible to all participants. This 
usually requires the participants in the discourse to begin by reformulating all 
problems as facts and in terms of real events through the use of stories. The 
use of discourse ethics also requires the participants to understand that this 
reformulation serves more of a purpose than simply enhancing their own 
understanding of a problem and to recognise instead that their task is to 
interrogate the validity of the norms being proposed in support of or against a 
certain course of action and to understand that there can actually be a 
plurality of good lives (Gimmler, 2003). 
As we have seen above, the listening phase followed by the more interactive 
storytelling phase brought home to the participants in the juries the need to 
think about the issues they are being asked to discuss as questions of justice 
(Habermas, 1996). This brings them to the most important aspect and the 
key principle of discourse ethics - the principle of universalisation. These 
abilities enable the jurors to use their enhanced post-conventional intuitions 
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to outline a strategy for solving moral conflicts (Gimmler, 2003). If the jurors 
have learned to use each of these principles, they might be able to act on 
behalf of others in society who cannot represent themselves. This would be 
the key legitimating factor of a process like the citizens' jury as a real and 
viable alternative to traditional representative democracy which could replace 
elected officials with groups of ordinary citizens who are brought together at 
intervals to solve political and social problems. 
Before I can make these judgements, or suggest some possible conclusions, 
we need to return to what I have called the social dimension of deliberation. 
What happens to the jurors when they exit the advocate stage and become 
deliberators? This discussion centres upon the perceived need of the social 
group to pass on their sense of validity and legitimacy through equality, 
justice and fairness. In this way, the learning occurring is essentially geared 
towards the societal and collective needs in keeping with the deliberative 
model. This learning will, as such, be based on the individual's ability to make 
judgements about the rightness and legitimacy of certain chosen courses of 
action in pursuit of the collective good. Thus, where moral learning is fully 
implemented, the development of individual and group awareness ofthe 
practices and processes of deliberation has been developed and is being 
implemented. The individual juror is learning to draw on the combined 
outcomes of all three forms of learning as decisions and judgements are 
made about the value of a variety of courses of action. Learning is most 
readily observed at this point. 
262 
Judging 
The final phase of the jury journey, as already outlined, is taken up with 
making judgements. This is where the jurors move from their third adopted 
role of advocates to that of deliberators. Judging is the aspect of learning that 
can best capture the new moral dimension that was emerging during the 
thinking phase when they relied on stories to express their reactions to the 
problem under discussion. We see the emergence of a strong sense of social 
solidarity not only amongst the jurors but between them and the community 
they feel they are acting as proxies for. As we have seen already, Habermas 
remains committed to the belief that a norm can be accepted as valid only if 
"all affected can accept the consequences and the side effects its general 
observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction for everyone's 
interests (and these consequences are preferred to those of known possible 
alternative possibilities)" (1990: 65). This statement captures in full what the 
jurors are trying to achieve in their deliberations. It essentially involves trying 
to anticipate the needs of others by trying to invoke a plurality of perceptions 
where one may not be fully available or shown to them and finally to 
reformulate questions to capture this anticipated set of interests that mayor 
may not be represented on the jury. 
To make a judgement requires a heightened ability to recognise the validity 
of the demands of others , even those who have not actually taken part in the 
deliberations of the jurors and the jurors are aware that they must try to 
accommodate this. In the last stage I called this awareness the "advocacy" 
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role and the acceptance of this role is crucial to the actual judgements that 
the jurors will make. The capacity for judgement characterises the recognition 
of issues as public concerns and represents the culmination of a process of 
identification and intervention that leads to an insight which can be used in 
public as well as in private situations to reach decisions that all of those 
affected can live with. 
For Arendt (1978: 69), judgement is the "mysterious endowment of the mind 
by which the general, always a mental construction, and the particular, 
always given to sense experience, are brought together, [it] is a peculiar 
faculty and no way inherent in the intellect". This means that, while the 
differences in ability and experience that the jurors bring with them to the 
juror journey may affect the time it takes to reach judgements, they do not 
affect the ability of all members of the group to eventually reach this stage. 
This last statement has in most cases to be accepted as counterfactual 
since, as we know from the discussion of the move from conventional to 
post-conventional rationality, most people will not operate at a level where 
they argue and discuss issues according to the principles of discourse ethics 
(Habermas, 1995). But I believe I can show how this can happen in the 

institutionalised discourse of the citizens' jury. 

The idea of judgement as something transcendental and in no way inherent 

to the intellect is a fundamentally important one for Habermas's work on 
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-discourse ethics carried out two decades later. Arendt goes on to explain the 
transcendental nature of what is being sought in discourse by spelling out 
how "the objects of my thinking or willing or judging ... are given in the world, 
or arise from my life in this world, but they themselves as activities are not 
necessitated or conditioned by either. .. [we] can mentally transcend all of 
these conditions" (1978: 70). This means that the learning they experience 
can enable the jurors to figure out how to act even if they do not always have 
the power to act. The jurors themselves use this as a measure of the success 
of the jury. 
In some ways it is like a game and we knew they mightn't do what we 
asked them to do but it was important to figure out what we ought to do 
and I still see that it is important in all walks of life to have an ideal aim 
and then you have to, as they say, cut your cloth don't you ... but you 
remain true to the ideal. We as a group knew what we wanted to 
achieve and even though we know it might not be achievable we knew 
that it is what people would have wanted us to aim for. 
F01 
Interestingly, the jurors admit that they knew that they might not be taken 
seriously and that perhaps the jury was never going to have a real input into 
the decision-making process. They claim, however, that they believed the 
success of the process would lie in the reaching of collective decisions. This 
belief is why I felt it was appropriate to continue to commit to highlighting the 
positive aspects of the jury in an attempt to uncover the transformative 
potential. Having spent some time on the jury, the jurors judged that 
participation was to be its own reward and they are unperturbed by the lack 
of practical effect the jury mayor may not have had. However, if we accept 
the anticipation effect, or Forester's (1995) "imaging the future", then these 
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issues need not be barriers to promoting deliberation. As discussed earlier, 
the jury organisers try to pre-empt possible barriers to deliberation and 
attempt to remove these by paying the jurors for their time. They also attempt 
to unburden the jurors by taking responsibility for their most pressing family 
commitments like that of childcare. 
The thinking of the jurors in the last phase led to the breakdown of "values, 
doctrines, and even convictions" (Minnich, 1989: 140). Once this occurs and 
the ground has been cleared, the jurors must make judgements about how to 
reconstruct their life-world to accommodate this new knowledge and these 
new norms (McCarthy, 1995; Eder, 1999). Judgement thus requires that the 
space for reflection has been adequately created and that the jurors feel 
equipped to challenge ideas and interpretations. For Arendt (1978), reflective 
judgement is the creative dimension of deliberation. Wellmer tells us "a well 
developed faculty of judgement is certainly of immense importance in moral 
as well as in political matters. But it is not an addition to, but rather an 
expression of what we might call the faculty of discursive reason" (1998: 
311). 
Turning advocates into deliberators 
In the previous stage, the jurors continued to behave in somewhat strategic 
ways, using stories and personal accounts of the problem to check on the 
legitimacy of the process. Equally, even though they remain somewhat 
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cautious they are generally satisfied that the decision to use a citizens' jury is 
legitimate, they are now acting more strategically to carve out a space for 
themselves and their experiences in the final decision. As described in the 
previous chapter, when they feel assured that the process is genuine they 
begin to feel ready to move from a stage of thinking about what their options 
are to a level of making judgements. This is similar to Yankelovich's (1991) 
"resolution" stage and during this time the jurors come to complete their 
deliberations and settle upon a course of action. They exercise judgement. 
When describing the jury itself, the participants are often slow to cite 
instances or situations where they say that the jury itself changed them. The 
women in particular, want to maintain a distance from organised politics and, 
avoid the use of the label feminist. Yet in many cases they have taken a 
feminist approach to problem solving. They do admit, however, to some form 
of personal transformation, the crux of which is an increased presence in the 
public sphere. This was described by one woman quoted below: 
You know you felt like you were really a part of it instead of just being 
on the outside. You weren't just tolerated. I felt like I had a stake in it ail. 
It was like the difference between being a freeholder and a tenant. I 
suppose they didn't have to take you seriously but they did. 
F22 
Likewise the stories and the snapshots can, according to Gallo, "create 
contagious communication in which lower-level students (less vocal jurors) 
could literally 'borrow a phrase' they heard from one of their peers and 
capture it (if only in short-term memory) in order to make their opinions 
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known" (2001: 112) 
The jurors also describe a change in their sense of their role as citizen. As a 
result of the process of discussion, they come to adopt the position of citizen 
in the way described by Dryzek (1990: 43), who believes that "individuals 
should participate as citizens, not as representatives of the state or any other 
corporate and hierarchical body". For the jurors, being a citizen is not a task 
but a moral role which they must accept. But they come to this position 
through a protracted learning process and not in a straightforward way. At the 
start of the process, they saw the exclusion of what they refer to as the "usual 
suspects" (M09) as a bonus that might prevent the jury degenerating into a 
forum in which people settle old scores or adopt a protectionist stance. 
It was so different; no one was able to take over. It really was aI/ new to 
most of us, and that meant that we had to listen to each other. These 
were issues most of us had never really thought about and if they had 
allowed people from the green groups in they would have taken over. 
No, it was best this way, we had to learn together. 
M07 
However, this view changes to a position that maintains that it is unnecessary 
to segregate the juries or even to engage in sampling. 
It was inevitable that he would be chosen [as spokesperson] because it 
was on people's minds from the start, if instead we had not been told 
that we would need a speaker until nearer the end I think we ~ould 
have chosen a different person. At the same time I'm not sure It . 
mattered, generally speaking a jury doesn't have to be representa~lve to 
produce a fair outcome, it is all about reasonable discuS,Slo~s commg 
out of debate and argument...in fact in the end I don't thInk It mattered, 
the ideas were our ideas and he was probably the one who was most 
comfortable at speaking especially as there were reporters and 
cameras there. It was rather good actually. We had become experts'F20 
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-By the time the juries came to an end, they were all convinced on this point. 
You know I think even the most informed person would have had to sit 
up and take note. When we went to see those places [the site-visits to 
recycling plants etc.] the practicalities of it all hit you and you couldn't 
simply keep insisting that you were right. I mean we always mean to 
recycle more ... but when that means hundreds of more trucks on the 
roads everyday transporting things to different plants .... 1 mean you 
have to think about that as well. I think even the few people who were 
there who considered themselves pretty good had a rethink. The 
numbers were staggering, really they were. 
M07 
While Forester admits that we might expect that "their stomachs get queasy 
in the face of pointed verbal attacks, their heads start to spin with the 
complexity and fluidity of it all" (1994: 155), this is obviously not the case. 
Instead, out of the mess comes order, jurors' emotions are made rational and 
the unpredictability they experience is used as an opportunity for change. 
We were really awful at first; we all heard what the topic was and had 
an opinion immediately, this was a hot topic in [name of town]. There 
was no one who wanted to budge. It seemed at that stage it could have 
been a waste of time ... but I really did change my mind while I was 
there. I went in actively resisting the argument; I didn't want them to tell 
me anything. As far as I was concerned I was there to ensure these 
people got the money. But, instead, we went through it and because 
most of us thought about it in a knee-jerk way: give it to them, don't give 
it to them, we had to be re-educated. No, sort of cleansed. 
M21 
This observation shows clearly what is involved in genuine deliberation. The 
jurors had to face up to their own biases and grievances about being ignored 
by decision makers in the past or simply not consulted. They also had to face 
the painful realisation that what they have always held to be true might not be 
right. They came face to face with the limitations of their own education, 
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communication skills and access to resources. This supports Chambers' 
(1995: 176) observation that "it is plausible that the most serious barrier to 
discourse can be found in the conversational habits that citizens have 
become used to". 
This reliance on the normal way of speaking, combined with the inequality of 
resources they felt they suffered from when faced with the experts, lies 
behind the importance the jurors attached during the second phase to the 
use of stories. By adopting an unconventional way of speaking about 
resource allocation and other political activities in a mundane and perhaps at 
times inappropriate way, they are challenging their own habits and those of 
the normal decision-makers. In this way, everyone is forced to reveal their 
hand and can no longer hide behind jargon. They are using stories as Smith 
shows to "help us [to] adopt an ethically illuminating perspective that had 
previously remained unoccupied. We can appreciate, via the construction 
and analysis of an analogy, a novel way to consider an object case" (2002: 
246). 
The use of stories is explained by the jurors as the outcome of their fears that 
the jury has the potential for abuse and manipulation through programming, 
as in any participatory project, and therefore they can only rely on shared 
experiences to assure them that their fellow jurors and the experts are people 
too. As time passes, they insist more and more that the jury be held on their 
terms, using their experiences and ideas about how to proceed and using 
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-their language. They explain this insistence by referring to their concern that 
they might otherwise be blinded by science and pushed into a decision that 
the organisers wanted. By encouraging the use of ordinary language and so 
on, the jurors felt they could control more of the discussions and be in 
charge. This need to see the human side of the experts who would normally 
have more influence is also seen in the general public's attitudes to 
politicians. According to the BBG research (2002: 8), when "those distant 
figures in power" reveal that they "are human like them", trust in politicians 
increases. The jurors allude to this need to see the real people behind the 
"politics" that they knew was involved in the jury. 
I know it was all very well managed and very organised and we had to 
stick with that but it was good to get to see these people up close, 
normally you never see them or even think about them between 
elections and then they only want your vote but this time it seemed to 
be important to them to find out what we wanted. You could tell that it 
mattered to them and that they wanted to get it right and you could see 
that they were tired or that they weren't very good at speaking to people 
without having a chance to really prepare their answers. So we felt at 
least like they were trying to connect with us and that they knew they 
could get it wrong. 
M21 
More important is the fact that the jurors who describe themselves as lacking 
confidence in their knowledge entered into the process on the assumption 
that they could bring something, however small, to it. 
I wasn't sure I had anything useful to add but I wanted to be there 
because a lot of people are like me. They are unsure and they don't 
know. I thought I could be that person's representative. 
F02 
But, in many cases, the jurors were able to make use of their lack of 
confidence as a resource to ·encourage the witnesses to break the problem 
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down into its constituent parts and to reveal the central problem. 
• 
I was afraid to be the one to ask stupid questions but there was a man 
there and he kept putting up his hand and asking all sorts of things that 
I thought everyone else knew. But you could see that when he asked 
them the others were relieved because they had been afraid to ask and 
that was important in getting us going. We needed to show them that it 
was the real life that mattered to us, not the theory and not even the 
money. As soon as they started talking about 'this will cost this' and 'this 
will cost that' we were lost. I mean they were talking about hundreds of 
millions and we just wanted to know is that better than that? Will that 
save more lives? That's what we want - the best option to get the best 
result and for us that was the bottom line. Can this save women's lives? 
M03 
All of those that I interviewed expressed this sentiment, a minimum belief that 
as one-time or even potential service-users, parents, taxpayers and so on 
they could bring at least a critical eye to the process. While they were 
sometimes unsure that they were skilful enough to complete the task (Price, 
2000: 277), they were confident that they could play an advocatory role 
ensuring that what they see as the real issues get taken seriously. 
We had to start somewhere and the council thought we should start 

with the numbers and that but we weren't accountants. We could only 

understand the figures in their way ... But when we got started we got 

into a big discussion about serving our country and all that but it was 

really only when we really started to think about the bigger picture that 

we got anywhere. It was all about how older people are treated in 

general and when we began to compare them [the war pensioners) to 

the other pensioners that we got anywhere. We needed to see it all in 

context. If we had just gone along with the way they presented it all we 

might not have seen the bigger picture. 

M21 
They were also confident that, as time passed, the group had learned 
enough to make up a wide enough skill base to plug the gaps in the 
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knowledge base of the group. In the case of one of the juries that involved 
lengthy conversations about issues like hypothecated taxes, the group 
contained a former civil servant who was able to explain it in what was seen 
as ordinary language and in some ways act "as translator for the group" 
(M28). In other cases where there was no obvious expert in the group, it was 
seen as a case of "muddling through" (M03), asking questions, being 
inquisitive and becoming expert. Jurors also express a confidence that they 
can keep up with the experts and can participate on an equal footing. This 
confidence is referred to by Fung and Wright (2001: 19) who explain, "while it 
may sometimes be difficult for a casual observer to distinguish between 
genuine deliberation and disingenuous posturing, the difference is 
nevertheless fundamental and generally apparent to participants". The jurors 
reported that where some facts were simply based on calculations that had 
been done by experts, they then saw their role not to question the facts they 
were being given but to expose artifice if that is how the jury turned out. 
We were wary at the start that there was also, of course, the chance 
that they wanted to use us to get their ideas accepted by the general 
public, and of course if it all went wrong maybe we would take some of 
the blame. I think before I went in I thought some of those things but by 
the end we forgot even the councillors. We were being dealt with by the 
researchers and we trusted them and we all agreed that if they wasted 
our time we would make a stink. I think that we all felt that way. It 
worked well and no one was duped or used, I don't think. I think they 
simply wanted some input, questionnaires aren't sufficient and they cost 
a lot of money and take up a lot of time to count up and even then 
people argue about who filled them in. This was new. It was 
transparent. 
MiS 
This is where the idea of social learning as a way of harnessing the potential 
of deliberation to enhance democracy can be seen most clearly. The citizens 
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are not only taking part in the processes of decision making but are also 
casting a critical eye over the organisers and their fellow jurors thus providing 
a set of checks and balances. Their initial fearfulness of their own lack of 
knowledge has become a resource. 
The fact that none of us knew anything about it at all was a good thing. I 
mean we were fresh and we didn't have loads of baggage. It was a 
problem that we never thought we would be expected to solve even 
though we all knew it was important but we hadn't already decided this 
is how it has to be. We were fresh so we could be more open and more 
aware when someone was trying to get something pushed through by 
the backdoor. 
M03 
To them, their own novice status comes to mean that they can be more open 
than the others involved in the decision making process. 
In most cases a compromise can be found and I agree with that, in that 
way the university people and the civil servants were better witnesses. 
They discussed the ideas and the pros and cons in a much broader 
way. I'm not claiming to be entirely open-minded but I had wanted to 
hear arguments and evidence and then I would make up my mind. I felt 
that the technical people weren't willing to listen to us. They all had their 
own ideas about how things ought to be and I doubt whatever we said 
to them they would have come round to our way of thinking. I think that 
was the key, the university witnesses were fairer and more open to 
thinking about things. We needed people like that because that is what 
we were being asked to do. 
M21 
This requirement to be reflective is applied by the jurors to both the experts 
and themselves. The failure of the jurors to explain the issues and to account 
for preferences in public in a meaningful way is counted against them. 
The witnesses were in some ways incidental and we needed to rely on 
each other, to find each other's strengths and use them. We did listen to 
the witnesses and we did take notes but as a jury we had to work 
together. I live alone with my kids so I had no one really in the evenings 
to talk to about it so I had to get the work done in the days and it was 
hard work. They were long days, I think we all took home reading, but 
not too much, it was not supposed to be private decisions and if you 
work a lot at home you decide at home or if you talk to your mates you 
e. 
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-decide with your mates and they are easier decisions because they are 
like you and they will have the same priorities so 'would say the jury 
was the thing. 
M15 
Similarly, witnesses who try to "blind them with science" (M35), or who seem 
detached from the jury process itself and have not "done their homework" 
(F01) about the area or the past experiences of the community with the 
issue, are seen as lacking commitment and therefore not worthy of trust. 
They are not simply dismissed out of hand for this but it does mean that they 
have to work much harder. 
As I set it out above, the key factor in the citizens' jury process is the 
emphasis it places on giving individuals the opportunity to engage in reflexive 
negotiation of the "imagined future" and the process they are engaging in. 
This process of imagining and storytelling that the jurors use to describe for 
others their desired/willed make-up of the world forms a crucial part of the 
legitimation process for their demands and enables them to bring alternative 
conceptions of the common good into the public realm. Once there, they are 
expected to satisfy the tests of validity by requiring the claimants to offer 
reasons for their preferences and it is here that invalid and illegitimate claims, 
however they are originally expressed, can be exposed and rejected. The 
jurors describe this process as part of the acquisition of language and other 
skills. One woman describes an incident that occurred some time after the 
end of the jury she had served on. 
After the jury a few years later, I had a problem with my. Dad, who was 
misdiagnosed with cancer and I went as far as I could nght through to 
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____ 
the GMC. I'm not that sort of person at all, the general medical council. I 
couldn't have gone as far as that without the jury. You know it gave me 
the confidence to talk up, to complain the doctor [to the GMC]. I wrote it 
all down and put it smartly and it went quite far, he was struck off and 
all. I'd got myself used to all these medical words and that and I just 
went along and fought for my side ..... My family couldn't believe it was 
me. I was a bit surprised an all. 
F08 
She has earlier admitted that she did not have either the confidence or the 
skills that would have enabled her to do such a thing before the jury. 
Certainly, the issue she faced with her father is emotional and therefore often 
quite empowering but she puts it down to a transformation of herself and 
others in the group that she can trace back to her own perception of herself 
"we felt like we were becoming experts". 
Anyway, at first I thought maybe they should have asked for younger 
people to do it but then when I got there, there were younger ones and 
they didn't always understand either, we all had to help each other. It 
was a lot to keep up with. If you've never been to university you 
couldn't know all the words. I used to come home and tell my husband 
all about it and he'd be saying what, "huh, speak English," he was lost. 
FOB 
A similar story of transformation is cited by Sang and Davies (199B: 61) and 
captures the idea exactly. 
I looked around the table at my kids and my husband. Everyone was 
talking and no one was listening to anyone else; not like when we a/l 
listen and take it in turns. I told them we should all be listening to 
each other, and my husband laughed and said, 'Don't worry kids; 
your mum has been doing a citizens' jury ... she'll be back to normal 
soon' 
I have collected a range of these stories, particularly from women including 
for instance: 
R: I did join a union for the first time after it. I hadn't ever joined one 
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-because I have always had good bosses and I've always enjoyed my 
work so it didn't seem necessary. After that I just felt it was the right 
thing. 
I: After what? 
R: The jury. Without a doubt it was because of that. I would never have 
done that before, I would have been too self-conscious but at the jury 
they seemed not to notice my voice, I have a funny sort of squeaky 
voice you see, and that was a first for me no one seemed to care 
what I sounded like, it was more important that we all had ideas and 
we all talked to each other. 
F10 
DeJiberators 
All of the above processes directly contribute to the emergence of the jurors 
as deliberators. Having moved from a position of fear to a legalistic regulatory 
role on to an advocacy role, the jurors have seen the dissolution of their 
usual channels of discussion. At this stage, all of their energies are invested 
in transforming the future of the discussions but in order to do this they must 
ensure the communication can continue, if at all. They have hypothesised 
about alternatives with a view to creating a more discursive approach to a 
given problem. The woman quoted below has experienced a very 
fundamental Habermasian shift from strategic action to communicative action 
(Habermas, 1991): 
My husband was really the one who first noticed that I was doing thi~gs 
differently at home. I used to have to tell the children to turn ?ff certain 
programmes or some music videos that J thought were .unsUitable but now that 
they are getting older saying "because I said so" really Isn't enough anymore. 
--------........... 
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-Now I try to discuss it with them, we talk about the way women are portrayed 
or the way violence is glorified and we agree what they can watch and what 
they can't but that has to change as they get older. I can't shelter them but I 
can try to see that they put it in perspective. 
F11 
This example is similar to that given by Harvey, Brown and Goodman (2001: 
204) about getting a child to rake leaves in the backyard. The parent is faced 
with two options, the first is to say that they will be paid for raking and the 
payment will be found under the leaves, the second option is to engage the 
child in a discussion about the importance of raking and this, as the woman 
above acknowledges, can only be achieved through language. She learns 
also that she has the communicative competence to engage in a 
conversation about understanding and consensus and that she can hold 
power as a negotiating tool in her family. She can alter the sequence of 
decisions made. The jurors all learn to some extent that they can, through the 
giving of reasons, change the future. It is this stage that they are at their most 
tentative; many of my interviewees describe this realisation as frightening. 
There were times when I really thought to myself "I can't do this. It's too 
hard." I suppose I was afraid of the responsibility but it was time to get 
the report written and we had to get that right. I think it would be hard 
not to have someone who was a sounding board, you know when you 
are there all day talking to people some of them intimidate you and you 
need to talk it over in other circumstances to be sure you aren't being 
walked all over. I found that useful. It was also important because he 
was able to remind me when I applied for my job how much I had 
enjoyed it and how much I had fought for my idea of the right thing to 
do. I suppose when time passes you start to forget things, you forget 
how much you had worked at it and he remembers me coming home all 
excited and worked up. He said at the time that I didn't really sleep as 
easily as I normally do. Definitely, I was thinking about it all the while, 
even when' was asleep I kept ticking it over in my head. It did go 
through my head all the while. 
F27 
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They understand now that what they are doing is intensely public and 
therefore they must tread carefully. This acceptance of a public role by the 
jurors is perhaps clearest when they are asked to discuss issues that have a 
direct bearing on their local community. In the quotations below the jurors 
were involved in one jury that was looking at how a local area might be 
rejuvenated. 
R: 	Normally no one listens, but this was very different, of course at the 
start we had the older people who wanted the theatre, the library. 
The parents wanted the sports centre and the green area for the 
children and so on but by the end human nature had been turned on 
its head. We wanted to do what was right for the area, so ... you had 
people who at the start felt that the sports centre was a complete 
waste of space in the end fighting for it, or people who felt that the 
last thing we needed was flats arguing that we should go along that 
line. We tried to keep a broad view of things, it's not easy, and 
sometimes we strayed a bit...a lot of people got into arguments 
about how the younger kids are crowding out everyone else but it is 
about doing right by them because they weren't there, were they? 
I: No, you had to be at least 18 to take part 
R: 	Exactly, so we had to be sure ... it was about compromise, the older 
ones want a different [name of town] from what the kids want but we 
realised we have to share it. I mean I must admit, I have an interest 
in sports and I had to compromise, it would be made smaller. The 
only thing I really understood was the sports centre and the library - I 
use them and my kids use them, the library is a listed building now so 
that won't change but we had to think about change and defend the 
changes we saw were necessary against people who wanted other 
changes. It's easy to say we don't need the theatre because lor 
none of my friends go there but when you are faced with people who 
go there but have never set foot in the sports centre you start to see 
the diversity. 
M15 
This juror quoted above is describing to great effect what is happening to 
them for the first time. Only at this stage are they at ease with being forced to 
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-rethink their common sense perception of themselves and their place in 
society. Their sense of self is being challenged at first by facts and then by 
the opposing opinions and demands that they have to incorporate. In an ideal 
deliberative space like that offered by the public sphere, choices are made on 
the basis of the justification offered by jurors for their decision. 
The thing was that I really wanted to see the back of the market, it is 
dirty and people hang around there at night and that scares me and lots 
of the others really felt that way. I had no reason other than that I don't 
like it, I couldn't say that I'd ever been mugged down there or anything 
so I had to agree it should stay. Especially when people were talking 
about the fact that fruit and vegetables are cheaper there than in the 
supermarket, parts of this area are quite poor and I suppose if you can't 
get vegetables cheaply you can't give them to your kids so their health 
is at risk. But as well as that, people who came from Africa and places 
like that who eat different fruit than we are used to were saying that you 
can't get their food in the supermarkets but you can in the market. You 
can't argue with those sorts of issues can you ... Actually I have been to 
the market a few times since. 
F14 
And similarly, another woman who took part in the ITC jury admits, 
I'm no angel, I mean I have been heard to use swear words 
occasionally but I really felt that there was no place in TV for bad 
language, I was always very adamant on that but we went over it 
together, and we discussed it and by the time we had all gone around 
listening to each other I think I could see why they didn't mind. And I 
think I understood better why. I got that from the others, not from the 
television people but from listening to the men and women on the jury 
and I ... they persuaded me, I could only make a case for myself not a 
case that could hold up publicly and they won me over. 
F10 
By now the course of action that is best defended by reasons and most 
rationally argued for by the participants is the one being adopted by the 
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group even if the majority might have opposed the choice. Now that the 
participants identify themselves as a public they are ready to reach a 
decision based on communicative rationality. These new patterns of 
participation are the result of the jurors learning about the need to reflect on 
their own preferences and reflect on what Habermas sees as the core of 
discourse as a special form of reflection that is observed when the ideals of 
deliberation are being met. The woman quoted previously had to examine 
her own fears about the market to decide whether or not they were valid 
enough to be introduced into the discussion, and as she has no evidence to 
support her claims that it is dangerous she realises it will not pass the validity 
test. This was a painful process for the jurors and required them to rely on a 
more moral and universal process of reasoning. 
It came down to what kind of society we want to live in and to pass on 
to our children. We have to think about that because the more and more 
we tell them that women are sex objects or women like violent men and 
all these mixed messages we give our children these days these things 
are wrong. It wasn't about television adverts, we wouldn't have sat there 
for four days if we really thought that it wasn't about how to treat people 
with tolerance and respect and how to do justice to our children and 
other ways of life. 
F10 
Instead, the participants are seeking out opportunities to co-ordinate action 
according to a new set of learned norms of behaviour, which are founded on 
a new principle of validity. They enact these new norms by developing 
mutually agreed patterns of arguing. The emphasis of the discussions and 
the jury sessions is changing, the consensus has been shaken and the 
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participants are actively seeking out a new definition of the problem they 
have been asked to consider. But even where the issue is not so immediate 
to their lives, they display similar tendencies. 
It's not something that any of us I don't think had ever thought about. I 
certainly hadn't...and we didn't know what to do. We could have agreed 
to follow the organisers or the one or two people who thought they knew 
about it. We had to decide what to permit and what to keep out. We had 
to do that or else we would have got very confused and any way we 
were already going off the point. At first we just wanted to say give them 
the money but that wasn't going to work so we had to put it in a wider 
context and we all agreed that that had to be ageing. 
F20 
From the outset, it has been clear that the idea of deliberative democracy is 
an ideal type but it has also been made clear that I believe that if the 
institutional underpinnings for discourse could be put in place we would see a 
deepening of democracy. The very idea of deliberative democracy is that it 
produces "actors who know they are involved in the common enterprise of 
reconstituting and maintaining structures of the public sphere as they contest 
opinions and strive for influence differ from actors who merely use forums 
that already exist" (Habermas 1996: 369-370). The last 3 chapters have 
shown that the citizens' juror embarks on this journey, but for what reason? 
Can the above discussion of their learning help to answer some questions 
about the validity of the deliberative project being undertaken by authors like 
Habermas (1996) and Bohman (1996). 
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10: Conclusions 
Introduction 
In this thesis I set out to understand whether the experiences of former 
citizens' jurors might support the promise that deliberation creates 
transformation of preference made by deliberative democrats. I spent the first 
six chapters describing the theoretical framework that would enable me to 
make that decision and the last three chapters describing what I have called 
the juror journey. Overall my findings suggest that the promise of deliberation 
is being achieved. But how does it occur? Before attempting to answer this 
question there is a more fundamental unease about the entire process of 
deliberative participation that must be resolved. While this study sheds some 
light on the effectiveness of the drive to increase political participation 
amongst the general public, two questions that have undermined deliberative 
283 
democracy since its beginnings remain unanswered. These questions are 
especially important when we note how the current New Labour government 
in Great Britain, which championed the use of deliberative forums wherein 
local people work together to solve political problems, might now be losing 
interest in initiatives like the citizens' jury (Wakeford, 2002). Wakeford (2002) 
claims that this might be because these forums have been so effective in 
getting people to deliberate together that they might have led to unwelcome 
criticism. My findings presented here support his assumption about the 
effectiveness of the citizens' jury model and I will try to explain why. 
The first question I identify concerns the nature of deliberation and asks: is 
there anything unique about deliberative processes that could not be 
achieved through the ordinary activities of civil society like adult education? 
The second is perhaps the more important one and the more intractable one 
- the question of scale and has two parts. Can deliberative democracy only 
deliver institutionally sponsored discourses that use representative samples? 
Will a deliberative democracy of "all affected parties", as Habermas (1996) 
and Goodin (2003) envisage it, ever be possible? 
Answering critics of deliberation 
This research suggests that the answer to the first question is probably a 
negative one. We know that Habermas (1996) believes that real discourse, 
as it is described above, could not be achieved by adult education and 
lifelong learning programmes. Although Habermas (1996: 373) wants to 
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"defend the claim that under certain circumstances civil society can acquire 
influence in the public sphere", he admits that "groupings of civil society are 
indeed sensitive to problems, but the signals they send out and the impulses 
they give are generally too weak to initiate learning processes or relevant 
decision making in the political system in the short run". 
The changes that are occurring for the citizens' jurors then must be created 
though the public sphere since it is only in the public sphere that discourse 
can occur and can in turn provide the "hermeneutical bridges" (Habermas, 
1996: 374) necessary to re-ignite public interest in discourse and problem 
solving. Gamson (1992) has already shown this in his work on the "gallery 
effect" of the public sphere. In support of this, the jurors I interviewed made it 
clear that it was the sense of having a public role to play and the need to 
make the right decision on behalf of others that made them treat the citizens' 
jury seriously. On the whole, citizens' jurors treat the process seriously even 
when they feel sure that the results of their deliberations will be ignored. The 
jurors made it plain to me that though they felt they might not be taken 
seriously, they wanted to feel that their decisions were legitimate and they 
are sure that legitimacy is conferred in the public act of discourse. I have 
already cited numerous examples of how they reached this conclusion. 
The answer to the second question, the question of scale, lies in the ability to 
build the hermeneutical bridges referred to above. For Habermas (1996), 
bridges stand as a metaphor for the skills required to change and to create 
285 
jbZ 
iI

1 
transformative potential. The jurors I spoke to described the experience as 
"taking a leap" (M35) and "reaching out to the public" (M09). For them, the 
jury provided them with the skills to create these hermeneutical bridges and 
more importantly, they maintain throughout that these skills are what enabled 
them to get outside their own private expectations and to take the needs of 
others into account. They also describe being able to draw on these skills 
later when faced with decisions in their own lives. They describe how, when 
making decisions that they would have formerly seen as entirely private, they 
now invoke a sense of publicness to verify whether the course of action they 
are about to choose is valid. 
But this can involve anything from a seemingly minor decision to switch off 
the television, described in the last chapter, to the decision to stand for 
election as a local councillor (as has happened). What is important is the 
process whereby the ex-jurors come to this decision and this more often 
involves an opening-up of the decision to a public level - since in their minds 
it is the public level that confers legitimacy. But this is a painful process and 
not an easy thing to go through. Some of the jurors referred to it as being like 
growing up. 
You really had to look inside yourself and face up to some things you 
didn't like. It was like when you are a child and you realise that your 
parents can't solve everything for you, it was quite frightening at times. 
F01 
Some jurors likened it to an awakening. 
I believe in the welfare state, I think we all have a right to a decent 
standard of living whether we work or not, but I didn't want to just give 
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-them the money without a good reason. But the other people who just 
wanted to say give out the money, I don't think it was out of a sense of 
fairness. I don't think they would have wanted for instance to give it to a 
retired German living in England for the last 40 years, or to a single 
mother. They didn't want to listen, it wasn't out of a sense of justice, but 
a sense of, I don't know, nationalism? I think perhaps that's why I 
opened up even more, when I heard the kind of people I was aligned to, 
I decided to think again. I think we all had to do that. When you hear 
yourself say something and you think I have no reason for this you have 
to think again. In the end, I felt we should give them the money but only 
when I actually thought about it in a bigger picture. Someone had to talk 
up for the ones that weren't there and couldn't defend themselves. That 
was our job after all and it had to be because none of us had any 
experience of this sort of thing, not really. Most of us knew nothing 
about war pensioners' widows so we were really speaking for the 
people it would matter to. 
M21 
This is the man who was also earlier quoted talking about the point at which 
he realised what the real issues were - "it was all about how older people are 
treated in general and when we began to compare them [the war pensioners] 
to the other pensioners that we got anywhere" (M21). 
This is what New (1998) believes the goal of deliberation should be, the 
jurors are learning to question received wisdom and to re-evaluate and re­
value ordinary wisdom, not wisdom based on knee-jerk emotional responses 
to a problem posed but wisdom gained through formulating considered 
reflective opinions. Although this is clearly a rewarding and important learning 
experience for the jurors, should we allow deliberative representatives to act 
on our behalf in forums like juries? Clearly, full-scale deliberations are 
impossible but are the representative forums of my second question 
acceptable? Can the use of advocates (who will deliberate on behalf of the 
rest of the community) achieve what Habermas (1970: 66) predicted when he 
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noted that "the strict separation between the function of the expert and the 
politician [in this case the jurors] is replaced by a critical interaction between 
them". This new involvement that is created through discourse can lead to a 
commitment to a reciprocal set of communications between the jurors 
themselves, but also between the jurors and their families, the jurors and 
their colleagues and so on. A commitment to discourse implies a commitment 
to resolving conflicts through communication, which relies on the different, 
and sometimes opposing, parties finding some way to keep the 
communication going. For the jurors, this was done through the use of stories 
when communication about the problem as it was posed by the organisers 
breaks down as Habermas (1996) would expect the jurors found storytelling 
could bridge the gap and provide them with a way to keep talking to each 
other. 
In the juries, this is seen where the participants start to expand the remit of 
the discussion and encourage the expert witnesses to come with them on 
this journey. It can also be seen where tough choices and trade-offs, which 
the experts appear to identify as inevitable, become more acceptable to 
them. What is happening is that the participants on the jury are engaging in 
discourse just as Habermas described (1990). So this study has come full 
circle, returning to the discussion about the discourse ethics begun in 
Chapter 1. Habermas's (1990) antipathy towards advocacy in discourse 
caused problems in the past for work like mine when, having uncovered the 
learning processes occurring at the individual level, the need to generalise 
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about the value of these processes becomes crucial. In the opening chapter 
of this thesis, I admitted that my use of Habermas's (1989) public sphere is 
not the orthodox Habermasian use of the term which he uses to refer to the 
spontaneous and customary linguistic exchanges through which a society 
depicts itself, reflects upon itself and critiques itself; and the citizens' jury is 
certainly not spontaneous, in fact it takes a great deal of planning. The other 
problem is that the citizens' jurors have experienced a transformation, but the 
citizens' jury is not something that everyone will experience. This problem 
stems from the fact that Habermas (1990) believed that "expert discussions 
[should not] assume a place-holder function for those who cannot represent 
themselves, precisely because the principle of discourse ethics requires that 
all who are affected - not simply their assumed advocates - be able to 
participate" (Gimmler, 2003). Habermas's (1990) antipathy might be an 
attempt to avoid one of the main critiques of deliberation, which is that the 
participants will only look out for their own self-interest and will resist any 
attempts to make them take the universal view, especially if it will be at the 
cost of their own preferences. In Moral Consciousness and Communicative 
Action (1990), he made it clear that he believes that real argumentation could 
only occur where those who are affected participate in the deliberations and 
that this is the only way that a reflexive account of the problem can be 
created. 
My work refutes this position. Firstly, while the jurors are becoming experts ­
and indeed they refer to themselves in that way - they did not enter the 
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process as experts. Even those with some experience of public speaking, 
higher levels of education and other characteristics associated with the 
"usual suspects" (Blakeley, 2001), feel as if they are forced to relearn these 
skills together. Secondly, I have shown that the jurors get past simply relying 
on private preferences in their deliberations and I have shown how this is 
achieved through the use of stories and other newly-acquired skills. 
Deliberation has been shown to involve "adopting a different point of view 
from one's own ... and the positioning of oneself in the place of another" 
(Smith, 2002: 246). In any case, Habermas (1996) with the publication of 
Between Facts and Norms, softened his position on advocacy as his 
discussion of motivation shows. Here Habermas (1996: 115) points out that 
the move to a post-conventional moral consciousness encumbers the 
deliberating individual with the need and desire to "enter discourses or to 
carry out imaginary discourses in an advocatory fashion ... to find the strength 
to act according to moral insights, if necessary against her own immediate 
interests, and hence reconcile duty and inclination". This reading of the basic 
tenet of deliberative democracy, that all affected persons should have their 
say, legitimises the use of forums like the citizens' jury and helps deliberation 
avoid losing its way among the preferences and goals of individuals by 
focusing on a "reflexive retrieval of the pre-theoretical, practical knowledge 
that is shared by all in a socio-cultural form of life" (Strydom, 1999: 254). The 
acceptance that real discourse can be achieved and can overcome the 
problem of scale through the use of imagiJ18ry discourses goes some way to 
resolving Dahl's (1970) dilemma of scale. 
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This recalls How's (2001) discussion of how to locate pre-theoretical know­
how, which I took account of in developing the topic guide. I take this further 
and suggest that if we are to accept that the skills of deliberation lie outside 
the individual (Habermas, 1995; 1996), and indeed form part of a socio­
cultural form of life, then remaining sceptical about the possibility of advocacy 
undermines the project of deliberative democrats. The experiences of the 
jurors has shown us how a deliberative form of democracy, even if it does 
rely on a small number of representatives to act as advocates for the wider 
community, can nurture discourse in a way that representative democracy 
cannot. It can produce citizens who are at ease with the pluralism and 
complexity of modern society (Bohman, 1996). More importantly, these 
people are capable of invoking a plurality where none exists. 
But the most important way to establish this universalisation was suggested 
in the opening chapter and involves applying the validity tests that are 
proposed by Habermas's concept of discourse ethics (1990: 1 03). The 
question raised at the start of this chapter is how do these changes in 
perspective occur? This is a difficult question to answer but Habermas's 
(1990) suggestion is that these changes occur as a result of the creation of 
norms that are then tested for their validity by the participants. These tests 
are what he refers to as discourse ethics. For Habermas, discourse ethics is 
the way we should test the validity of the norms that are being proposed for 
consideration, as the way decisions ought to be reached. However, the most 
common critique of Habermas's work is that we are not left with clues about 
how discourse that satisfies the principles of discourse ethics can be 
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institutionalised. He simply says that if the conditions for legitimacy according 
to discourse ethics are met then we will see the change in citizens. Roberts 
(1997: 128) describes what this evidence mig ht be like and suggests that it 
will be seen in the move from the norm of citizens simply defending their 
position and treating it as incontrovertible to the point where, through 
deliberation, they can "become observers of their own thinking and [to] 
become aware of the potential incoherence of their thoughts". This is how the 
transformative potential of "deliberation can help people examine the 
premises and values on which their actions are based and can stimulate the 
discovery of alternative visions of the future" (Roberts, 1997: 130). This is the 
shift in attitude that I believe I have found and that I suggest helps to 
establish whether or not their deliberative experience actually creates 
sustainable transformations of preference. 
My use of the term sustainable is important since, for example, viewing an 
anti- vivisection film might make individuals decide to avoid products tested 
on animals in the short-term but does that amount to a real transformation of 
preference? If the jury is to have any impact on the lives of the jurors after the 
jury itself has come to an end, they must not only be able to see the justice of 
the norms that they have established but they must also be able to see how 
to apply them. This is why I maintain a commitment to developing positive 
criteria to make discourse possible. The value of discourse ethics is in 
"providing tools for a communicative framework in which political and moral 
conflicts are resolved" (Gimmler, 2003). 
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The significance of the juror journey 
The discussion of the effect of jury membership offered in Chapters 7, 8 and 
9 provides a rather simplistic account of the progression from personal 
preferences in the private sphere to a more public rationality. I use this linear 
structure to facilitate the telling of the jurors' stories and, while this might be 
problematic if my objective was to develop a critique of the citizens' jury 
model, I believe it is acceptable since my objective is more theoretical. I set 
out to answer fundamental questions about the role of discourse in 
deliberation in order to understand the transformation of preferences 
promised by deliberative democrats. The jurors' move from a conventional to 
a post-conventional way of thinking about the issues raised by the jury is 
clearly signalled in the way the jurors are able to describe how they 
broadened the scope of the discussion and examined the alternatives from 
the perspective of an imagined future that would be created if a course of 
action was taken (Habermas, 1995). While not all the jurors develop these 
skills fully, or at the same pace, the jurors who took part in this study all show 
some evidence of being able to do this. Once they develop this skill of 
practically imagining the future, they can use it as a way of making a choice 
between alternatives and weighing up the benefits of different proposals. 
My decision to present the final phase of the jury model (see Figure 1 above) 
as the pinnacle of the deliberative process should not, however, suggest that 
the deliberator exists in a sort of constant state of discourse. The period of 
time they spend as deliberators is painful for the jurors as they struggle with 
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the conflict between their own personal preferences and the acknowledged 
.. 

need to act on behalf of others. They have become aware of the ideal of 
deliberation where all affected persons take part in the discourse and this 
means that the onus is on them to represent the wishes of those who are not 
present and maybe even to envisage the needs of future generations. This 
recognition was perhaps most clearly visible on the juries held to discuss the 
funding of healthcare and waste management. In a marked contrast to 
Habermas's (1984, 1987b) work on communicative action, which "claims that 
certain universal characteristics of human language or communication make 
possible mutual agreement on the validity of shared norms independently of 
particular social contexts" (Stryker, 2000: 216), I have shown that the jurors 
constructed norms based on formal and substantive standards of rationality. 
While it might be expected that the jurors will rely on their own experiences to 
determine the validity of proposed norms, their acceptance of the role of 
deliberator proves them capable of hypothesising and for them everything 
becomes hypothetical. The ability to hypothesise becomes the source of a 
universal language that operates independent of particular social contexts. 
This means that they become able to deal with the empirical or real world as 
a matter of theory and to extrapolate out from their own experiences to a 
more social world where problems are encountered as a matter of morality. 

They begin to see their own heritage and culture as hypothetical and this is 

best observed in their use of stories to re-appropriate their own life histories 

and to imagine themselves into the life-world of those around them. More 
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than anything else, the deliberators rely on reconstructing the world as a 
range of theses which mayor may not be relevant to the different issues 
which they must then prove to be valid or else discard. This is where the 
transformation can be theoretically and empirically located. The jurors learn 
to leave bellind their substantive rationality in favour of a universal rationality, 
but they must do this slowly and in a way that is embedded in "the 
contingency of individual life histories and in collective patterns of memory, 
learning, and experience" (Benhabib, 1986: 319). 
I n the past, critics have dismissed Habermas for trying to carry out his work 
at the universal level without paying attention to the more substantive events 
that allow individuals to develop this universal perspective. They see a 
contradiction in the fact that, while he acknowledges the particularity of the 
public sphere as a phenomenon only observable in modern bourgeois 
societies, he wants to use it to make universalising claims about the nature of 
public opinion and discourse (Eley, 1992; Fraser, 1992). Certainly, this 
seems to point to a contradiction but one that I believe has been resolved by 
Habermas's more recent turn to the institutions of law to verify his theory of 
modernity and discourse. In my work, I am also attempting to understand 
discourse as a universalising process but I acknowledge that the procedure 
of discourse is a learned skill acquired where the life-world of the individual 
meets the role of citizens' juror in the public sphere. 
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I believe I have shown how this is the case and that I have made it clear that 
the deliberator only comes into being when the individual is able to 
discursively justify norms. But the jurors justify the norms they use by 
exploring ideas about the context where the norm will operate and this is 
clearly shown where the advocates use personal anecdotes to justify their 
positions. This means that the jurors use their own lived experiences to 
provide justifications for norms within the context of situations they can 
imagine, which for the most part means situations that they are familiar with, 
have some experience of, or can see that the norm applies to. They use 
stories to make a theme of some part of their life, their culture and their 
background and this is how they can bring it into the discourse. But 
storytelling here also has a discursive function. It is a means to hypothesise, 
it mayor may not be relevant, but it still brings to mind the particular contexts 
that might be affected or might illustrate ideas, issues or act as a template for 
the future. The story becomes a tool that can be used to critically appropriate 
their own past and present it as something that might be relevant to fellow 
participants. Stories also serve as tools for recognising the value of the 
experiences that others can bring to the discussion. 
The role of the deliberator 
The role of the deliberator offers us the best opportunity to draw together 
some of the findings of this research. The transformation into deliberator can 
be seen in terms of a universalising project that enables the individual to 
learn from the past through a process of deliberation that "takes precisely 
296 

nmni" p-~' ". H1V > !Idt3£J!Ai:. ~ ,-;:co2", - I!!IIiIIIIIIiII 
these particularities into account, rather than setting them aside for the sake 
of universalistic morality" (Rehg, 1994: 9). All of the prior knowledge that the 
jurors brought to the jury is turned into a hypothesis to be judged. Should the 
hypothesis be deemed relevant and useful, it is reflectively appropriated and 
used as a reason in argument. The deliberator is marked by twin 
prerogatives. Firstly, the feeling of duty where they have to ensure some part 
of their own culture or experience that is not sufficiently appreciated in 
discourse by making sure it is given its due recognition and is catered for in 
the norms generated. Secondly, to ensure that hypotheses that are shown to 
be exclusionary are rejected by the group. 
The question of the justification for norms is the crucial task of the deliberator 
and is the very reason they are brought through the process of the jury in the 
first place. The language of the juror testimonies collected in this study and 
shown above brings us back to the fact that the basis of most claims to the 
legitimacy of the project of deliberative democracy is the belief that 
individuals are transformed by the process of deliberation they change from 
private individuals into public citizens. Earlier references to the concept of the 
public sphere have shown that I locate the experience of the citizens' jurors 
here where private individuals come together as members of a public to 
discuss issues and problems in a critical way (Habermas, 1989: 27). As I 
have also shown, the concept of the public sphere as Habermas discusses it 
is not unproblematic (Fraser, 1992; Benhabib, 1992), but while I accept some 
of the critiques and, in fact, have presented a more flexible reading of 
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Habermas's work on the public sphere, I contend that much of the criticism of 
it has failed to see that what is central to Habermas's work on the public 
sphere is the potential it offers to develop a deliberative culture. A 
deliberative culture is the best way to make explicit to participants in a 
discourse the essentially moral nature of the decisions they face in the life­
world. 
This study has used the narrative forms in which the jurors present 
themselves as part of a "theory of culture that sees moral identities as 
products of performative narratives between social groups and civil society 
that simultaneously create and reconfigure the symbolic order" (Lara, 1998: 
24). This means that the individual is able to formulate and try out new 
identities and ways of doing, like making decisions, that they are aware will 
affect others and, more importantly, they have thought about those effects 
and whether or not they are acceptable. The significance of the different 
processes involved in creating learning through deliberation is seen in the 
movement of the participants from an individual understanding of themselves 
and their demands to a more moral self-understanding. This shift occurs 
when the participants come together to hypothesise about how to do things 
better and according to Lara (1998: 4), "employ fictional narratives to contest 
and restructure conceptions of subjectivity, notions of morality and 
expectations about the good life" in order to make their judgements. This 
change will occur only when the participants emerge in the public sphere and 
make their claims on a universalistic basis. According to Habermas (1996), it 
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is only in the public sphere that tensions between facts and norms (the 
cultural and the social) can be utilised to carve out a space for intervention by 
citizen participation such as the citizens' jury. 
Deliberative democrats set out with the goal of challenging the individual's 
preferences and as such to alter the social integration of the jurors, but will 
they remain in this altered state? Will they engage in discourse when they 
are faced with new problems that have to be dealt with in public? I believe 
that they can and do use what they have learned to help them resolve 
problems that arise later. They do this because as many of the jurors quoted 
have shown, they believe they have changed. When citizens' jurors learn to 
deliberate, "the existential question of who I am and who I would like to be, 
which is posed in the singular is repeated in the plural- and is given new 
meaning" (Habermas, 1996: 160). By learning to deal with problems in this 
way, those who encounter one another come to recognise each other as 
"collective actors contending about the distribution of collective goals" 
(Habermas, 1994: 107-108). They discover a new willingness "to regulate 
their living together according to principles that are in the equal interest of 
each and thus can meet with the justified assent of all" (Habermas, 1996: 
496). Ideas about collective goals are identified, supported and transformed 
through argument, which itself is a form of rational public action that is 
supported by learning processes. 
All of this of course relies on the quality of the discourse, which should 
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provide a critical standard against which every actually realized consensus 
can be called into question and checked (Habermas, 1990). If everything is 
rendered questionable and potentially transformable via discursive 
engagement then it is important that agreement, if it is ever to be reached in 
any binding sense, must be reached through deliberation. These 
deliberations must, in principle, be open to all; treat all affected persons 
equally; and allow participants to question not only the other participants but 
also the very assumptions of the process. As discussed earlier, the claim to 
legitimacy made by deliberative democrats is founded on the principles of 
discourse ethics, which says norms that are to be considered valid could be 
agreed on by all those who will be affected by their consequences 
(Habermas, 1990). The only expectation demanded by Habermas's model of 
discourse is that participants are able to justify their objections and if 
successful in doing this, to have them incorporated into the formulation of the 
solution by putting forward the better argument. 
Clearly, the concept of a discourse free from constraint is an abstract ideal, 
as Habermas himself admits, but the juror journey has shown its value as 
either a potential guide for action or as a principle of critical evaluation. 
Finding a practical application for discourse ethics is not something that has 
ever truly concerned Habermas whose "argument takes place on a fairly 
abstract and theoretical level, and he does not take very much interest in the 
empirical or practical application of his ideas" (Alvesson and Sk6ldberg, 
2000: 120). This is where this study has sought to bring a new dimension to 
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-discussions about deliberative democracy, by highlighting the processes the 
jurors go through in order to reach their decisions. I have uncovered a space 
in which discourse ethics can be observed. 
The research presented here is original in that respect. I have presented empirical 
work that can be used to support the ideals of discourse ethics and have shown 
that the current thinking on deliberation is being held back because of the delay we 
have experienced in dealing with the role of advocacy. Critics of Habermas often 
dismiss his work when they realise that it is not a model that should be used to 
generate good policy but instead to test it (Forester, 1999), but my research has 
shown that discourse ethics, as a procedure for testing policy and decision making, 
will be of value for any organisation or institution attempting to engage with the 
public. I have shown that individuals readily learn the skills required of advocates 
and representatives and, in so doing, learn how to make legitimate and valid 
decisions. Habermas's (1990; 1996) work on discourse is also more flexible than he 
is given credit for and I have shown how he can deal not only with communicative 
action but also with the changes in social identity that are its outcome. 
I have made numerous references throughout this study to the change in attitude to 
the citizens' jury but I have shown that it is not the mechanism itself that is 
important but the opportunity for discourse. The practice of deliberation is not about 
the application of discourse ethics, but this is where the key opportunity to continue 
this work would be found. While the advocatory role of the deliberators could 
benefit from further discussion I feel that follow-up work to examine these issues 
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will be in the area of public policy to examine whether the deliberative processes 
that are being used to enable users of healthcare and other services to manage the 
services they use are effective and legitimate. Discourse ethics provides a set of 
questions that researchers can use to make decisions about the validity of 
deliberative processes and, in particular, those that are being used to consult the 
public about service provision. My work shows that the usual measures of class, 
education, equality and power that are used to evaluate the efficacy of methods like 
the citizens' jury are not adequate and instead evaluators should be asking 
questions about the process itself. The most important question as I have shown is 
the question of universality and whether or not participants in a deliberative forum 
achieve a more universal perspective through their deliberations. Deliberative 
processes that are in use should be evaluated according to this principle, thus 
potentially improving their outcomes but more importantly their validity and 
legitimacy. If such processes could be shown to be legitimate in these terms then 
we could conclude that deliberation does deliver on its promise to transform 
preferences. 
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Appendix 1 
Contact summary form 
Informant 8 
Gender: Female 
Age: 40s 
Visit date: December 2000 
Jury date: Sept 1996 
1. What were the main themes and issues raised in the interview? 
Learning about the issue 
Having to think about the issue in a pragmatic but broad way 
The way ordinary people are empowered 
Being challenged about everyday practices 
2. Responses to main questions? 
a) Reasons for taking part: 
General interest in the specific issue 
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Payment not really an incentive 
Her experiences living near an incinerator in the past, felt she had relevant 
experience 
Learned a great deal. 
New levels of confidence 
b) Feeling about the arrangements made? 
No comments really. Happy with the set-up 
c) Immediate aftermath 
Started recycling more 
More outspoken on issues 
Expects more of people who she discusses issues with, wants them to argue 
in a more rational way 
d) Feelings about any long-term impact 
More interested in politics and the news 
Continues to recycle and to encourage neighbours to do the same 
e) Specific behaviour changes 
Voting change of partytand no longer abstains 
Recycling 
Less packaging materials, wrapping paper etc. 
Attends town meetings, would speak up more often 
3. Questions to be added for later interviewees 
Voting and voting behaviour after the jury, any changes? 
Follow-up questionnaires etc. she doesn't recall receiving any 
Adapted from Miles and Huberman (1994: 53) 
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Appendix 2 
Topic guide 
'How everything started' 
Can you tell me how you got involved with the citizens' jury? 

Why did you agree/Did you consult anyone e.g. family member etc. before 

deciding? 

Did they contact you by phone/letter/on the doorstep? Was the personal 

contact important in your decision? 

What about payment? 

Had you done something like a citizens' jury before? Public speaking/legaJ 

jury duty 

341 
'How things developed' 
What was it like the first day? 

How were things organised? 

Tell me about your fellow jurors e.g. age/gender/class 

Can you describe a particular session? 

Did people have strong opinions/set opinions? 

Do you think some people had done some research in advance? 

How did the sessions differ? Small/large group, witness sessions, question 

and answer sessions 

Could you say what you thought? 

Did you change your mind about the issue as the days progressed? 

Did the moderator have control of the ideas that were discussed? Did the 

focus of the discussions stay fairly similar throughout? 

Can you describe any changes in your opinions/approach to the problem? 

Do you think other people changed? 

How did the group elect a speaker? 

'What became' 

Can you describe any differences between group members? 

How did the group deal with difference? 

. 
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How did the group deal with 

And were people in general happy with the outcome? 

What about the fact that there was a sort of decision to be made? Can you 

describe your attitude to the report? 

Have you done something like this before/since? 

Do you think you feel more confident or just about the same, about speaking 

in public nowadays, would you be more likely to stand up at a .... 

How interested in "politics" would you say you are? 

Did this change because of the jury? Short-termllong-term. 

Has anyone else been in touch with you about the jury? 

Have you heard from the organisers? Is that what you expected? 

'Personal aspects' 

What about the rest of the family/your parents/colleagues? 

Is there anything about the experience that you still think about? Describe. 

Have you noticed any changes in the way you approach issues at 

home/work? Have other people said they noticed a change? 

Have you considered making any changes as a result of your experience? 

Joinlleave a political party/write to newspaper? 

Would you do it/recommend it/take part again? 
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Appendix 3 
Jurors interviewed 
Identifier Age 
F01 70s 
F02 60s 
M03 60s 
M04 50s 
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Home 
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Home 
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Home 
Home 
Home 
Home 
Home 
Home 
Home 
Home 
photographer 
Caterer 
Student (former 
Royal Navy) 
Retired former 
secretary 
Secretary*** 
Court official 
Manager courier 
company** 
Retired 
psychotherapist 
Nightclub 
doorman - Lone 
Parent*** 
Unemployed 
Factory 
worker*** 
Consultant to 
pharmaceutical 
industry 
Shop owner-
Photography 
-­
NVQ 

Undergraduate 

degree 

School exams 

O-Levels 
Undergraduate 
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Undergraduate 
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Degree , 
I 
I 
i 
None i 
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None 
Undergraduate 
degree 
Teacher's 
-- ---------_ .. _-­
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F20 
M21 
F22 
M23 
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M28 
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ul 
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40s 
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20s 
50s 
20s 
60s 
405 
30s 
40s 
30s 
60s 
WE 3 
WE 5 
WE 5 
African 3 
Caribbean 
Italian 3 
Irish 3 
WE 3 
WE 3 
Indian 3 
WE 5 
WE 5 
Home 
Home 
Home 
Home 
Home 
My 
workplace 
Home 
Home 
Home 
Home 
Home 
Lone parent 
Housewife 
Plant Technician 
Shop assistant 
(Lone parent)*** 
Musician 
IT Trainer 
Retired dinner 
lady 
Part time shop 
assistant 
Welfare advisor-
Part-time*** 
Retired health 
reasons former 
revenue 
officer*** 
Lecturer ­
Computer 
science 
Retired (former 
scientist) 
certlTlcare 
Teacher's 
certificate 
Diploma 
None 
None 
PGCE 
None 
GCEs 
GCEs 
Undergraduate 
degree 
Master's degree 
PhD 
-I M31 50s WE 3 My Pub/Bar NoneI i 
I workplace managerI 
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I, 
f. Iparents born workplace degree 
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>, 
---­1M33 1 50s 3 Home Security None
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guard*** , 
70s WE 3 Home Retired engineer Master's degree, 
honorary PhD 
fM35 30s WE 3 Home Office manager O-Ievels 
*' identifier made up of Gender (M or F), Interview number 01to 35 
-denotes jurors who have changed jobs since the time of the jury, M03 having being made redundant from an advertising job was at the 
time studying for a PGCE at the time of the jury, M13 has since left his job as a bank clerk 
*** denotes jurors who were not in employment at the time of the jury 
jMM I 
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Appendix 4 
Consent form 
I confirm that the researcher has explained the aims of the research to me 
and I have agreed to participate in an interview. I have read the information in 
the letter sent to me and I have had the opportunity to ask questions about 
the object of the research. Any questions I have asked have been answered 
to my satisfaction. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I 
may withdraw from the study at any time. I understand that our conversation 
is to be tape-recorded and that what I say will be transcribed Where my 
comments are used in any subsequent report or publication they will not be 
used in any way that would allow me to be identified. 
Name
----------------------­
Signature___________ 
Date
-------------­
Appendix 5 
Sample transcript 
Interview Number 8 
I: 	 Can you tell me why you agreed to become a juror? 
R: 	 Well to be honest I was being selfish. I was concerned whether they 
were going to put up another one of these chimneys to get rid of all the 
rubbish. Then when I decided to actually take part then, I started to 
feel you really don't wouldn't want to be putting it on anyone else's 
doorstep either. So then I wanted to look at all the other issues. I 
imagined they would tell us how they could get rid of all the rubbish 
and we did. We looked at all the other ways of getting rid of rubbish. 
I'd never really thought about it before to be honest, you just put your 
rubbish out and you never think about it. But that was it really, at first I 
was concerned where they was going to put and I guessed they were 
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going to put it somewhere because of all the ...... well its obvious isn't 
it and I didn't realise at the time all the rubbish comes in from London 
to us. I mean I don't know where I thought it was going before that but 
I didn't realise that a lot of the London rubbish was being disposed in 
[name of place] and really you know that. .. I was surprised. It opened 
my eyes I'd never really thought about it that much up until then apart 
from the bottle banks. 
I: You've just described a change in your attitude can you tell me more 
about that. ... 
R: Well I used to live in [name of place] which is a really built up area and 
I had one there and I didn't like living near it and that's why when we 
had the children we got out of there because apart from all the 
pollution .....well it was too built up anyway, but I never did like the 
incinerator there, not that, well I can't say I ever really thought about it 
in any real sense, but I felt uncomfortable with it there and was glad to 
get away from it. I didn't protest about it or nothing but I just was 
scared of the pollution. 
I: When you were approached to take part in the jury what was your first 
reaction? 
R: I got the letter and I just thought it was a great idea, for me. I wanted 
to know more about it, I suppose I wanted to try and prevent another 
one being built if the council actually had other options. As I had 
moved away from one I didn't want to again be in an area where they 
were going to put one. When it first started I was working in the job I'm 
in now, which is basically catering and I'm more or less my own boss. 
The only problem really was my own con'fidence, I wasn't sure I'd be 
able to understand what they would talk about and at first I found it 
hard to keep up. I thought to myself, I'm never going to get used to all 
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the new language but one of the ladies in it, her daughter is at 
university and she found it hard to understand some of what we had to 
read but you soon got into the swing of it. At first I kept asking them to 
explain the new words and all that and then it wasn't so hard anymore. 
I think we all felt the same. I wrote down a lot of what they said and if I 
didn't understand it I put up my hand, it was like being back at school, 
but not as scary. You didn't feel intimidated, they kept asking if we 
were okay, did we have any questions and I kept them busy. I wanted 
to make sure as well that it wasn't just the hobnobs around her who 
got asked. People like us you know working people only ever to get to 
hear of things when they have already been decided and then you ring 
up the council and they say oh now we had meetings about that. 
Anyway, at first I thought maybe they should have asked for younger 
people to do it but then when I got there, there were younger ones and 
they didn't always understand either, we all had to help each other. It 
was a lot to keep up with. If you've never been to university you 
couldn't know all the words. I used to come home and tell my husband 
all about it and he'd be saying what, "huh, speak English," he was lost. 
It was fun actually. 
I: 	 Did the others feel the same way? 
R: 	 I think everyone was a bit nervous about being the odd one out or 
feeling different. It was like the first day at a new school. It was 
interesting actually because you could see that everyone had dressed 
up a bit for the first day but once you realised that people weren't 
going to laugh at you because you didn't go to college you relaxed. 
After a few days anyway we felt like we were becoming experts, we 
did say to each other that we were learning a lot about science and 
that. But I have to admit I had a chip on my shoulder and when we 
introduced ourselves I felt like I was going to be the only catering 
person. But we were all sorts. No, it was interesting. Especially we 
I 351 II1.________________________ _ 

were taken out to the places where they dispose of all of the rubbish 
and I couldn't believe it where they were putting it all under the ground 
and I don't know up until then my eyes hadn't been opened, I thought I 
knew a bit, but I hadn't realised, I mean I thought it was burned for the 
most part but under the ground it goes with sort of sheets, lightweight 
sheets to walk on it. so that it that they can put the grass down, its 
creepy. Yeah ... 
I: You said you got a letter from the organizers what was the selection 
process, do you know? 
R: Yes they sent a letter and in it they said they were sending out 
thousands of letters to all sorts of people so I suppose at the time I 
thoug ht chances of them coming back are very small, but they did and 
I went along. It was interesting. I got the time off work. And when we 
got there, there really were all kinds of people. I didn't expect that. 
People I would never meet normally. Professional people and 
housewives and retired people all sorts. 
I: Was the payment an issue? 
R: Well when I said yes I didn't know they were paying us but I knew I 
would have to take unpaid leave from work but I do that anyway from 
time to time. I don't work a full-week every week, so the payment yes, 
it helped but it was neither swings nor roundabouts. I would have done 
it anyway. I'd do it again as well. 
I: If they hadn't written personally but it had been an ad in the local 
paper or on the radio asking people to call up an volunteer do you 
think you would have responded? 
R: No, I thought that they would be taking people from different areas to 
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find out where would be the best place and that was discussed about 
where to put the incinerator but even though that was on my mind I 
think it needed the personal touch. I mightn't have had the confidence 
to put myself forward or to volunteer but when you are asked its good 
to do it. I liked the small group sessions best, they put you in groups 
for discussions and that was better it wasn't so big and when you were 
first there you needed that security. It wasn't such a vast.. ... if you're 
not used to speaking 
I: 	 Had you ever done anything like that before? Speaking in public? 
R: 	 No, no, at work I just work with food and then even when I do have to 
talk to clients it's one to one and anyway I know what I am speaking 
about that's the difference and at the moment I also work in restaurant 
I: 	 Can you describe the other jurors? 
R: 	 They seemed to have quite a lot of confidence but then you always 
thinl< that when you are nervous you think no one else feels as bad as 
you. They did. Yes, they seemed well its amazing really but they 
appeared to have quite a lot of confidence, but then when you spoke 
to them you found out they were scared too, or unsure, no one knew 
what to wear or what exactly they were expected to do ... 
I: 	 Do you think there was a difference between the men and the women 
or along age lines? 
R: 	 I think perhaps the men were more outspoken than the females, not all 
the time mind, we did say our bit, they tended to try to start off the 
sessions but the women played their part too, I think by the time you 
start absorbing all the information you get the idea in your head you 
get to know what you think, your views you know of what you think 
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should be done at the end. It was weird because people were 
changing their minds right there in front of you and 1 was thinking 
about it one evening and I asked my husband what he thought and 
then I explained what we had learned that day and he admitted he 
wasn't sure anymore. You couldn't help but be changed by it. 
I: Do you think there were other people who came, did others come with 
a definite idea that they weren't going to change? 
R: I think, what I'd done, I'd read it put it all down and waited to be told to 
come, I think what a lot of people done, they'd gone into it much 
deeper and had done some research before saying yes, which I 
hadn't. Yeah I'm sure they did, I mean I've just got a busy life, I just 
read it, ticked and thoug ht oh I've got to go and find out what it's all 
about, but I think yeah, a lot of people probably did, especially if they 
were in the area where they thought the incinerator was going, I mean 
you would wouldn't you. 
I: Do you think that was the main incentive for people, a fear of it being 
in their own yard so they had to? 
R: I would have thought so. 
hadn't been here yeah. 
Oh it certainly would have been mine if it I 
I: So what did you think of the way it was set up or the arrangements? 
R: It was very good, it was very good and the speakers, most of them 
were very good. Some of them went on and on and lost me but most 
of them were precise and clear, yeah most of them were okay. Just 
sometimes some of the little words they were using in that area that I 
didn't understand but I got around, I found out what they were talking 
about and then I went back and you could use the words as you said 
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you can't speak about things you don't know what you're talking about. 
I: What about, you said you didn't prepare for it, but did you in the 
evenings find that you almost had homework? 
R: I did think about it more, I did, they didn't give you homework but I 
used to come home afterwards yeah and think about, but I still never 
went to the libraries, still never got any books, by then I think I was 
kind of had my own opinions, without going to the library or you know 
on what they should have done. We talked about here at dinner time 
and I showed to the family. 
I: And were other people going to libraries do you think? 
R: I think they were, I think they seemed pretty clued up on a lot of things, 
I should think they did a bit of background work before they went. 
I: What would you say the sessions were like, you did say you had a 
preference for the smaller one? 
R: Em, I think the smaller ones were more friendly. Em, I think the larger 
ones, I think quite a few of the people maybe were held back to speak. 
When you get in the smaller ones they tend to give their views. That's 
the way I feel. But then it changed as the days went on and gradually 
the big group was less frightening and people had built up their 
confidence to disagree with the loudest or the biggest people. That 
sort of thing so it was about learning wasn't it and some people need 
more help to do that than others. 
I: Did the focus of the jury as the days went on? Did the jurors influence 
it? 
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R: Yeah. 
I: Could you describe, can you remember in detail one of the actual 
sessions, what kind of things happened in any session? 
R: I can't remember to be honest, anything specific, em we were just, like 
they gave us certain things to speak about as far as I can remember 
and we all had to give our views on that certain theme, say it might 
have been in certain areas of burying, burying the rubbish or the 
incinerator and you'd all speak about you felt about each, that's what 
we all did in our individual groups. You gave your view in the groups 
and then you had to argue it out together and afterwards you went 
back to the big group and said this is what we have agreed upon and 
these are the things we are still not agreed about. You had a speaker 
for that but when the other groups asked him or her a question you 
could respond as well. Especially, if it was your point that was being 
raised. 
I: Did you have to elect the speaker. 
R: Yeah we always agreed at the start who would take notes and then 
afterwards they would be the speaker. It was usually not a vote 
because we decided everyone should get a turn and we just worked 
on that basis. 
I: What if a person didn't want to be the speaker? 
R: At the start some people said they didn't want to do it but that didn't 
last long [laughs] 
I: And then at the end what happened, you'd all come back, did the 
groups all come back together? 
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R: 	 We'd come back and the person who took the notes spoke, I think by 
the end everyone was confident about doing that, it was only some in 
the larger groups at the start who didn't want to. 
I: 	 Did you act as the speaker at all? 
R: 	 Yeah, in the end. Although at the start I felt I just wouldn't, couldn't 
have done that no. The thing was that no one was arrogant or nasty or 
made you feel inadequate, I just think it's a confidence thing, being 
able to speak. 
I: 	 You said you had an interest in pollution as an issue, did you normally 
though go to other local meetings here? 
R: 	 No, no. 
I: 	 If it had been a local meeting at the town hall ......... about something, 
the incinerator? 
R: 	 About something like that' would have gone to that. But only because 
it was going to affect me. I think I'd go along now even if I wasn't going 
to have to look at it. That's the thing isn't it, it was about health and 
about the whole world not just us anymore. I mean my children don't 
have asthma or anything like that but their children could so we have 
to plan for that now. 
I: 	 Would you speak at those ....... 

R: 	 If I was em, I would now yeah. I've been to a few about allsorts of 

things. I mean the children's playground and the local park and all 

sorts of things. 
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-I: Getting back to the jury did you feel it was necessary to almost agree. 
Was it possible to disagree with them? 
R: Yes, you could disagree. We had some great bust-ups. No seriously 
we did argue about it but it was always friendly and calm. We had to 
work together. 
I: Was there anybody who had a particularly strange idea or.? 
R: No I don't think so no one thought that we should simply ignore the 
future health implications and no one felt that you can eliminate waste 
altogether so the ones that were very disinterested became interested 
and the ones that were a bit radical calmed down. You see in the end 
we had to decide something and it was really only just on the last day 
that we all gave our views and I think there was just a few of us, just 
two or three of us that definitely said no to an incinerator. Before that 
you could see who stood for what but we had never said outright. And 
I think gradually went round and round and in the end em it was really 
sort of would you prefer this or would you prefer that. And it was sort 
of bang, bang, bang and it was all sort of more or less decided. 
I: And were people in general happy with the outcome or was there sort 
of a division in the ... 
R: Em, I think there was, a little bit, not a lot. Well it wasn't as though 
they said to us well this is what we propose, I mean then we could 
have said, they didn't tell us exactly where they were going to put the 
incinerator, it was just a general idea. 
I: What about the fact that there was a sort of decision to be made, was 
that on your minds that you had to reach a target of some description 
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or did it proceed as more natural. 
R: I've got to be honest, at the start I didn't feel that at the end of the day 
that anything that we said would have made any difference. Where 
they were going to put it I think they were going to put it, there were 
other ways of disposing of it, of all the rubbish. To me I still couldn't 
take the option of someone recycling the whole lot of it. I never could 
get it into my head if someone was prepared to come to an area, and I 
WOUldn't have minded the recycling here, were we live, I really couldn't 
come to grips with why they were going to put up an incinerator which 
is like going backwards in time and not moving forward. And maybe 
they won't listen to us at all but the thing was to try and figure out what 
was needed and to begin to at least take steps to educate people 
about it so that they could tell others and gradually people would see 
that they have to complain or they have to change how things are 
done. 
I: Is that something you had felt before you went the first day? 
R: No, no I didn't, I didn't think nothing, I didn't think anything except I 
thought' don't want an incinerator anywhere near my ... 
I: What was it that troubled you so much? 
R: Now I know that it's the dangerous emissions that come out of it, I 
think that's why now but at the time it was more that they are horrible 
to look at but I dare say they can do it in a way to make they small and 
more attractive, but you still get all the emissions coming out wouldn't 
you. 
I: Do you think though you have changed your opinion in some ways 
about incinerators as the days went on? 
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R: Yes, I did, it just seemed that, I felt a bit deflated as I was a one of the 
people who definitely said no. In the end I accept though that 
incinerators are her to stay there's got to be one because we'd just be 
covered in refuse, because they can recycle so much but they can't 
recycle everything. I 
I: So why do you think they held the jury? 
R: Good publicity I should think. But I think they knew people would enjoy 
it and maybe get something out of it. I suppose they knew that if we 
learned about things we would tell people about recycling and that and 
that would be more effective that newsletters and all that. In my 
business word of mouth and recommendations and are the best form 
of publicity. 
I: Since you were on the jury has anyone asked you, like a neighbour or 
a friend or family or people at work asked you what it was like or 
asked you to describe it to them? 
R: Yeah, atfirst they did, when I'd finished they did, when I, I can't 
remember all the things I was telling them and they were amazed as I 
was. I think they thought we had spend all that time and expense 
sitting around this table but are they actually going to all do it when 
they get home all these big ideas, 
I: Used you try and recycle bottles before being on the jury, were you 
more conscious of it? 
R: I did now and again but' was more conscious of it afterwards. I did 
now and again when I went down the road, but afterwards when \ 
realised the amount of rubbish they had to get rid of, yeah \ did. I think 
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one of the main things was that my husband he works in Marketing 
things, I suppose, selling food and things like that and they have to be 
packaged these days don't they? People won't buy anything that's not 
presented, like Easter Eggs, you know they're not going give you an 
Easter Egg and I think that you know the best thing to do is to hit them 
to make em materials that are more disposable and that's the only 
way you can do it and maybe make them put more money towards 
getting rid of it. 
I: Was that an idea that was actually discussed? 
R: We talked about it at the jury and I had never really thought about it 
before and I spoke to my husband about it too and he agreed. He's left 
there now, they did have one of those meetings where they talked 
about getting rid of, trying to make boxed and thing in more, but I think 
they are doing it.. ... I'm sure they are. He says that times have 
changed and that people like things wrapped in good quality paper 
rather than foil these days and that clothes shops give out more paper 
bags now. I've noticed that too. So I think things can change but you 
need to get the change to grow rather than impose it on people. 
I: What about, you said that you became more conscious of the need to 
recycle, but have you noticed any other change in your behaviour or in 
the way you think about things because of the jury? 
R: In the weeks afterwards I began to feel ashamed of the amount of dust 
bin bags that I put out for just us. Especially at Christmas and that so 
now I make an effort not to use the plastic bags in the shops for 
vegetables, especially fruit that has its own skin. That's sort of thing 
and I don't buy foil wrapping paper any more. 
I: Was it something you had thought about before? 
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R: 	 No, no , hadn't really and then all, the only thing I did think about 
before and I don't know why was the disposable nappies, I always 
thought that was a bad idea because there's so many and where are 
they all going ..... that was the only thing I ever thought about, where 
on earth are all these disposable nappies go. I can't imagine the 
amount and they did say it was a big problem but that was about the 
only thing I thought about at the time, I thought where on earth do they 
all go? We went to see all these horrible birds flying over them oh it 
was awful the smell it was terrible. Imagine living near somewhere like 
that. 
I: 	 Do you think you feel more confident or just about the same, about 
speaking in public nowadays, would you be more likely to stand up at 
a .... 
R: 	 Now I know the procedure, I just didn't have a clue about what we'd be 
doing or would we be around a big table, I just, I didn't, I thought we 
might be sitting there looking at films of different areas, I don't really 
know; what I expected, but it was great and it wasn't difficult or 
embarrassing it was a challenge and I really enjoyed it all. 
I: 	 What about, you talked about, one of the first things you said on the 
tape was about the sort of language they were using was sort of 
scientific language and since we've been talking you've used a couple 
of the more scientific terms, are they now words that you use? 
R: 	 If I can remember them, well at least if someone mentioned them I 
would know what they were talking about whereas before I didn't know 
what they were speaking about. and I wouldn't have, as I said until I 
came home and sorted them out for myself and then I wrote these 
words down and I thought' don't know what these mean but I'll find 
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out. So when I got back I'd be more in the picture. 
I: In the jury there was lunch times and coffee breaks and things like 
that. In those sort of informal moments was there an opportunity to 
ask the other jurors about those words or did you just. ..... 
R: No I was quite, at the lunches and things everyone was just sort of 
chatting generally about everything you know. No, no not really. We 
spoke about other things and went back and carried on. 
I: So you actually took a proper break? 
R: Oh, yeah. 
I: What about the report that was written, because what seems to have 
happened was that you were asked for all your ideas and you put 
things down on paper as a group but then it was written by someone 
else, that you yourselves didn't actually write the report. 
R: I don't think I've ever seen it. 
I : You never saw it. 
R: No. 
I: There was a follow up piece of research done by the University of 
Birmingham, which would have been sent out by the Institute of Local 
Government, were you contacted? 
R: No. 
I: They sent questionnaires, but they seem to have missed ...... 
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R: 	 Yeah. I don't think that would have been enough anyway. The jury 
thing was about ideas. You said what you think and somebody else 
argues against it, they use some evidence, they offer some examples. 
It is something I pick up on now in a discussion, I think I have higher 
expectations of people now and of me I suppose I expect them to be 
able to give you some examples and evidence. 
I: 	 Were all the witnesses the same as each other? 
R: 	 No, I didn't think they were, no. I didn't think they were. I mean the 
ones that were saying we can recycle everything we were thinking 
people won't go back to terry cloth nappies we need to come up with 
an alternative and to invest money in those alternatives. People 
expect convenience but it doesn't have to cost the earth. 
J: 	 Were there people on the Jury who had actually, people who had very 
strong opinions about the Environment? 
R: 	 At the start anyway I think we were too busy answering questions to 
give a general, anyone sort of to stand up and say how they felt about 
the environment. I think we were answering questions. I mean they'd 
ask you what you thought about what they was thinking about but I 
can't remember anyone of us being outstanding about the 
environment except the people who were speaking to us about what 
we should buy and what we shouldn't as I realise now. 
I: 	 So how will you feel if they do build an incinerator nearby? 
R: 	 I would be disappointed because there are alternatives but I realize 
now what a hard job they had, em I realised it must be very difficult to 
find an area where you're going to put it. I would be very, very upset 
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but I think I would realise that you've got to do something with it all [the 
rubbish] haven't you? But I still go back to this recycling, I mean 
someone professional recycling. 
I : You said you became more confident, are you still more confident then 
you were prior to the jury? 
R: I'm saying I would still speak out more, its like when you go out for a 
meal I don't like complaining because I just think that you ruin the 
evening, certainly in a Restaurant, if you start complaining you've 
ruined the evening anyway. I'm more likely to not go back to the 
Restaurant and spoil everybody's evening by complaining but I mean 
if I got a poor product I would complain. 
I: Would you, do you sign petitions or do you write to your MP's. 
R: Oh, yeah. I don't write to the MP's, but I've signed petitions for 
different things yeah. But 'd only sign, yeah for what I believed in. In 
the past I might have signed to get rid of the person or to avoid hurting 
their feeling but I wouldn't sign just to please the person who's going 
around with it. 
I: Are you more or less likely to do those sort of things. Are you 
because of the jury more or less aware now of the need for people to 
get involved? 
R: Yes, I think, I mean, t'm not going to go on about it. After the jury a few 
years later, I had a problem with my Dad, who was misdiagnosed with 
cancer and I went as far as I could right through to the GMC. I'm not 
that sort of person at all, the general medical council. I couldn't have 
gone as far as that without the jury. You know it gave me the 
confidence to talk up, to complain the doctor [to the GMC]. I wrote it all 
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down and put it smartly and it went quite far, he was struck off and all. 
I'd got myself used to all these medical words and that and I just went 
along and fought for my side..... My family couldn't believe it was me. I 
was a bit surprised an all. I don't know J wasn't aware of thinking about 
it, but I think it gave me a bit more confidence to get that far, to the 
general medical council to complain a doctor. It made me a bit more 
kind of angry as well. 
I: 	 What do you mean by angry? 
R: 	 I suppose I mean I pay more attention to it all now, the news and local 
things going on and I keep an eye on the papers to see what's going 
on at the town hall and if I think I can get involved I will. Not just the 
waste stuff but anything that matters to the community around here. 
The jury showed us all that. We all changed and that was only from 
hearing things about how rubbish builds up and we talked to each 
other about it, and agreed it would be so easy to change things. And I 
try to do my bit. I always make sure we sort out the rubbish and I take 
bottles to the bottle bank and when I am going 'cos some of my 
neighbours don't have a car or anything I can take there's too. Its so 
simple to organize and the neighbours call it the "bottle bank run" but 
without me and my car they would have to just throw them with the 
ordinary rubbish. Although I think the council is changing that soon. 
I: 	 Have you got involved in more formal ways with any organisations or 
anything? 
R: 	 No. 
I: 	 Political parties or anything like that? 
R: 	 No, no. That's not for me but I must say I did vote for the first time in 
......----.............. 
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years after the jury. And I voted Labour for the very first time in my life. 
I: Have you ever been the sort of person who joins clubs? 
R: No, no I just work, that all really. 
I: Other research that has been done says that people come out of juries 
and they want to change the world and they're going to join this and 
that. Did you feel like that? 
R: Not really no, no I didn't. I just em, I just thought that if anything 
happened to come up in the area to do with that waste disposal I'd go 
to it. I think really ..... I've learned every thing aboutthe incinerator. If 
there'd been something on about that, I'd have gone through and 
followed it but I don't think it has. 
I: Did you ever contact the council and ask them what had happened? 
R: No, I didn't no. I should have done I suppose but I didn't think that 
was the point they were quite clear that we were only to make 
recommendations and that it would take a long time to reach a final 
decision. 
I: What about your own family are they the sorts of people who join 
things or are you more sort of ..? 
R: No, no we don't. Apart from the gym, that's about it. My Dad was 
involved in lots of things but I've always felt that I am too busy. I try to 
do things but its only really loca\. I think if there was anything in the 
news about it I would read it, maybe before I would have skipped over 
it but I would read, if it was in the newspaper now I would read it, yeah 
I would. If I felt I could help I would try to. 
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I: Would it have to be about local waste issues or could it be..... ? 
R: No, no general now. For instance there was a global warming 
conference in The Hague and I followed that. But I do look at other 
things mostly medical and educational because of the children. I have 
been asked to do some things with the PTA and I think that's mostly 
because of the catering and they are always putting on functions but I 
will try to do that because that's important. 
I: If you heard on the news this evening that it was now going to go 
ahead and it's going to be somewhere near here what would you do? 
R: As I said I wouldn't want it in my backyard and I'd, you know, I know 
it's got to go somewhere but if they're going to put it near people's 
homes or if they're going to divide these dangerous substances that 
go in it I'd have to complain. J hope they would at least compromise 
and sort out the rubbish and treat the dangerous stuff that leaks gases 
and that if they do that and it whatever's going to come out the top of 
it's not going to be dangerous, but how would you ever know, who 
would you trust? You can only really trust ordinary people who have 
lived with it or who have suffered because of it. That was what was so 
good about the jury I felt I could trust these people they weren't 
politicians or accountants they were ordinary people who wanted to 
balance their family life with the environment and they were sensible 
about the costs too. I think we did a good job together. We asked 
ourselves the right questions. I don't know if we found the answers but 
its up to the experts to figure that out. 
I: Okay, I'll leave it at that. Thank you very much. 
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Appendix 6 
Role and time-ordered matrices 
Respondent FOg 
Perceived 
RoleTime Role 
Before jury Envoy 
RegulatorDay 1 
Days 2,3,4 Advocate 
Final day and Deliberator 
after the jury 
W 
0\ 
\CJ 
Expressed as 
Fearfulness, Lack of confidence, Assumes others like her will be 
ignored 
Checking up, Verifying who's who 
Tries to introduce new aspects, Calls for extra witnesses, Broadening 
the topic of discussion, More future-oriented 
"I" becomes "We", Contributions being defined in order to appeal to the 
public at large, Recognising other issues that could be dealt with in this 
way 
Adapted from Miles and Huberman (1994: 119-125) 
